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LA PUISSANCE MARITIME INSTRUMENT DE LA PUISSANCE POLITIQUE ET D'UNE STRATÉGIE GLOBALE DE RAYONNEMENT VOIRE DE DOMINATION: Les puissances maritimes occidentales
ABSTRACT. Source of conflicts for the control of the strait and access to the Baltic, the sea was the force of modernity for the Scandinavian states. Until the arrival of the Russian naval force and the founding of Saint Petersburg, it was the basis for the commercial predominance of Denmark and the logistical vector of Swedish military domination on the continent.
RÉSUMÉ. Source de conflits pour le contrôle du détroit et l'accès à la Baltique, la mer a été le moteur de la modernité des Etats scandinaves. Elle fut, jusqu'à l'avènement de la puissance navale russe avec l'établissement de Saint-Pétersbourg, le fondement de la prédominance commerciale du Danemark et le vecteur logistique de la domination militaire suédoise sur le continent.
Geography has for obvious reasons played a large role in the creation of maritime powers. Easy access to important waterways coupled with equally easy access to necessary natural resources like timber, hemp and tar were essential for establishing the maritime states of early modern Europe. The Baltic Sea region was in a unique position as a launching point for establishing a maritime great power in the early modern period. There were plenty of good, natural harbours to accommodate both trade and warfare. The sea in the Baltic is mostly calm, and the sea lanes served as the most important infrastructure in the region – even if there was a problem with ice during the wintertime. The Pomeranian coniferous forests provided large naturally grown masts and spars. Oak trees grown along the Baltic coast were well suited for the building of wooden warships. The fertile farmland of the southern Baltic in Denmark and the province of Scania (Skåne) provided ample supplies for port cities and maritime communities.
Out of the Viking age and the medieval period gradually emerged two recognizable maritime states, Denmark and Sweden. Denmark was from the beginning a feudal state with a well-defined power base. Once conversion to Christianity had taken place, both Sweden and Denmark engaged in a number of crusades in the Baltic. These crusades were combined maritime operations under direction of the king and his bishops.
On 11 August 1694 an incident took place which strained Anglo-Danish relations seriously. The Danish ship of the line Gyldenløveof fifty guns under the command of Captain Niels Lavritzen Barfoed, peacefully anchored at the Downs, was attacked by the seventy-gun HMS Stirling Castlefrom Sir Cloudesley Shovell's Squadron. The Gyldenløvesuffered three men dead and eighteen wounded, including Captain Barfoed himself. On the Stirling Castle, Captain Deane reported that he had eight men dead and about twenty wounded. The Danish ship was seriously damaged and had to undergo significant repairs. Barfoed and his officers were subsequently arrested, and they were only released after prolonged negotiations between Denmark and England.
Denmark remained neutral during the ongoing Nine Years’ War of 1688–97. However, the Danish king did provide auxiliary troops for the English war in Ireland from 1689 to 1691. Politically it would seem very unwise to compromise the good relations between the two countries by attacking a Danish warship, unless there was a very good reason. So what serious offence had the Gyldenløvecommitted to provoke such an attack? Or was it perhaps all a mistake? Surprisingly, the underlying cause was what we today might regard as a trifling matter of courtesy. The battle was the result of a dispute over the right of English warships to demand that foreign warships strike their pennants in the Channel. It was not the only incident of its kind, and in the period around the year 1700 such ‘courtesy battles’ involving both Danish and Swedish warships strained England's relations with the Scandinavian kingdoms. These conflicts have been noted by researchers before, but the fact that the English insistence on striking of pennants had long term strategic implications for the sailing patterns of the Danish and Swedish navies has not previously been described. This chapter seeks to present the flag disputes in their context as seen from a Danish and Swedish perspective.
Before we look at the wider perspective of the flag disputes, let us return to the situation in the Downs in August 1694. The wider context of that and other battles needs to be included in order to understand the incident.
This book presents a wide range of new research on many aspects of naval strategy in the early modern and modern periods. Among the themes covered are the problems of naval manpower, the nature of naval leadership and naval officers, intelligence, naval training and education, and strategic thinking and planning. The book is notable for giving extensive consideration to navies other than those ofBritain, its empire and the United States. It explores a number of fascinating subjects including how financial difficulties frustrated the attempts by Louis XIV's ministers to build a strong navy; how the absence of centralised power in the Dutch Republic had important consequences for Dutch naval power; how Hitler's relationship with his admirals severely affected German naval strategy during the Second World War; and many more besides. The book is a Festschrift in honour of John B. Hattendorf, for more than thirty years Ernest J. King Professor of Maritime History at the US Naval War College and an influential figure in naval affairs worldwide.
N.A.M. Rodger is Senior Research Fellow at All Souls College, Oxford.
J. Ross Dancy is Assistant Professor of Military History at Sam Houston State University.
Benjamin Darnell is a D.Phil. candidate at New College, Oxford.
Evan Wilson is Caird Senior Research Fellow at the National Maritime Museum, Greenwich.
Contributors: Tim Benbow, Peter John Brobst, Jaap R. Bruijn, Olivier Chaline, J. Ross Dancy, Benjamin Darnell, James Goldrick, Agustín Guimerá, Paul Kennedy, Keizo Kitagawa, Roger Knight, Andrew D. Lambert, George C. Peden, Carla Rahn Phillips, Werner Rahn, Paul M. Ramsey, Duncan Redford, N.A.M. Rodger, Jakob Seerup, Matthew S. Seligmann, Geoffrey Till, Evan Wilson
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