The English lawyer has been notoriously unwilling to admit the relevance of social sciences to his discipline. In part, this may be attributed to his lack of formal training in economics or sociology. As regards the latter, there are some signs of the handicap being overcome: much current research effort is now being directed to the interpretation of law and the legal system as social phenomena. But the application of economic reasoning to legal instruments and institutions has been limited and tentative. Although it has long been recognised that a marriage of the two disciplines is necessary for the procreation of effective norms in areas where the law clearly governs economic activities, for example, the regulation of trade and income redistribution, so far, in this country at least, creative thinking about central legal institutions such as tort, contract, property and crime has remained relatively untouched by such a mode of analysis. Yet, as Americans have demonstrated, there is nothing inappropriate in such an exercise. At first sight the subject areas of economics and law will appear to diverge significantly: the former is “concerned with the manner in which a society produces, distributes and consumes wealth when it is constrained by scarcity, either of tangible resources or of intangible resources,” while the latter is often viewed as a system of norms governing the conduct of individuals and institutions. Yet such conduct will generally involve the transfer and acquisition of resources. With this congruence of interest, therefore, the opportunity exists to compare economic analysis with prevailing legal rules on particular issues to see whether the “right” solution is reached.