After the financial crisis of 2008, the European Union (‘EU’) not only increased its substantial legislation regarding financial services, but also built up a strong and unified system of financial market supervision. In particular, central surveillance authorities were created. These were given far-reaching competences with regard to substituting dysfunctional national authorities or players in the financial services sector. The three European Economic Area (‘EEA’) and European Free Trade Association (‘EFTA’) States—Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway—participate in the EU's internal market through their membership of the EEA. In order to continue participating on an equal footing in the internal market for financial services and to honour their duty to maintain homogeneity, the EEA EFTA States also had to incorporate the new institutional setup regarding financial services supervision. This obligation, however, in particular relating to certain intrusive powers of the new surveillance authorities, collided with some constitutional reservations, above all of the two Nordic EEA EFTA States. This article will show how these conflicting aims could be merged into a system that on the one hand guarantees the unified overall approach needed for strengthened surveillance of the internal market for financial services, and on the other hand safeguards certain constitutional reservations of the EEA EFTA States. It also looks at how third countries that do not (fully) participate in the internal market, such as the United Kingdom and Switzerland, are likely to be treated in this context by the EU.

To design regulatory policies, agencies depend on information from the industries they are tasked to regulate. Therefore, agencies can organise consultations with the aim of obtaining information from different perspectives. This article focuses on stakeholder diversity in agency public consultations. We ask to what extent is information provided by stakeholders other than the regulated sector, such as other business interests, experts or nonbusiness interests? Stakeholder diversity is relevant as it may prevent agencies to become exposed to one-sided information and capture by specialised interests. Are there consultation design factors that foster consultation diversity? Or, is (a lack of) consultation diversity structurally shaped by the context in which an agency operates? Analysing a wide range of public consultations organised by European Union regulatory agencies indicates that most information agencies receive via consultations comes from regulated interests and that the limited participation of nonregulated interests is highly tenacious.

EU agencies have mushroomed in recent years and new agencies, such as those in the financial arena, can have far-reaching quasi-regulatory and supervisory powers. These developments raise fundamental questions as to their constitutional standing, the delegation of powers and how to wrestle the challenges of independence and accountability. This paper considers ESMA, the most ambitious new financial sector agency. It examines ESMA's governance and accountability mechanisms and makes normative proposals to better balance the competing supranational and national interests within it. Such refinements should also be implemented in conjunction with additional accountability requirements, particularly a greater role for the European Parliament. This reshaping is vital to guarantee ESMA's autonomy and legitimacy.

This paper offers up a map of self-authored post-legislative guidance practice among the EU’s decentralised agencies. It shows that the use of guidance by EU agencies is widespread and significant, but not pervasive in that 14 of the EU’s 33 agencies currently engage in guidance-making. Where guidance is produced, it varies significantly between and within agencies as regards volume and length. These documents are hard to find, they are called a miscellany of different things, and there seems to have sprung up, ad hoc, a hierarchy of guidance that is both interesting and lacking in clarity. The question as to whether such guidance binds those to whom it has been addressed has been fudged, with agencies and courts engaging in exercises of tautology and misdirection to avoid the appearance of anything that looks like binding norm-making by the EU’s agencies. Consultation and participation in the making of guidance seems lackadaisical. This map suggests a level of differentiation that is so ill-thought out, and so ad hoc, so lacking in foresight and oversight, as to be dysfunctional. At the same time, the lack of engagement by the EU courts with these norms suggests that the site of opportunity for a way forward in this area lies other than with the judiciary.

Children in out-of-home care (OOHC) experience a number of adverse educational outcomes, including lower attainment and fewer years of schooling; and they are less likely than their peers to remain in education and training after 16 years of age. Children in OOHC are being left behind in educational settings. This is worrying as education can provide the gateway to future life opportunities and a way for them to escape the adverse circumstances which brought them into care. Agencies supporting children in OOHC aim to ameliorate these negative outcomes. The barriers to good educational outcomes for children in OOHC are well documented and include systemic factors over which a support agency has little control. In order to monitor the effectiveness of an agency in supporting children in OOHC, it is essential to monitor the elements of service provision that are influenced by agency inputs rather than systemic or institutional factors. This article will outline potential ways in which agencies can effectively monitor their impact on children's lives.

