This chapter begins with the observation that non-international armed conflicts pose serious challenges to the efforts to regulate war in both international law and recent ethical discourse, and argues that neither has responded well to these challenges. Various problems in both are identified. The second part of the chapter examines the historical conception of just war accepted as consensual in the West from the high Middle Ages till early in the modern period, arguing that it provides a helpful frame for thinking ethically about non-international armed conflicts. The third section of the chapter carries this reasoning forward, applying it to non-international armed conflicts generally and to the problem of detention in such conflicts specifically.

The article by EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator Gilles de Kerchove and his adviser Christiane Höhn provides an inside view into the EU's practices and views related to counter-terrorism and international law. It explains the EU's criminal justice approach to the fight against terrorism and provides arguments for the effectiveness of this response in practice. The authors set out the tools for regional law enforcement and judicial cooperation the EU has adopted since 9/11, based on the principle of mutual recognition, as well as EU-US cooperation in this area. It also looks at the role of the military in the fight against terrorism. In a second part, the article deals with questions related to the international legal framework for the fight against terrorism, such as the existence of not of an armed conflict in the legal sense against Al Qaeda. It also explains relevant initiatives in the EU-US context, including the EU-US legal advisers' dialogue, the EU framework to support the closure of Guantánamo and the EU input to the implementing provisions of the National Defense Authorization Act.

This article addresses the issue of whether the international criminal tribunals are under an obligation to fund family visits for indigent detainees. It examines the concept of positive obligations and its relation to the detention situation and describes the practice of funding family visits as it has developed at the International Criminal Court. It further analyses relevant developments in the Court's case law. It argues that the Court is indeed obliged to fund family visits. In this regard, the mere recognition of a detainee's right to family visits in the tribunals’ legal frameworks and in international soft-law penological standards can be said to inadequately reflect the particularities of international detention.

On 29 June 2006 the United States Supreme Court issued a landmark opinion in the case of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld. The Court's essential holding, joined by five justices, found that the President lacked the authority to establish the military commissions which he had created by special order on 13 November 2001. The holding dealt the administration of George W. Bush a stunning defeat, and the very fact of the Court's striking down the military commissions confirmed an assertive, if slim, majority on the court in a time of national emergency and armed conflict. Most striking, the Court found that the so-called war on terror is governed by common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, a legal conclusion that, because of the legitimacy and prestige of the Court, neither Congress nor the President may easily avoid. The lasting jurisprudential impact of the decision, however, remains to be seen. For, on the one hand, Hamdan suggests that the military commissions simply lacked the authority conferred by a statute of Congress – and Congress has since remedied that gap. But, on the other hand, what impact will the Court's analysis of the laws of war have on the Commissions and future judicial assessments of their lawfulness?

This essay examines the international legal contours of Hamdan. It does so as follows: First, it gives the background to the key legal decisions made in 2001 and 2002 to establish the military commissions and interpret the Geneva Conventions so as not to apply to Taliban and Al Qaeda detainees. Second, we explore the principal international legal elements of Hamdan. Third, we conclude with an epilogue of sorts, noting the aftermath of Hamdan in the Military Commissions Act of 2006 and reflecting on a few key points raised – and left unanswered – by Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.