A key element in the historically unprecedented advances in indigenous women’s political representation under Bolivia’s Evo Morales’s administration (2006–2019) was the influence that women coca growers played in the rural women’s indigenous organization known as the Bartolinas. Driven in no small measure by their resistance to the US-financed War on Drugs in the Chapare region, the cocaleras became both Bolivia’s strongest indigenous women’s organization and its most dedicated advocates for indigenous women’s rights. This article contends that intersectionality—of gender, class, and indigenous identities—is at the heart of understanding indigenous women’s transformation from “helpers” of a male-dominated peasant union to government ministers in the space of ten years. Not only did they effectively deploy chachawarmi, the Andean concept of gender complementarity, to advance their rights in a way consistent with their cultural identity and political loyalties, but they also benefited from the gains of a predominantly urban middle-class feminist movement even though they formally rejected the feminist movement’s composition and perceived orientation.

Most literature on drugs and conflict focuses on how the drug trade affects insurgent behavior, paying little attention to its effect on state behavior in conflict settings. This article begins to address this gap by analyzing the impact of drugs on state violence during the internal conflict in Peru (1980–2000), which, in the 1980s, was the world’s major producer of coca for the international drug trade. Drawing on literature on criminal violence and on drug policy, this study theorizes militarization as the main channel by which drug production affects how state forces treat the civilian population during internal conflicts, though it also explores a second channel associated with corruption. The analysis finds that, all else equal, drug-producing localities saw increased state violence in ways consistent with the militarization channel.

International pressure to suppress cocaine trafficking sustained decades of harsh drug laws in Bolivia against cocaleros (coca producers), thus affecting coca production for traditional consumption and for manufacturing illicit cocaine. These harsh drug laws caused social unrest in cocalero communities outside traditional coca zones. President Evo Morales, leader of the Movimiento al Socialismo (Movement toward Socialism, MAS) party, implemented ‘Coca Yes, Cocaine No’ (CYCN), a harm-reduction strategy that authorised ‘non-traditional’ farmers to cultivate legal coca and self-police production. This article compares CYCN outcomes in Bolivia's traditional and non-traditional coca regions and finds that strong cocalero organisations were vital to CYCN success in non-traditional areas. In contrast, organised resistance in traditional zones restricted CYCN success and added to regime instability in the lead-up to Morales’ forced resignation in 2019. Hence, while Morales harnessed state power to change drug policy, he was constrained by the rural grassroots organisations that brought him to power.

The origin of illicit economies has been understood as a consequence of ‘low stateness’ (i.e. low reach of the state). Given the limited stateness in many regions, however, this article seeks to explain how only some sub-national territories have become vulnerable to illegal drug trafficking. To make this case, the representative example of the Alto Huallaga valley, in the Peruvian Amazon, is analysed. This article argues that ineffective development and settlement efforts by the Peruvian state in the Alto Huallaga, rather than the absence of the state, produced socio-ecological conditions in the region, in the late 1970s, that made it more vulnerable to the illegal economy. At the same time as international demand for illegal cocaine was expanding, two conditions resulting from frustrated state development plans came together: an enclave of poor peasants who were not self-sufficient and a natural environment impoverished by soil degradation and intensive deforestation, paradoxically not suitable for any crop except coca.

This article investigates the use of coca by the Bolivian Army during the Chaco War of 1932–35. I present research that reveals the surprising extent to which the Bolivian Army provisioned coca to its soldiers as a substitute for adequate nutrition; as a morale booster; as a stimulant; and as a medicine. The article explores the social and cultural implications of mass coca consumption by Bolivian soldiers, many of whom were mestizos who had never before chewed the leaf. Ultimately, I argue that the pervasiveness of coca within the traumatic popular experience of the Chaco War sowed the seeds of a historic transformation of the politics of coca in Bolivia. The Chaco War initiated a process by which coca in Bolivia was transformed from a neo-colonial marker of the Indian caste to a material and symbolic element of an emergent interethnic working class. Through a comparative analysis of the Bolivian army's use of coca in the Chaco War with the German army's use of methamphetamine during World War II, this article concludes with a consideration of the ways in which the present case study expands our understanding of the crucial but under-studied historical relationship between drugs and warfare.

