This chapter discusses two Middle English Charlemagne romances, The Siege of Milan and The Sultan of Babylon, to illuminate post-1291 anxieties about royal politics, Christian infighting, and God’s will and support. It brings these romances into conversation with two main bodies of literary and historical material. The first consists of writings that polemically engage with the question of whether English and French kings should prioritize domestic affairs or crusading activity. The second consists of poems, letters, and chronicles that, written by Christians following crusading defeats, feature wrathful rebukes of God and threats of conversion to Islam. I draw on this latter corpus to offer a new interpretation of the literary motif of the “afflicted Muslim” who vents his military frustration on his “gods,” arguing that such depictions should be understood as projections of Latin Christian anxieties about God’s lack of support to the crusading enterprise.

Millions of “secular Muslims” would become “practicing Muslims” if there existed a variant of Islam compatible with their values, for instance one that would broaden women’s rights and adapt rites to the rhythms of modern life. If no liberal variant has emerged, the reason is not that Islam is monolithic. As with other religions, it admits diverse interpretations. Yet over fourteen centuries, variations in interpretation have produced just one major schism: the Sunni–Shii split of 661. This is puzzling because Christianity, the other monotheism with over a billion adherents, sees schisms frequently. If the collective action necessary for a liberal schism has not materialized, a basic reason lies in obstacles to conducting honest discussions on what Islam represents. Liberal Muslims are intrinsically opposed to settling conflicts through violence, which handicaps them vis-à-vis groups prepared to charge them with physically punishable religious offenses. Easily victimized, they cannot fight back as effectively. Thus, apostasy and blasphemy rules, the two most lethal weapons of Islamic illiberalism, reproduce the fears that allow their preservation. To avoid personal trouble, liberal Muslims, atheists, non-Muslim believers, and assorted other dissenters all avoid repudiating the notion that apostasy and blasphemy are acts that require temporal punishment.

Although entry into Islam is costless, exit was banned early on. According to a widely accepted interpretation of early Islam, soon after Muhammad’s death a precedent for banning apostasy was set. In fact, the underlying dispute was over zakat, and the episode amounted to enforcing the tax code. But recasting this historical detail would not necessarily settle controversies over Muslim religious freedoms. Certain Quran verses speak of retribution against nonbelievers. Others preclude compulsion, arguably establishing a right to leave Islam. Insofar as a textual inconsistency exists – and that itself is debatable – for advocates of liberalizing Islam the challenge boils down to prioritizing liberal verses. Blasphemy and heresy charges, used repeatedly to persecute heterodox sects, also restrict sundry liberties. The fear of getting accused of religious offense constrains political discourse and inhibits collective action. But a broadening of Muslim religious freedoms through the liberalization of apostasy and blasphemy rules is not unthinkable. Analogous transformations have occurred in other religions. Besides, Islam has been reinterpreted repeatedly since its emergence, radically so in modern times. Innovations include Islamic banks, which are business corporations, and various Islamic NGOs, which are organized as nonprofit corporations. Evidently, no absolute barrier exists to broadening Islamic religious freedoms.

Freedom of expression and freedom of belief have been burning issues in the Islamic Republic because they give an indication of the extent of support the has regime enjoyed. As a champion of reason and freedom Qābel instructed his readers to examine how sacred scripture dealt with the issues. In particular he focused on the issue of unbelief (kofr), and he argued that the original meaning was restircted, whereas it had been vastly expanded in subsequent years. His espousal of freedom of belief and expression endorsed freedom for non-Muslims, including atheists. He also discussed contentious issues suh as insulting the Prophet, and concluded that terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda were no better than those in the West who defame the Prophet with “satirical” cartoons.

This chapter examines how the rise of populist nationalism in Saudi Arabia interacts with Wahhabism and the role of Western power in controlling the outcome of this interaction. As a result of its founding agreement, the Saudi ruling family needs the support of Wahhabi clerks for internal legitimacy and of the West, mainly the US, for technological help and defense and security backing. These Saudi rulers have instrumentalized Wahhabism to advance a pan-Islamic ideology (da?wa) in an effort to fight rivals at home and combat Arab nationalism and liberal, socialist, and Marxist trends in the Arab region and Islamic societies. This ideology was also used to achieve global influence. The chapter explains that Saudi Arabia is a case in which an extreme interpretation of religious doctrine was needed to legitimize an authoritarian regime and ultimately became a tool of domestic governance and foreign policy.

This chapter studies debates over sovereignty between the ‘ulama and the state. It does so by examining the killing of the Pakistani governor Salman Taseer and his alleged act of insulting Muhammad. The author asserts that in the case of Taseer’s killing, and in blasphemy cases more broadly, the issue of sovereignty boils down to the question of who can deem the insulter worthy of death and execute this punishment. The state, considering itself sovereign, reserves this right for itself. Consequently, it deemed Taseer’s extrajudicial killing a murder and awarded the death penalty to his assassin. The ‘ulama regard God as the ultimate sovereign. They assert that His sovereignty is vested in His law, the shari‘a, which they interpret and articulate. Many ‘ulama maintain that according to the shari‘a, insulting Muhammad is such a grievous crime that anyone can legitimately commit sovereign violence against a Prophet-insulter. Importantly, a minority among the ‘ulama support the state’s monopoly over legitimate violence. These ‘ulama also claim to formulate their arguments from within the shari‘a. In a broader sense, this chapter’s exploration of blasphemy intervenes in the debate of whether an Islamic state – i.e. a polity that demands its own sovereignty, but also emphasizes its reverence for God’s sovereignty – is possible.