We develop a theoretical framework and present a corresponding empirical analysis of the Food and Drug Administration’s irrigation water quality regulatory standard under the Food Safety Modernization Act using lettuce as a case study. We develop a stochastic price endogenous partial equilibrium model with recourse to examine the standard’s efficacy under various scenarios of foodborne illness severity, standard implementation, demand response to foodborne outbreaks, and irrigation costs. The stringency of regulation is evaluated with endogenous producer response to regulatory requirements and corresponding implications for economic surplus. The baseline results show that in the case of the lettuce market, the proposed microbial irrigation water quality regulation in the Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA) is not cost effective relative to the existing Leafy-Greens Marketing Agreements relying on water treatment for mitigation of microbial contamination. However, FSMA can be cost effective if water treatment is sufficiently expensive.

This article examines the development and usage of e-government in Malaysia. The history of public administration reform in Malaysia demonstrates the government’s willingness to experiment with innovations seen as improving the efficiency, effectiveness and responsiveness of public services. Thus, e-government has been enthusiastically promoted by the Malaysian government and has spread across most government organisations at central and subnational levels. The article provides details of a range of services both within government and for society that are available in e-government modes. However, there are challenges to the development of e-government including adherence to traditional models of service delivery, resistance to organisational culture change by officials, preference for counter services by clients and constraints on the availability of information technology training. Mobile phones are now seen as a new way to encourage citizens to use e-government on a regular basis.

This article describes the process from first proposals in the early 1990s to project completion many years later for seven large Swedish road and railway projects. The purpose is to find reasons for the massive cost overruns as well as explanations for why projects are brought to completion despite much higher costs than when the decision to build was made. Cost overruns are set in an institutional context to highlight the interplay among national, regional, and local policymakers. National investment programs are seen as promises by other parts of society, irrespective of whether project costs increase during the process toward procurement and implementation. Another aspect is that the infrastructure manager’s administrative framework currently makes it impossible to compare costs in contracts with final cost, meaning that there is no institutionalized learning process in place. Design preparations and the estimation of costs for new projects must therefore be done without an understanding of what has been working well in the implementation of previous projects. While Benefit-Cost Analysis (BCA) played no role in the planning of the seven projects, the article sends a stark warning that early cost estimates provide poor input for assessing project rate of return.

United States Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) has regulated drinking water since the 1974 Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA). Congress directed it to achieve three conflicting goals: (i) establish stringent nationwide standards, (ii) ensure that these standards are both technologically and economically feasible, and (iii) accommodate significant differences in cost among water systems of different sizes with different water sources. USEPA chose to emphasize goal (i) at the expense of (ii) and (iii). In 1986, Congress intensified its preference for (i), was silent concerning goal (ii), and criticized USEPA for failing to achieve goal (iii). In lieu of economic feasibility, the Agency substituted “affordability,” defined as expenditures up to 2.5 % of national median household income irrespective of the benefits. This imposed deadweight losses, and substantial inequities on rural areas, low-income communities, and low-income households generally. In 1996, Congress directed USEPA to use benefit-cost analysis positively and normatively. Regulations issued since 1996 do not appear to comply, however. A review of post-1996 drinking water standards indicates that most were certified by USEPA as having benefits that justified costs, but these determinations were unsupported by the Agency’s own regulatory impact analyses. This article proposes that USEPA define by regulation that “economic feasibility” means marginal benefits exceed marginal costs for the smallest water system subject to SDWA, and that all future drinking water standards must be economically feasible. Economic efficiency would be greatly enhanced and the pervasive inequities of “affordability” greatly diminished. Unlike “affordability,” this definition is objective and compatible with lay intuition about the meaning of key regulatory terms.

We examine the net benefits of social distancing to slow the spread of COVID-19 in USA. Social distancing saves lives but imposes large costs on society due to reduced economic activity. We use epidemiological and economic forecasting to perform a rapid benefit–cost analysis of controlling the COVID-19 outbreak. Assuming that social distancing measures can substantially reduce contacts among individuals, we find net benefits of about $5.2 trillion in our benchmark case. We examine the magnitude of the critical parameters that might imply negative net benefits, including the value of statistical life and the discount rate. A key unknown factor is the speed of economic recovery with and without social distancing measures in place. A series of robustness checks also highlight the key role of the value of mortality risk reductions and discounting in the analysis and point to a need for effective economic stimulus when the outbreak has passed.