The implementation of President George H. W. Bush's 1989 Andean Initiative brought to the fore competing US and Bolivian agendas. While US embassy officials sought to exert control in pursuit of militarised policies, the Bolivian government's ambivalence towards the coca-cocaine economy underpinned opposition to the ‘Colombianisation’ of the country. This article deconstructs prevailing top-down, US-centric analyses of the drug war in Latin America to examine how US power was exercised and resisted in the Bolivian case. Advancing a more historically grounded understanding of the development of the US drug war in Latin America, it reveals the fluidity of US–Bolivian power relations, the contested nature of counter-drug policy at the country level, and the instrumentalisation of the ‘war on drugs’ in distinct US and Bolivian agendas.

In Peru, eradication campaigns targeting coca crops in the Upper Huallaga have dispersed the country's drug trade over vast parts of the Bajo Amazonas region. In order to understand this dispersal it is necessary to map the relocations of coca cultivations or shifts in smuggling routes, but also to examine the array of micro-practices, relations, groups and networks that generate ‘drug flows’. By following different key actors, this article explores the movements of drug lords, smugglers and producers who intersect frontiers, borders and borderlands. This empirical focus is combined with an analysis of the actors’ social ties to other groups to discover the myriad ways in which illegal/legal forces are part of the power arrangements that form the foundation for Peru's drug flows.

Qualitative research focusing primarily on advanced-proficiency second language (L2) learners suggests that online corpora can function as useful reference tools for language learners, especially when addressing phraseological issues. However, the feasibility and effectiveness of online corpus consultation for learners at a basic level of L2 proficiency have been relatively unexplored. The current study of Japanese-L1 (first language) learners in an EFL (English as a foreign language) context (N=117) addresses these gaps in research. A preliminary investigation (Experiment 1) examined EFL learners (n=78) as they used the Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA: Davies, 2008–) to revise essays. Experiment 2 (n=39) used a within-subjects comparison to determine whether participants attained greater accuracy in supplying the missing word in a gap-fill test when using an electronic dictionary or COCA. The survey results from the two experiments revealed that participants generally found using an online corpus difficult. In Experiment 2, a paired-samples t-test showed that participants, at an alpha of p=.05 two-tailed, were marginally better able to answer test questions when using the online corpus than they were when using an electronic dictionary, p=0.030. The implications of the study within the context of previous research are discussed along with pedagogical recommendations and possible avenues for future research.

Chewing coca in South America began by at least 8000 cal BP: our authors found and identified coca leaves of that date in house floors in the Nanchoc Valley, Peru. There were also pieces of calcite — which is used by chewers to bring out the alkaloids from the leaves. Excavation and chemical analysis at a group of neighbouring sites suggests that specialists were beginning to extract and supply lime or calcite, and by association coca, as a community activity at about the same time as systematic farming was taking off in the region.

Indirect sources were used to characterize the nature and magnitude of threats to the native plants and forest ecosystems caused by the cultivation and control of coca, the precursor to cocaine, in the Huallaga valley of Peru, whence the majority of the world's cocaine originates. Deforestation is concentrated between 500 and 2000 m in the tropical premontane forest belt. Recent listing of Peru's seed plants permitted a quantification of plant species known from the department of San Martin between 500–2000 m and thus at risk due to forest degradation. This flora consists of 169 plant families, almost 900 genera, and about 2600 species. Fifteen percent of the species are restricted in distribution to Peru, while 6% are known only from San Martin. An additional 778 species, including 46 narrow endemics, are known from vegetation types found below 500 m. More than 223 000 ha of land were found to be in ‘hill agriculture’, consisting predominantly of coca fields and this suggests that the total impact of coca/cocaine deforestation is greatly under-estimated by using simply the area of coca under cultivation. Degraded tropical pre-montane forest may amount to as much as 1 000 000 ha in all of Peru.