A sense of disappointment permeates this book, or at least parts of it. But, as mentioned in the introduction, this is to some extent a consequence of the perhaps excessive ambition that people like me had at the outset of the BRICS process in 2008 and, especially, when the CRA and NDB, after difficult negotiations, were successfully launched in Fortaleza in July 2014. Nevertheless, looking at the big picture and trying to imagine things to come, I believe it is safe to say that the BRICS are here to stay. Cooperation between the five countries is likely to continue uninterrupted, with ups and downs of course, but sufficiently strong to decisively affect their international relations and the balance of power in an increasingly multipolar world. Not only is the development bank something unique in the history of our countries, but the BRICS process as a whole should be seen and valued from this angle—as the unprecedented transregional joining of forces of nations with different features and histories but united by common strategic purposes.

Since the creation of the BRICS, China's relative political and economic importance has increased continuously—in the world and relatively to the other BRICS countries. The group has become more lopsided than it originally was and, on present trends, will become even more so in the future. However, a point I made about my experience in Shanghai—that the Chinese very rarely threw their weight around and were respectful of the other four countries—can be made more broadly about China's behavior in the BRICS process as a whole.

In any case, the other four countries will undoubtedly continue to have a significant weight. India, in particular, also accounts for a rising share of the world's economy and, even more than China, of the world's population. Russia has demonstrated, time and again, its capacity to act independently and vigorously in several regions of the world. The country is respected and even feared. South Africa will continue to hold the key to events in sub-Saharan Africa. Brazil, currently at its nadir, will sooner or later again play the constructive and independent role the world is accustomed to see.

When the Commission said that the British Caribbean colonies were established for the sole purpose of producing tropical commodities for export to Britain, it restated what John Stuart Mill had said more than a hundred years earlier that the Caribbean colonies were places where England found “it convenient to carry on the production of sugar, coffee, and a few other tropical commodities” (Mill [1848] 2003, 249), commodities that it was unable to produce domestically. Mill added that little agricultural production was undertaken in the colonies except staples and they were sent to England (ibid.). In short, England established its Caribbean colonies to be global agricultural production platforms.

A global agricultural production platform is an overseas unit that is established to produce a commodity or commodities that a nation cannot produce domestically or cannot produce in sufficient quantities to satisfy domestic demand. It may also be established if a commodity can be produced at significantly lower costs abroad than at home. The land used to produce the commodity may be owned by a foreign corporation, or a foreign corporation may sometimes contract with local farmers to be the sole buyer of the commodity, as was the arrangement between Geest and banana producers of the Windward Islands. The commodity or commodities are exported—an insignificant amount of the commodity may be used domestically—either for consumption or as intermediate goods. This kind of agricultural activity creates minimal economic linkages within the economy where the global agricultural production platform is located, although such activity may create significant linkages between the local economy and an overseas economy. Moreover, the foreign corporation or the foreign monopsonist invests a minimal amount of the economic surplus in the local economy.

It is likely that some agricultural regions in a large continental economy, whose varied climate and soil permit a highly diversified agricultural structure of production, may have many features of a global agricultural production platform. The agricultural production platform in such economies may be owned by individuals or firms that are resident outside the region, and it may supply unprocessed agricultural commodities to firms located outside the region, thus forming linkages not within the region where it is located but between the region and the rest of the larger economy.

I turn now to discuss the financial institutions or mechanisms created by the BRICS, starting with the reserve pooling arrangement, later called the BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA). The origins of the CRA can be traced back to the mid-2000s, to a period preceding the actual establishment of the BRICS in 2008. When I arrived in Washington, DC, in April 2007, to occupy a seat as executive director in the IMF Board, my predecessor in the position, Eduardo Loyo, drew my attention to two issues that pertain to the matter at the hand.

He stressed, first, the enormous difficulty in making any progress at all in terms of IMF reform. This was indeed the situation in the earlier part of 2007. The subsequent financial crisis in the United States and Europe, especially after Lehman collapsed in September 2008, would change the picture and allow us to make progress in this field. But even after 2008, as mentioned above, progress would be limited and always obtained in the teeth of hefty resistance of overrepresented countries, including notably most of Europe.

