This article revisits the mainstream scholarly view that the Greek Hestia is the least anthropomorphic deity among the Olympians, an idea that owes much to a short reference to her in Plato’s Phaedrus. The analysis is based on textual and visual sources from the Archaic period: I first review two references to Hestia in early hexameter poetry, in Hesiod’s Theogony and in the Homeric Hymn to Aphrodite, before turning to the depiction of her in two early Attic black-figure vases, the Sophilos dinos at the British Museum and the François vase, which have been neglected in discussing Hestia’s anthropomorphic nature in early Greek thought. While the study of individual Greek gods has returned to the fore in the field of Greek religion in the last 20 years, it seems that not enough has changed in the current conceptualization of Hestia.

In the first part of this paper I draw on some reflections offered by Descartes and Malebranche on the dangers of anthropomorphic conceptions of God, in order to suggest that there is something misguided about the way in which the so-called problem of evil is commonly framed. In the second part, I ask whether the problem of evil becomes easier to deal with if we adopt a non-personalist account of God, of the kind found in Aquinas. I consider the sense in which God is termed ‘good’ on this latter conception, and while not proposing that it can justify or explain the evil and suffering in the world, I suggest that the world’s manifest imperfections are compatible with the existence of a loving creator who is the source of the existence of the world and of the goodness found in created things.

Our current ecological predicament requires a shift to a post-anthropocentric educational paradigm in which we educate for and about a world that is not “for us,” but comprised of a multitude of eco-systems of which we are simply a part. To facilitate this, education should be enacted differently; we need to experience learning not as furthering entrenched nature/culture binaries, but as “worlding” processes, whereby imaginary divides between individual and environment are troubled, as humans and the material world are revealed to be relational and entangled. Posthumanism offers an affective turn towards a social and ecological justice that accounts for such entanglements; enacted through necessary processes of de-familiarisation from the dominant vision of education. In this article we firstly explore the theoretical underpinnings of critical posthumanism to critique sustainability education-as-usual and propose new modes of teaching that lean into affective processes of noticing and surrender. We then discuss a research project in which participants came together to explore what happens when we cease to privilege humans as the ultimate instructors and holders of knowledge. In doing so we disrupt normative methodologies, drawing on affect, embodiment, relationality, transdisciplinarity and an ethics of care which extend learning to more-than-human kin.

Although sheep are commonly transported long distances, and sheep welfare during transport is a topic of research and policy discussion, the subject of their fatigue during transport has been under-researched. The current qualitative study, focused on the EU and UK, aimed to critically analyse stakeholder views on issues relating to sheep fatigue, including behavioural indications of fatigue, the interplay between fatigue and other factors, and the practicalities of identifying fatigue in commercial transport conditions. Insight into stakeholder perceptions of these issues could contribute to the body of knowledge regarding sheep fatigue during transport, potentially playing a part in future efforts to improve fatigue understanding and detection. Eighteen experts from different stakeholder groups were interviewed. Reflexive thematic analysis of interview data yielded four themes and three sub-themes. The first theme, “Let’s anthropomorphise it a little bit”, underscores the pervasiveness of anthropomorphism and suggests using it in a conscious and deliberate way to drive stakeholder engagement and policy change. The second theme, “We think that they’re like we are and they’re not”, cautions against wholesale transfer of human experiences to animals. The third theme, ‘See the whole animal’, advocates using Qualitative Behaviour Analysis (QBA), proven reliable in other contexts, to deepen and enrich our current understanding of fatigue. The fourth theme, ‘Fatigue “never comes up”’, highlights the fact that fatigue is rarely if ever discussed in the context of sheep transport. These themes suggest several avenues for future research, including developing QBA-based assessments for fatigue to improve welfare during transport.

Although an increasing number of works are focusing on depictions of God in the New Testament, none so far specifically focus on how these depictions rely on anthropomorphic language in their presentation of God. This article attends to this oversight by turning to the Synoptic Gospels (and the book of Acts) as a test case. Not only do these narratives lack an explicit anti-anthropomorphic agenda, but they also rely on divine anthropomorphisms that are derived from Jewish Scripture. To demonstrate this claim, the article concentrates on how Matthew and Luke expand Mark's anthropomorphic presentation of God and how Luke's presentation emerges as the most anthropomorphic of all. It also discusses how Mark, Matthew, and Luke's respective narratives depict God's human, or human-like, characteristics according to the following four categories: (1) God's human roles and titles, (2) God's depiction as an acting subject who speaks and desires to be in relationship with humans, (3) God's concrete presence located in space, and finally, (4) God's description as a character with recognisable body parts and other markers of corporeality. In the end, we shall see that anthropomorphism is a central component of God's characterisation in the Synoptics and that this anthropomorphic characterisation better enables readers to see the Jewish, scriptural shape of God as a personal deity who desires to be in relationship with humans.

Speaking with conversational AIs, technologies whose interfaces enable human-like interaction based on natural language, has become a common phenomenon. During these interactions, people form their beliefs due to the say-so of conversational AIs. In this paper, I consider, and then reject, the concepts of testimony-based beliefs and instrument-based beliefs as suitable for analysis of beliefs acquired from these technologies. I argue that the concept of instrument-based beliefs acknowledges the non-human agency of the source of the belief. However, the analysis focuses on perceiving signs and indicators rather than content expressed in natural language. At the same time, the concept of testimony-based beliefs does refer to natural language propositions, but there is an underlying assumption that the agency of the testifier is human. To fill the lacuna of analyzing belief acquisition from conversational AIs, I suggest a third concept: technology-based beliefs. It acknowledges the non-human agency-status of the originator of the belief. Concurrently, the focus of analysis is on the propositional content that forms the belief. Filling the lacuna enables analysis that considers epistemic, ethical, and social issues of conversational AIs without excluding propositional content or compromising accepted assumptions about the agency of technologies.

The scientific study of animal welfare has generated a welter of complex, equivocal and often contradictory results. Consequently, there is little agreement about how impairment of welfare should be measured. While some solutions to this have been suggested, these have usually relied on more sophisticated versions of, or more control over, existing measures. However, we argue that the difficulties arise because of questionable assumptions in the definition and measurement of welfare, in particular the measurement of suffering and the assumed importance of individual well-being. We contend that welfare can be interpreted only in terms of what natural selection has designed an organism to do and how circumstances impinge on its functional design. Organisms are designed for self-expenditure and the relative importance of self-preservation and survival, and the concomitant investment of time and resources in different activities, varies with life history strategy. The traditional notions of coping and stress are anthropomorphisms based on homeostatic mechanisms of self-preservation in a long-lived species. Suffering-like states are viewed as generalized subjective states that are geared to avoiding deleterious circumstances with which the organism does not have specific adaptive mechanisms to deal. Attempts to measure suffering-like states directly are likely to remain inconclusive, at least for the foreseeable future, because such states are private and subjective, may take many forms fundamentally different from our own and are likely to depend on the operation of phenotype-limited priorities and decision rules. However, measuring the impact of circumstances on functional design via the organism ‘s decision rules provides a practicable means of giving benefit of the doubt by indicating when suffering, or an analogous subjective state, is likely.