Chapter 3 explores the emotional rhetoric of elected public officials. We examine the presidential speeches of two Democratic presidents – Bill Clinton and Barack Obama. We find that Obama’s speeches are more positive than Clinton’s and less negative as well. The use of anger depends on the target (i.e., issue). Consistent with our theoretical argument, Obama expressed significantly less anger about race relations compared to Bill Clinton. We look even further at the differences between Black and white politicians by examining floor speeches of members of the United States House of Representatives. Most Black Members of Congress are elected in majority (or plurality) minority districts. Therefore, we would not expect for them to be as constrained by anger, particularly about race, as Obama. We find that to be the case. Black Democratic members of Congress convey more anger about race relations than white Democratic members of Congress. These findings suggest that Black politicians limit their anger when whites are a substantial number of the voting population, but Black elected officials and candidates abandon this rule when the electorate has a substantial number of Black voters.

Outlines the political career of Bill Clinton and his rise to the presidency in the post-Watergate era, as well as the corresponding rise of his wife, Hillary Clinton. Addresses the altered political climate of the period and how the actions of Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr elevated President Clinton’s inexcusable moral turpitude into impeachable conduct.

Historian James Whitman notes that, historically, governors used pardons to maintain low prison populations. He relates the report of an English observer in 1835 that prisoners in New York “felt unduly wronged” if they did not receive a pardon after serving half of their sentences, a belief reinforced by the existence of “semiannual clemency sessions which resulted in the release of forty to fifty convicts simultaneously.”1 One explanation for the demise of executive clemency was its replacement with more formal types of executive lenience, such as parole.2 As noted inand , however, American jurisdictions would later severely restrict parole. And when that happened, a traditional safeguard against bloated prison populations – the pardon power – did not reemerge.

This introduction offers an extended reading of David Foster Wallace’s 2000 foray into political journalism, “Up, Simba,” which illustrates what will be the central claim of this book: that literary post-postmodernism is best understood as the means by which left-leaning writers negotiate the neoliberal turn — a version of, rather than an alternative to, this new consensus. To make that case, I trace connections between the communitarian logic of the so-called New Sincerity, the form of post-postmodernism most closely associated with Wallace, and the interventions of Bill Clinton and the New Democrats, who rejected key New Deal principles in favor of a "third way" between liberalism and conservativism. This introduction also historicizes "postcritique" and the various "post-ideological" accounts of neoliberal culture, accounts which, in my view, reproduce contemporary liberalism’s ambivalence about the free market and free-market politics, and therefore can be understood as symptomatic of the very changes they seek to interpret.

This chapter explores texts that articulate the differences and continuities between Reaganite neoliberalism, as represented by Bret Easton Ellis’s American Psycho, and Clintonian neoliberalism, as represented in Clinton’s own speeches, Joe Klein’s Primary Colors, and the work of Mary Gaitskill. Clinton’s defense of welfare reform attaches a therapeutic rationale to right-wing ideals like “personal responsibility," and we see this same logic in in Gaitskill’s post-feminist interventions into ‘90s-era debates about female masochism and campus sex codes. We also see how this personalizing logic resolves political conflict in her novel Two Girls, Fat and Thin, in which what could be understood as an ideological disagreement about capitalism — the tension between a left-leaning journalist and a follower of a thinly-veiled version of Ayn Rand — proves to be a product of the two women’s failure to take "responsibility" for their own emotional experiences. In this chapter, I also examine how the logic of welfare-reform is contested by novels like Richard Price’s Clockers and Sapphire’s Push, both of which seek to demystify the “workfare” state’s idealization of legal, low-wage work.

The period since the 1990s has proved, in an ironic way, the strength of Israel–US relations. In 1991, American president, George H. W. Bush, clashed with Israel, and since 1996, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had strained Israel–US relations in an unprecedented manner. In both cases, the constants that determined the course of the Israel–US relationship, religion, shared values, and history, proved to be stronger than any individual, regardless of their position. The period covered in this chapter was characterized by a close friendship and strategic partnership between the two nations. During those years, the two countries signed several memoranda of understanding which solidified the American commitment to Israel’s security and ensured its qualitative military edge, as well as expanding the cooperation on economic and cultural matters. The military-industrial cooperation as well as security cooperation between the two countries deepened. The growing Israeli attachment to American culture and values was another manifestation of the deepening relations between the two countries. The Israeli economy changed from socialist to neoliberal under the influence of American economic thinking. Neoconservatism spread across Israel’s political and intellectual elites through institutions and people, most notably Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. The Israelis adopted many of the characteristics of American culture and economy, bringing their country closer to the United States in form and content. The ties between Israel and the Christian Zionist Evangelicals deepened as well. With the Evangelicals returning to the forefront of American politics since the mid-1970s, they became a major force in the support of Israel, a tendency that was especially encouraged by the right wing in Israel. Evangelical support for Israel has only increased during the 1990s and 2000s.