This article has three sections, each of which deals with an Executive Order. The first section, “Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) Past,” emphasizes the critical role that Executive Orders played in the formation of OIRA. More specifically, OIRA owes its initial existence to the establishment of a centralized regulatory review system, the Quality of Life Review, which initiated Office of Management and Budget (OMB) review of environmental regulations through the issuance of a directive from OMB. Every subsequent President expanded OMBs powers through the issuance of Executive Orders which culminated in the Iconic Executive Order 12291. The section concludes with the recommendation that a select class of Executive Orders, and OMB Directives, be designated as “Iconic” by the National Archivist in consultation with the OIRA, and then given substantial deference by incoming Administrations. The second section, “OIRA Present,” describes an Executive Order issued during the Kennedy Administration which remains in effect but was promulgated prior to the establishment of OIRA and therefore recommends that a new Executive Order be issued which gives OIRA specific authority to participate in the conduct of interagency reviews of Executive Orders. The third section, “OIRA Future,” describes an Executive Order which implements a regulatory budget (RB) and institutionalizes a mechanism for controlling the size of the administrative state. This final section of the article recommends that the aforementioned Executive Order be reviewed and modified based upon the outcome of a request for public comments, and rules with demonstrated positive net benefits should no longer be accorded an automatic entitlement for issuance as a final rule absent their inclusion in an RB.

“Uncertain futures” refers to a set of policy problems that possess some combination of the following characteristics: (i) they potentially cause irreversible changes; (ii) they are widespread, so that policy responses may make sense only on a global scale; (iii) network effects are difficult to understand and may amplify (or moderate) consequences; (iv) time horizons are long; and (v) the likelihood of catastrophic outcomes is unknown or even unknowable. These characteristics tend to make uncertain futures intractable to market solutions because property rights are not clearly defined and essential information is unavailable. These same factors also pose challenges for benefit-cost analysis (BCA) and other traditional decision analysis tools. The diverse policy decisions confronting decision-makers today demand “dynamic BCA,” analytic frameworks that incorporate uncertainties and trade-offs across policy areas, recognizing that: perceptions of risks can be uninformed, misinformed, or inaccurate; risk characterization can suffer from ambiguity; and experts’ tendency to focus on one risk at a time may blind policymakers to important trade-offs. Dynamic BCA – which recognizes trade-offs, anticipates the need to learn from experience, and encourages learning – is essential for lowering the likelihoods and mitigating the consequences of uncertain futures while encouraging economic growth, reducing fragility, and increasing resilience.

Most hospital payment systems based on diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) provide payments for newly approved technologies. In Germany, they are negotiated between individual hospitals and health insurances. The aim of our study is to assess the functioning of temporary reimbursement mechanisms. We used multilevel logistic regression to examine factors at the hospital and state levels that are associated with agreeing innovation payments. Dependent variable was whether or not a hospital had successfully negotiated innovation payments in 2013 (n = 1532). Using agreement data of the yearly budget negotiations between each German hospital and representatives of the health insurances, the study comprises all German acute hospitals and innovation payments on all diagnoses. In total, 32.9% of the hospitals successfully negotiated innovation payments in 2013. We found that the chance of receiving innovation payments increased if the hospital was located in areas with a high degree of competition and if they were large, had university status and were private for-profit entities. Our study shows an implicit self-controlled selection of hospitals receiving innovation payments. While implicitly encouraging safety of patient care, policy makers should favour a more direct and transparent process of distributing innovation payments in prospective payment systems.

In this paper we review the benefit-cost analyses (BCAs) made to support applications for authorisations under the EU’s REACH Regulation on hazardous chemicals. Experiences from over 100 cases suggest that there are a number of informational and methodological challenges to overcome in these BCAs. In particular, we find that many REACH applicants have had problems explaining the societal relevance of the regulatory impacts expected to affect them and other market actors. Adapting the framework for regulatory impact assessment proposed by Dudley et al. [(2017). Consumer’s Guide to Regulatory Impact Analysis: Ten Tips for Being an Informed Policymaker. Journal of Benefit-Cost Analysis, 8, 187–204], we discuss these impacts from a welfare economics perspective and make suggestions on how to improve current practices in BCA applied to chemicals risk management. From this discussion we then distill a number of topics that deserve more attention in applied BCAs under the REACH Regulation.

