In certain quarters of the former Yugoslavia, the ICTY judgment issued on 30 June 2006 in Prosecutor v. Naser Orić has been strongly criticized for meting out a two-year prison sentence to the Bosnian Muslim wartime commander of Srebrenica. After a short sketch of the factual background which the trial chamber considered to be the pivotal sentencing factor, this note focuses on the legal issues underlying his conviction for having failed to prevent the murder and cruel treatment of a number of Serb prisoners. In particular, the trial chamber's interpretation of the standard of ‘reason to know’ of these crimes deserves attention. The judgment also gave rise to other significant developments, such as the approach to repeated prosecutorial violations of its disclosure obligations and an important clarification regarding the scope and nature of crimes committed by subordinates of a superior.

This case note focuses on two aspects of the January 2005 Strugar Judgment of the ICTY. The first is the trial chamber's finding that the accused was not aiding and abetting his subordinates in the commission of the crimes charged through his failure to discharge his duty to prevent the crimes and/or punish the perpetrators. The second is the trial chamber's definition of one of the alternative mental states a superior must possess before a conviction can be entered against him on the basis of Article 7(3).