With the Iran–Iraq conflict and the Cold War coming to an end, the US–Iran relationship appeared to warm as each country no longer faced the existential threats that had once consumed them. With the death of Khomeini, Iran also found itself at a crucial juncture as more pragmatic figures came to the fore. The ascent of new leadership marked a more pragmatic turn for Iran. Meanwhile, in the US, George H.W. Bush attempted to usher the US into the post–Cold War world, and seemed more eager than his predecessor to engage with Iran. Time would not be on his side, however, and other priorities – especially the revolutions in Eastern Europe and Operation Desert Storm – distracted Bush from making any significant steps toward rapprochement. His successor, Bill Clinton, did nothing to better the relationship in his first term, but with the surprise election of the reformist Mohammad Khatami the two rival nations began warming to the prospect of serious engagement. Despite some initial gestures and successful Track II diplomatic exchanges, however, time and expectations again would become factors and the decade would close without concrete agreements.

This chapter examines containment in crisis during Clinton's second term, in which Iraq repeatedly obstructed UN inspectors, ultimately leading to their permanent exit from Iraq and US retaliatory airstrikes in Operation Desert Fox. The United States in this period became increasingly isolated on Iraq policy as France, Russia, and China refused to support military action and called for the lifting of sanctions. Containment's domestic critics exploited these crisis by building a political coalition to discredit containment and shift US policy toward regime change through the strategy of rollback. This coalition succeeded in passing the Iraq Liberation Act in 1998, which symbolized the entrenchment of the regime change consensus in US politics, leaving defenders of containment isolated in the political sphere. Clinton, however, made little effort to enforce this law and continued to treat containment as the de facto policy.

This chapter argues that in Bill Clinton's first term containment worked well enough to limit the Iraqi threat, compel more cooperation with inspectors, and generally maintain the international coalition as well as domestic political support. Clinton's main change to containment was stressing compliance with the UN inspections rather than Saddam's removal as the main condition for the lifting of sanctions. His Iraq policy, however, was sandwiched between an international coalition that wanted to move toward normalization with Iraq and a domestic political sphere that wanted to intensify efforts to topple Saddam. Finally, developments in Iraq, especially the extent of Iraqi cheating on disarmament and Saddam's crushing of the internal opposition in 1995–1996, added greater legitimacy to the main ideas of the regime change consensus, especially the beliefs that containment would soon collapse and that Iraq would never comply fully with inspections because of the nature of its regime.

The humanitarian issues and nonexecutive advocacy that constituted the basis of ongoing US-Vietnamese dialogue in the absence of formal relations remained of pivotal importance before, during, and after Washington and Hanoi resumed formal economic and diplomatic relations in the mid-1990s. Although American policymakers attempted to conclude the humanitarian programs they had earmarked as preconditions to more formal ties, varying definitions of full accounting, the repatriation of migrants to Vietnam through the CPA, and efforts to bring the HO into line with worldwide standards precipitated profound disagreements. Ultimately, US officials moved forward with formal relations with Hanoi and (re)created special programs for South Vietnamese migrants. The 1996 Resettlement Opportunity for Vietnamese Refugees gave screened-out migrants who were repatriated to Vietnam under the CPA one more chance to apply for resettlement in the US.The 1996 McCain Amendment created loopholes to permit the original, exceptional terms of the HO to remain intact. US-Vietnamese collaboration on humanitarian issues, and normalization itself, persisted after the resumption of formal economic and diplomatic relations. The ties between American and South Vietnamese people outlasted both the collapse of South Vietnam and the resumption of relations between Washington and Hanoi.

Chapter 3 explores presidential rhetoric on cases that have already been decided by the Supreme Court. To investigate this, we examine all mentions of Supreme Court cases, by month, from 1953 to 2017. We differentiate written and spoken comments and show that while the former are used almost exclusively to direct the implementation of the Court’s decisions, the latter are designed to allow presidents to take positions on Court cases that are important to their electoral bases given the primacy of presidential speeches to presidents’ permanent campaigns for public support. Often, presidents will comment on recently decided cases to speak to issues that are timely and salient to the national policy conversation in an effort to guide those conversations. Indeed, we find that the presidents are especially likely to discuss Supreme Court cases during reelection years and when those cases garner media attention.

Argues for Clinton's reversion to Cold War diplomacy in his second term. Containment of Russia and Iraq became central concerns. Chronicles Clinton battles with Congress, his impeachment, and his expansive foreign policy of apparent humanitarian interventions (in Kosovo especially), but waged as much to contain Russian power as to advance human rights.

Argues that despite hopes of sweeping change, Clinton ended up running a traditional, Cold War–style foreign policy. He used Cold War institutions like NATO, and acted to contain Russian power in the Balkans. Examines attempts to apply a Clinton Doctrine and its successes and failures. Argues that Clinton's interventions advanced a trend of wars of Muslim liberation.