Economists understand that a fit for purpose policy regime requires a reliable general equilibrium model of the system in question and a well specified description of the objectives that the policymaker is trying to pursue. The current financial stability regime has neither and without these critical foundations the regime is fundamentally fragile and incomplete. There is no anchor on the conduct of policy, an absence in genuine accountability and, as a result, reputational risks for policy institutions.

Regulatory impact analyses (RIAs) weigh the benefits of regulations against the burdens they impose and are invaluable tools for informing decision makers. We offer 10 tips for nonspecialist policymakers and interested stakeholders who will be reading RIAs as consumers.

1. 1. Core problem: Determine whether the RIA identifies the core problem (compelling public need) the regulation is intended to address.

2. 2. Alternatives: Look for an objective, policy-neutral evaluation of the relative merits of reasonable alternatives.

3. 3. Baseline: Check whether the RIA presents a reasonable “counterfactual” against which benefits and costs are measured.

4. 4. Increments: Evaluate whether totals and averages obscure relevant distinctions and trade-offs.

5. 5. Uncertainty: Recognize that all estimates involve uncertainty, and ask what effect key assumptions, data, and models have on those estimates.

6. 6. Transparency: Look for transparency and objectivity of analytical inputs.

7. 7. Benefits: Examine how projected benefits relate to stated objectives.

8. 8. Costs: Understand what costs are included.

9. 9. Distribution: Consider how benefits and costs are distributed.

10. 10. Symmetrical treatment: Ensure that benefits and costs are presented symmetrically.

Numerous regulatory reform proposals would require federal agencies to conduct more thorough economic analysis of proposed regulations or expand the resources and influence of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), which currently reviews executive branch regulations. Such reforms are intended to improve the quality of economic analysis agencies produce when they issue major regulations. We employ newly gathered data on variation in current administrative procedures to assess the likely effects of proposed regulatory process reforms on the quality of agencies’ regulatory impact analyses (RIAs). Our results suggest that greater use of advance notices of proposed rulemakings for major regulations, advance consultation with regulated entities, use of advisory committees, and expansion of OIRA’s resources and role would improve the quality of RIAs. They also suggest pre-proposal public meetings with stakeholders are associated with lower quality analysis.

Critiques of benefit-cost analysis (BCA) are usually made on theoretical or methodological grounds; however, understanding how BCA is actually used in decision-making processes is critical if BCA is to inform policy-making. Our paper examines how the implementation of BCA within policy decision-making processes can serve to increase, rather than alleviate, controversy. This runs contrary to the standard assumption that BCA improves decision-making by providing objective data that serves as a basis for policy consensus. To frame this issue, we engage the literature on the role of science in policy decisions and the role of bureaucrats in understanding and implementing policy research. We introduce the concept of “Bureaucratic BCA” as a framework for the practical application of BCA; Bureaucratic BCA does not refer to BCA specifically conducted by bureaucrats or a lesser, technically inferior version of BCA, but rather acknowledges that BCA plays an interactive role within bureaucratic decision-making processes rather than simply serving as a sterilized information input. We show how the dynamics of BCA within the policy process can make BCA a source of controversy and waste rather than an aid to policy efficiency. In light of the Bureaucratic BCA framework, we provide recommendations as to how BCA can be implemented more productively.

Benefit-cost analysis (BCA), a discipline best known for guiding policy choices, can also guide personal decisions. In either application, traditional BCA tallies benefits and costs using market values or willingness to pay. When future outcomes are uncertain, as they are across a wide array of situations, BCA must call as well on the methods of decision analysis. Thus, von Neumann–Morgenstern utilities, subjective probabilities, and sequential decision strategies are brought into play.

Traditional decision analysis distinguishes between risk and uncertainty. With risk, the probabilities of possible outcomes are known; with uncertainty, those outcomes are known, but not their probabilities. We introduce the concept of ignorance: a third, less tractable category. With ignorance, even the possible outcomes of decisions cannot be identified. Ignorance takes particular importance when high payoffs are associated with these unidentified outcomes, as is often the case. We identify such outcomes as consequential amazing developments (CADs). In the policy realm, the 2008 financial meltdown or the Arab Spring would represent a CAD. For an individual, a CAD might be that one’s secure tenured position had been inexplicably terminated, or that one’s trusted business partner had long been shuttling corporate secrets to a competitor. We distinguish between unrecognized and recognized ignorance. In the latter category, we identify specific cognitive biases that impair decision making.