Second, Loyo told me, it was important to keep an eye on monetary cooperation in East Asia, where 13 countries, led by Japan, China, and South Korea, had been gradually putting into place, since 2000, a reserve pooling arrangement, called the Chiang Mai Initiative. Initially a network of bilateral swap arrangements, Chiang Mai could be seen as an embryonic Asian Monetary Fund, something that was watched with concern by Americans, Europeans, and the Administration of the IMF. Their worry was that this initiative might open the way for a fragmentation of international governance and a loss of “centrality” of the IMF, an institution that they tightly controlled. As we know, the Fund was, and remains to this day, essentially a North Atlantic organization. From the point of view of EMDCs, even outside Asia, the establishment of an Asian Monetary Fund was a welcome development as it might exert pressure to move forward with IMF reform and provide a template for similar initiatives in other regions of the world.

The deep international financial crisis of 2008–9, centered on the US and European financial systems, distracted all of us from the issue. Also, G20 negotiations in 2008–10 held up the expectation that IMF reform might after all make substantial progress.

For men, not much. But for women, a whole lot. So said Mary Wollstonecraft, as she argued that this time around we must make certain that the genders live on an equal footing. The first time around, men built marrfam and, while doing so, managed to disenfranchise women across both the economic and sexual/reproductive realms. But this time around, Wollstonecraft said that we cannot let that happen. If, however, we are going to craft a level playing field on which women have the same chances as men to be in charge of their lives, we have to understand how men constructed an uneven playing field in the first place.

According to Frederick Engels (colleague, confidant, and close friend of Karl Marx), a pivotal event in the ancient history of genders and families was the onset of the Agricultural Age. Before that epoch, most persons in most parts of the world were hunters/gatherers who survived on fishing and hunting, and also on consuming wild-growing berries, fruits, and nuts. But over ten thousand years ago, certain discoveries turned the world upside down— they were a game changer. Foremost among those innovations was plant cultivation along with the breeding of livestock.

The upshot of those innovations was that for the first time ever, land itself became much more than merely wild spaces over which to stalk game and collect the bounty (fruits, nuts, berries,seeds, etc.) that sprang from it. Land evolved gradually into something it had never been before— a valued economic commodity. Land could now be induced to grow crops and support livestock. Furthermore, land had a way of unexpectedly generating a surplus— an abundance— much more food than people could consume. They thus gained a level of material wealth (in the form of crops and livestock) never before imagined, much less actually experienced, during hunter-gatherer (HG) days. Hence, in pursuit of that bourgeoning surplus or wealth, many HGs gradually morphed into what we today might call “agriculturalists.” Thus, for many tribes, agriculture became what Marx and Engels described as their principal “means of economic production.” Agriculture either replaced, or for a while existed alongside, their HG activities.

The New Normal is about women in pursuit of autonomy, that is, sovereignty, self-determination. It's about women seeking to wrest control from men over both the economic and sexual/reproductive spheres. Inspired by the eighteenth-century Age of the Enlightenment, Mary Wollstonecraft incited the struggle that was then carried forward throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Consequently, the New Normal pursued today among advantaged segments (upper middle class) of the population is the result of more than two centuries of New Lights social and political action.

Note that I said women in pursuit of autonomy. Claiming sovereignty over their economic and sexual spheres is just the beginning. A once-for-all declaration does not abruptly make it happen. Recall that the US Declaration of Independence ignited a long and bitter war. And all too many of today's men, though not always with malice, tend to push back and resist the efforts of women to gain and maintain sovereignty. Hence, in order to preserve and expand their autonomy, women continually find themselves enmeshed in a lifetime of complex negotiations with men. Throughout their life-course women must negotiate and renegotiate the terms of their autonomy. And that is what Chapter 5 is about.

Earlier chapters showed that Old Lights are composed of that subset of conservatives who are dubious re social change— that is, theocratic evangelicals and traditional Catholics, among others. The historic complaint New Lights have against Old Lights is that they sacrifice women's justice, freedom, and human development on the altar of tradition. And a more recent New Lights complaint is that the Old Lights agenda is particularly hurtful to the socioeconomic well-being of women (and men) who are less advantaged (lower middle class, working class, poor, persons of color, and Latinx). That complaint— highlighted and underscored by the emerging Digital Era— alleges that the Old Normal is out of sync with the demands and opportunities of what, in the West, is fast becoming the pivotal economic way of life. Old Normal beliefs and practices— especially when written into laws and statutes— tend to hamper the capabilities of less advantaged women in particular (but also men) to cope with the awesome and daunting challenges posed by the developing economic arena.

