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1 results

  • 4 - Blame Games in Germany

  • Markus Hinterleitner, Brown University, Rhode Island
  • Book:
    Policy Controversies and Political Blame Games
    Published online:
    30 October 2020
    Print publication:
    12 November 2020, pp 73-107
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  • Summary

    This chapter examines and compares the cases situated in the German political system. The chapter reveals that the German political system exhibits much more heated, and oftentimes more consequential, blame games than the UK political system. Extensive conventions of resignation and opportunities to retrieve salient information about a controversy by appointing an inquiry commission are powerful tools for opponents to hold political incumbents accountable and to force them into heated blame game interactions. Blamed incumbents must actively engage in blame management and may be forced to act in the interest of opponents. However, political incumbents also benefit from institutional factors. An active and loyal governing majority and fragmentation among opponents are assets. Whether the overall institutional configuration is more favorable to opponents or to incumbents largely depends on the degree of government involvement in a policy controversy.