As Iran and the shah adjusted to life after the coup, the monarch tried to solidify his ties to the United States. This entailed military support from America and Iran’s renewed commitment to the US side in the Cold War. Iran created an internal security force, SAVAK, trained in part by America. The shah clamped down on Communist activities and confronted rising Islamic dissent with violence. At the same, the Shah pursued social programs and launched the White Revolution, which America supported. However, its platform, especially women’s suffrage and land reform, triggered widespread opposition. Ayatollah Khomeini emerged as the leader of Islamist dissent in 1963 and was eventually exiled. America and Iran had to brace themselves for the fallout of these events.

After 444 days in captivity, the Iranians finally release the hostages in Iran on the same day Ronald Reagan is inaugurated president – a final insult to the hated Jimmy Carter. Despite this initial positive step, the 1980s turn out to be a low-point in the relationship. Hoping to capitalize on the chaos of the revolution and regain oil-rich provinces ceded to the Shah a decade earlier, Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein invades Iran and sparks an eight-year war of attrition at tremendous cost to both sides. Incensed at the lackluster response from the West over the invasion and the use of chemical weapons, Iran further isolated itself from the US and sought alternative means of promoting its interests, chief among them the spread of revolution through the region. Iranian support for Shia militant groups, especially Hezbollah in Lebanon, in turn outraged Reagan and his team, as Americans became key targets for kidnapping and terrorist attacks. Despite the mutual enmity, the two countries maintained some forms of communication, however ineffective. The greatest consequence of this, however, was the Iran-Contra Affair, which nearly brought down the Reagan White House.

Despite promises to the contrary, Jimmy Carter largely continues the same policy toward Iran and the authoritarian Shah as in years past. However, with the outbreak of large protests just weeks after his visit to Tehran at the end of 1977, US policymakers find themselves poorly informed and positioned to react to the changing situation in Iran. The documents in this chapter map the process of Washington’s initial misjudgment of the near future for its ally through the slow realization that the Shah is not going to see out the year, let alone the decade. In his place rises a new force, utterly unfamiliar to the White House, and led by an enigmatic figure, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, whose fiery rhetoric and anachronistic beliefs leave Carter and his advisors scrambling for a response. After the US agrees to take in the ailing Shah for medical treatment, students acting in Khomeini’s name storm the US Embassy in Tehran and forever alter the world's perception of the nascent Islamic Republic. The chapter ends by documenting the scramble in the White House to free the American hostages and Carter handing over the presidency to Ronald Reagan as the hostages finally return home.

In this chapter, I analyze the ideological affinity between PIJ and Iran. I do so by first analyzing al-Shiqaqi’s view on the Shiites, and then investigating PIJ’s support for the Iranian Revolution. We see that the Iranian issue cannot be understood without relating the Iranian Revolution to the leitmotif of al-Shiqaqi: anti-colonialism. Consequently, we see that theological Shiite influence on PIJ is exaggerated. Second, as we assessed the ideological influences on al-Shiqaqi in , we here add to this analysis by comparing the thought of al-Shiqaqi with that of Ali Shariati and Ruhollah Khomeini. In the last section, the analysis is extended to include PIJ’s pragmatic stance in internal Palestinian politics. We see that while the Iranian Revolution embodies the need for regional unity, between Sunnis and Shiites, the resistance against the State of Israel embodies the need for local Palestinian unity.