Muscle power was the reason why men were able to build an uneven playing field in the first place— tilted in their favor and dispossessing women— and then sustain it throughout both the Agricultural and Industrial Ages. However, in the wake of the Digital Era muscle power is finally giving way to brainpower. No doubt Mary Wollstonecraft and her spiritual descendants would be pleased to learn that today the prospects for inventing a gender-level playing field seem brighter than ever before.

Recall the Chapter 3's argument that, in the developing Digital Era, educational reform, whose principal goal is to enhance students’ aptitude at reiterating accumulated information, leaves much to be desired. Accordingly, rather than simply tweaking the Industrial Age model, the notion of reform might give way to the more far-reaching prospect of makeover apropos for the Digital Era marketplace (DEM). Such a makeover is based on ideation, that is, critical/creative thinking that results in problem-solving and stimulation of fresh questions.

The call for makeover becomes especially relevant in light of the severe disruptions that COVID-19 inflicted on both K-12 and colleges. A few observers actually used the term “old normal” to describe the ways things were done by schools/colleges alike pre-COVID-19. And the perplexing question they now raise is, can we, and/or should we, go back to the old normal? If not, what would “new normal” schools/colleges look like?

Chapter 3 noted that long before COVID-19, MIT economists Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee argued that the Digital Era renders typical modes of school reform inadequate. They reminded us that the typical education model envisions the “expert” (teacher/professor/sage on the stage) actively imparting information and knowledge to “neophytes” (students) who are typically seated passively in a room before him/her. The major task facing the neophyte is to reproduce those imparted materials to the satisfaction of the expert. Nonetheless, at least for a while COVID-19 frustrated that model by making it a health risk for persons in the same room.

Hence, to cope with the requirement that participants be physically distant, many educators tweaked the traditional sage/neophyte model by simply transplanting it from in-person to online. To be sure, some educators had in prior years been exploring the promises and pitfalls of online courses.

While relaxing near the complimentary coffee dispenser at my local supermarket (pre-COVID-19), an African American man, whom I had never seen before nor have seen since, approached from out of nowhere. Mid-life and middle class, he had a warm smile and an entirely disarming demeanor. After the obligatory exchange of pleasantries, “Hello, how are you?,” what he said next took me by complete surprise: “You look like someone who's been around for a while, and maybe you can tell me what's happening. With all this bad stuff going on everywhere you look, what do you think the world's coming to?”

I have no idea why he thought to confront a total stranger with a ponderous existential question debated since the days of the ancient Greek philosophers. I could see he wasn't joking, but he did have an agenda: He was hoping I’d agree with his premise that the world is in fact getting worse by the day and that the old cliché really is true— we’re going to hell in a handbasket! Although it did not occur to me at the time, I wondered later if he thought I might perhaps join him in reciting the now infamous mantra, “Make America great again!”

He reminded me of those students in my university classes on families, genders, relationships, and sexualities who share an equally downbeat view of life. To counter their pessimism, I pose a decidedly upbeat possibility: “Over the long haul might things actually be getting better?” But when I suggested that idea to my acquaintance he immediately lost interest, and with a disappointed glance he turned around and vanished into the crowded store as suddenly as he’d appeared.

I regret that I failed to ask him what America was like before it started “going to hell.” I wonder what he would have said. A 2019 study from the Gallup research group offers a partial glimpse into what America looked like during the decades prior to the celebrated August 1969 Woodstock music festival compared to what it looks like today. Called “10 Major Social Changes in the 50 Years since Woodstock,” the author observed that “Woodstock wasn't so much a catalyst for change as a signal that it was coming. Woodstock was […] symptomatic of major societal changes underfoot.”

Way back in 1965, renowned Harvard sociologist Talcott Parsons published a widely read essay called “The Normal American Family.” For him, “normal” was comparable to what today's nurse means when he reports that the patient has a “normal” body temperature of 98.6. For instance, during the 2020 COVID-19 epidemic, certain facilities measured body temperature by requiring would-be entrants to stand before a device that cast a beam on their forehead. A screen on the device then displayed a number alongside its verdict— it told the nurse that the person's body temperature was either “normal” (98.6) or “not normal” (e.g., 103.9).