Objectives: To obtain further information from members of the International Network of Agencies for Health Technology Assessment (INAHTA) on the involvement of consumers in their programs.

Methods: A questionnaire for a survey was developed and sent to member agencies in November 2010. Survey responses were compared with those from an earlier survey conducted in 2005.

Results: Of the thirty-three agencies that provided responses, 67 percent involve consumers in some aspects of their health technology assessment (HTA) programs, compared with 57 percent in 2005. As in the earlier survey, most agencies reporting involvement have contact with consumer or patient organizations and a large minority also involve individual consumers. Summaries of HTA reports that are intended to be easily understood by consumers are prepared by 84 percent of the agencies, and 42 percent involve consumers in dissemination of HTA material. In both areas, there was some increase from the levels previously reported.

Conclusions: The survey results suggest that there is a trend to increased involvement of consumers by the INAHTA agencies in their programs but that the level of involvement remains relatively limited. The manner of consumer participation varies between agencies.

Irrespective of the level of government, public officials increasingly face the challenge of evaluating and making choices between more instruments. Agencies are intended to be a new and different type of governance instrument offering prospects for stronger input from experts, greater transparency and depoliticised decisions. Using ‘legitimacy’ as the framework, this study compares an agency (European Aviation Safety Agency) to comitology and its predecessor (a sui generis intergovernmental regulatory network). Although EASA is often heralded as a major change, the conclusions here are that its predecessor was quite effective and that comitology has been greatly improved and could have been explored as alternative instrument. Therefore, the agency solution was neither unavoidable nor necessarily better.

Objectives: The aim of the study is to make an international comparison of Health Technology Assessment (HTA) Agencies, to show their similarities and differences.

Methods: An e-mail questionnaire was sent to thirty HTA agencies internationally. Questions related to the structure of the agency, the relationship with health-related institutions, the prescriptiveness of the decisions taken, the main core and the modalities to spread the assessment, and the type of funding.

Results: Twenty-four HTA Agencies answered the questionnaire: 25 percent in America, 4.2 percent in Australia, and 70.8 percent in Europe. Fifty-four percent of HTA Agencies are governmental institutions (83.3 percent have central government funding), while 62.5 percent have relationships with health-related governmental institutions. Of the agencies, 87 percent reported that their decisions are not prescriptive, while for 20.8 percent and 8.3 percent of them stated that this was the case totally or partially, respectively, especially for the governmental and American Agencies. Seventeen agencies (70.8 percent) declared their work on multiannual programs (77 percent of the governmental HTA Agencies and 100 percent of the American ones). The assessments mainly addressed diagnostic procedures (85.7 percent) and pharmaceuticals (25 percent). The most common way to disseminate results is by means of paper report (91.7 percent), followed by the Internet (16.7 percent), and seminars to expert audiences (12.5 percent).

Conclusions: The comparative analysis of HTA Agencies showed that governmental and American Agencies have a profound impact on the prescriptiveness of their assessment, and this could be linked to the fact that these types of Agencies work on multiannual programs. European and American HTA Agencies have many similarities in terms of type of assessment, funding, and dissemination of results.

The media system controls information resources that public health agencies may wish to use to accomplish their goals, particularly in a crisis. The resources of the public health system sometimes are prized by the media system, and this provides opportunities for public health agencies to gain access to the media. This paper reviews the goals and resources of the media system as they relate to the mission of public health agencies in the periods before, during, and after a public health crisis. The various media are reviewed with attention to the role each can play for different purposes and at different stages of a crisis. The importance of presenting health information in the form of stories is emphasized, with specific advice regarding the attributes of an effective story.