Belarus willingly uses migrants as a tool for political pressure, sending them into forests bordering the EU. This prompted Poland to secure its territory with additional troops and, first, to build a razor wire fence, and, second, to build an entire wall made of steel and concrete. The humanitarian situation of migrants stuck in the Białowieża forest has been dire. An underexposed theme is how not only people were hurt by the border policies, but non-human animals were also affected. As the effects of fencing ‘fortress Europe’ on wildlife are widespread (spatial behaviour, movements and gene flow), this paper uses the Polish–Belarusian border as a case study of a conflict between human border policies and non-human interests. We argue that the plans for the Polish wall are illegal, politically unjust and unethical, also from a more-than-human perspective. The wall is illegal because requirements under EU environmental law, in particular Article 6 of the Habitats Directive, were not met. The wall is unjust because it painfully demonstrates how animals’ communal or even liminal status is far from being recognised. Finally, the wall is unethical because it fails to account for the vulnerability of both humans and non-humans.

Developed in Britain and the United States in the 1980s, genetic profiling has since become a global technology. Today, it is widely regarded as the evidentiary “gold standard” in individual and forensic identification. However, its origins as a technology of post-empire at Britain’s externalized borders in South Asia have remained unexamined. This article will argue that the first state-sanctioned use of “DNA fingerprints,” a pilot program exploring its value in disputed cases of family reunification migration from Bangladesh and Pakistan to Britain’s postcolonial cities, repays closer examination. National and transnational responses to the advent of genetic profiling as an identification technology demonstrate the interplay between imperial and postcolonial models and networks of power and truth production. At the same time, this experiment prefigured and conditioned the wider reception of DNA profiling in matters of kinship. Far from being a footnote, the use of genetic profiling by migrants determined to exercise their legal rights in the face of a hostile state also worked to naturalize genetic ties as the markers of “true” familial relationships.

Border artificial intelligence (AI)—biometrics-based AI systems used in border control contexts—proliferates as common tools in border securitization projects. Such systems classify some migrants as posing risks like identity fraud, other forms of criminality, or terrorism. From a human rights perspective, using such risk framings for algorithmically facilitated evaluations of migrants’ biometrics systematically calls into question whether these kinds of systems can be built to be trustworthy for migrants. This article provides a thought experiment; we use a bottom-up responsible design lens—the guidance-ethics approach—to evaluate if responsible, trustworthy Border AI might constitute an oxymoron. The proposed European AI Act only limits the use of Border AI systems by classifying such systems as high risk. In parallel with these AI regulatory developments, large-scale civic movements have emerged throughout Europe to ban the use of facial recognition technologies in public spaces to defend EU citizens’ privacy. The fact that such systems remain acceptable for states’ usage to evaluate migrants, we argue, insufficiently protects migrants’ lives. In part, we argue that this is due to regulations and ethical frameworks being top-down and technology driven by focusing more on the safety of AI systems than on the safety of migrants. We conclude that bordering technologies developed from a responsible design angle would entail the development of entirely different technologies. These would refrain from harmful sorting based on biometric identifications but would start from the premise that migration is not a societal problem.

This article considers the key data protection challenges facing humanitarian organizations providing assistance to refugees, internally displaced persons and migrants. These challenges are particularly significant for several reasons: because data protection has come relatively late to the humanitarian sector; because humanitarian organizations are under pressure to innovate rapidly; because the global communications architecture on which many of these innovations depend is inherently vulnerable to State surveillance; and because States are deploying increasingly sophisticated and coercive means to prevent irregular forms of migration and/or subjecting humanitarian organizations to surveillance and disruption. The first part of the article outlines the fundamental rights challenges presented by contemporary data-driven migration control paradigms. The second outlines concerns about “data-driven humanitarianism” and “mass surveillance” to show how humanitarian organizations risk inadvertently exacerbating these problems. The third assesses specific data protection challenges that humanitarian organizations face and the policies and practices they have developed in response. The article concludes with some brief observations on the technical and political dynamics shaping their efforts to comply with their legal and ethical obligations, and calls for the sector to work together to extend data protection norms and outlaw cyber-attacks by State actors.

In the U.S., migration has been documented to affect the prevalence of infectious disease. As a mitigation entity, border security has been recorded by numerous scholarly works as being essential to the support of the health of the U.S. population. Consequently, the lack of current health care monitoring of the permeable U.S. border places the U.S. population at risk in the broad sectors of infectious disease and interpersonal violence. Visualizing border security in the context of public health mitigation has significant potential to protect migrant health as well as that of all populations on both sides of the border. Examples of how commonly this philosophy is held can be found in the expansive use of security-focused terms regarding public health. Using tools such as GIS to screen for disease in people before their entrance into a nation would be more efficient and ethical than treating patients once they have entered a population and increased the impact on the healthcare system. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2018;12:554–562)

In Western states, restrictive migration policies over the last 30 years have entailed a shift in the practices of control, leading to the institution of systems of detention at international borders. Border confinement raises substantial issues about fundamental rights; it involves questions of legality and legitimacy, and the definition of new technologies of government. In France, the origins of border detention show how pre-existing administrative practices of detention were legalized through the adoption of “waiting zones,” a new regime of detention that enhanced both conditions of detention and disciplinary control over detainees. This development confronts human-rights activists who have opposed border detention since the mid-1970s with “paradoxical gains” and a tough dilemma: the rights that have been granted by the state to travellers held at the borders are not enough, whereas legalization has opened the way for new control mechanisms. Understanding border confinement involves analysing these paradoxes produced by constant negotiations between the administration, willing to tighten control over its borders, and concerns of certain groups within civil society, willing to defend basic rights and give a legal framework to control practices. In France, the diffusion of penitentiary models of management and the ambiguities of law that this article explores further draw together the conditions for administrative processes of legal exclusion. What do such processes teach us about evolving regimes of government within rights-based liberal systems?