Although Barry Barnes (1974, 1977) and David Bloor (1976, 1978, 1981) are co-workers in the Science Studies Unit at the University of Edinburgh, there are hitherto unnoted but fundamental differences in their programs in the sociology of science.
Bloor defines his “strong programme” in the sociology of science by three basic tenets (“causality,” “symmetry,” and “reflexivity”) and also claims to establish laws and to test a general theory of the causal links connecting cognitive and social factors in the history of science. (Bloor 1976, pp. 4-5). In other words, the “strong programme” aims to be: (1) Causal, i.e., concerned with the conditions which bring about beliefs or states of knowledge. (2) Symmetrical, i.e., appealing to the same sorts of causes and to the same patterns of causal explanation for all beliefs and cognitive claims, whether regarded as true or false, rational or irrational, successful or unsuccessful. (3) Reflexive, i.e., using the explanatory resources of the sociology of science in the critical evaluation and explanation of the sociology of science itself.