Consequential ignorance cannot be studied in a controlled laboratory setting, since its payoffs are high, its time delays often long, and merely introducing the subject would tend to give away the game. Thus we develop a descriptive understanding of ignorance drawing on great works of literature, from antiquity to the present day, positing that skilled writers understand how humans make decisions and respond to unanticipated outcomes. Shakespearean examples would be Hamlet’s ignorance of his father’s killer, and Macbeth’s lack of awareness of the tragic ramifications following his actions to seize the Scottish crown.

Following this descriptive analysis, we turn to prescription. We draw on decision analysis to develop a formula for calculating consequential ignorance; it incorporates the expected magnitudes and assessed base rates for CADs. Finally, we propose a decision-analytic framework for measured decision making, given ignorance. Our recommended approach explicitly recognizes decision-making costs, and thus proposes when to use quick and intuitive as opposed to more deliberative approaches to decision, or the labels Kahneman has popularized as System 1 and System 2.

Studying ignorance through literature has important implications for BCA. Given the potential for ignorance, there are two key goals for prudent decision making. First, steps should be taken to recognize when ignorance might be present. Second, efforts should be made not to respond in a suboptimal fashion when ignorance is anticipated or when a CAD springs upon us. Great literature can provide the equivalent of widespread life experience, and can help a decision maker reach both goals. At its heart, this essay represents a benefit-cost approach to dealing with ignorance. Numerous connections to BCA are made throughout.

In this article I build an analytic narrative to provide an integrated and analytical view of the economic reforms that took place in Colombia during the years 1974-1978. Through the use of basic game theory and historical evidence, I present the core of the strategic interactions between several players: Government is depicted as a committed but poorly endowed agenda setter, Coffee as the dominant player and Industry as the contending but relatively weak player. The analysis shows that the 1976 coffee boom changed the interaction between sectors from an assurance to a prisoner’s dilemma game, and identifies as the post-boom solution the Government–Coffee coalition, which carried out a soft version of the initial reforms.

How large should a monetary policy committee be? Which voting rule should a monetary policy committee adopt? This paper builds on Condorcet's jury theorem to analyse the relationships between committee size and voting rules in a model where policy discussions are subject to a time constraint. It suggests that in large committees majority voting is likely to enhance policy outcomes. Under unanimity (consensus) it is preferable to limit the size of the committee. Finally, supermajority voting rules are social contrivances that contribute to policy performance in a more uncertain environment, when initial policy proposals are less likely to be correct, or when payoffs are asymmetric.

Although demographic change leaves pay-as-you-go pension systems unsustainable, reforms, such as a higher pension age, are highly unpopular. This contribution looks into the role of intrinsic motivation as a driver for pension reform preferences. Theoretical reasoning suggests that this driver should be relevant as it decreases the subjective costs of a higher pension age. We test this key hypothesis on the basis of the German General Social Survey (ALLBUS). The results are unambiguous: in addition to factors such as age or education, the inclusion of intrinsic work motivation helps improving our prediction of an individual's reform orientation.

Bien qu'il est généralement admis en économie publique que le fossé qui sépare l'approche positive des choix publics et leur approche normative implique l'existence de possibles pareto améliorations dans les choix en matiere de dépense publique, il semble que l'économiste manque d'outils adéquats pour déterminer la réelle importance de ces possibles améliorations. Le présent article vise à combler, en partie, le manque et met plus particulierement l'accent sur les inefficacités coût dans la production de biens et services publics locaux. En effet, ces inefficacités étant indubitablement des inefficacités paretiennes, elles sont nécessairement à l'origine d'un gaspillage des ressources fiscales. Une méthode paramétrique fondée sur l'application du concept économétrique de frontière stochastique au concept microéconomique de fonction d'utilité en équivalent monétaire est développée puis appliquée dans le contexte du modèle bien connu de l'electeur médian. Une mise œuvre à partir de données sur les communes françaises est finalement proposée.