A reading of around 98.6 reveals two features about the person, both of which were analogous to what Parsons meant by the “normal” family. First, the person's body is deemed to be functioning at an optimal level. S/he is assumed not to be unhealthy. Positive things are probably going on inside the patient's body. On the whole they seem to be in good health; it is unlikely that anything menacing (like COVID-19) is lurking inside them.

Second, not only is s/he assumed to be in a healthy state, s/he gives no obvious evidence of potentially harming the health of those around her/him. And the flip side of assuming a nonnegative influence is the further assumption of a positive influence— besides doing no harm, s/he may be contributing in various positive ways to the health and well-being of others around her/him, that is, the Greater Good.

In the middle of the twentieth century, Parsons (as did most social scientists and laypersons) believed that “normal” marriage and “normal” family were limited to legally joined heterosexuals and were, in essence, one and the same entity. Indeed, we might coin the phrase marrfam to capture that single entity. Persons successfully doing marrfam were perceived to be “normal,” that is, they were seen as socially “healthy” persons. Not only did their normality benefit them personally, but being normal also benefitted their surrounding social context. They served the Greater Good mainly by, among other things, producing children that they then socialized to become “normal” members of society.

Women's quest for autonomy requires control/sovereignty over both the economic and sexual/reproductive spheres. The two spheres are packaged together— one is not necessarily more or less essential or consequential than the other. Both spheres are equally vital, and sovereignty over one enhances control over the other. Conversely, diminished control over one realm undermines sovereignty over the other.

Given that women's quest for autonomy lies at the core of the New Normal, what public policies might support that quest in the twenty-first century? New Lights took a big step toward answering that question a century ago by proposing the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) to the US constitution. Shortly after gaining the right to vote in 1920, American feminists led by Alice Paul discovered that in and of itself the vote was necessary but not sufficient to implement their ambitious objective of achieving autonomy.

Hence, to facilitate that objective, they proposed ERA. Though first introduced in Congress in 1923, it did not win final approval until 1972. Congress then sent the following text of ERA to the states where, initially, it sailed swiftly through the ratification process:

• Section 1. Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on account of sex.

• Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.

• Section 3. This amendment shall take effect two years after the date of ratification.

But just as ERA was racking up the states necessary for ratification, it got blindsided and shoved into limbo by fierce political opposition from Old Lights— those conservatives “who ignore or resist [social] change.” Throughout the 1970s/1980s, Old Lights terrified citizens with “fake news” re ERA, as depicted in the 2020 film Mrs. America. The film's protagonist is the Roman Catholic lawyer Phyllis Schlafly (Cate Blanchett) who headed the crusade to convince Americans that lifting the lid on women's life-options via ERA would damage both women and society alike. Undoing the shackles of patriarchy would, said Schlafly, backfire by exposing women to “perils” from which they had previously been shielded.

Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.'s response to the frequently asked question, “How long will it take to see social justice?” was both unequivocal and hopeful: “How long? Not long because the arc of the moral universe is long, but it bends toward justice. How long? Not long.” Dr. King was quoting freely from an 1853 sermon by the influential abolitionist minister Theodore Parker. Parker was confident that one day slavery would end, and, in fact, 12 years later it did— but not before America endured a nightmare of horrific suffering. Though by no means achieved entirely, the goal of social justice in the United States had by 1865 moved one huge step closer toward becoming reality.

The next critical step on the long road toward social justice was the gradual dismantling of legal/formal segregation in the United States— a tearing down brought about by the 1960s civil rights movement that Dr. King spearheaded. One consequence of that dismantling is that the “moral universe,” that is, the just society to which both Parker and King (and many others) aspired, though not yet a reality, is now closer to being realized than it was, say, 200 years ago.

Nevertheless, there is, as the biblical saying goes, “much land yet to be possessed.” For example, before he was assassinated, Dr. King focused much of his attention on the specter of socioeconomic inequality faced not just by persons of color but also by many Latinx persons and by disadvantaged white Americans as well.