It need hardly be stressed that ‘the land question’ is again at the centre of the political stage. Soaring city centre prices make rational land-use planning virtually impossible, while on the fringes of our urban areas, and in regions of new development, speculators increase the costs of new ventures while returning to the community none of the associated gain in land-values. The objectives of a land policy should be clear. In the first place, speculation in land must come to an end. Secondly, those real increases in the value of land which will nonetheless result from developments which change an area’s potential must be recouped for the community. Thirdly, the public should have control over the allocation of land as a valuable scarce resource.

The problem is to design a land policy which can achieve these objectives and at the same time be politically, financially and administratively feasible. In the design of any such land policy, there are certain major questions which must be resolved. These key questions are central to any understanding of the failure of past policies, and critical for the formulation of any future successful approach.

Firstly, much previous discussion has centred around the choice between taxation of increases in the value of land, and outright public ownership. The arguments for the taxation approach include on the one hand that it generates income through securing ‘betterment’ for the community, and on the other hand that its costs in compensation are zero. Outright ownership, however, can also generate a continuous income through rents. Although this income will admittedly probably at first be smaller because it will have to be set against compensation, the reduction can be minimized by careful phasing of compensation. Moreover, ownership represents a less easily reversible policy, and therefore a more permanent income. Furthermore, the taxation approach suffers from a major disadvantage not shared by outright ownership. This is the crucial question of the level of recoupment of the increase in value. If the whole of this increase is taken by the state through tax, the market in land seizes up altogether.

Perched on what appears to be an uncomfortable grey cube, Doreen Massey is shown on grainy CCTV footage being interviewed by curator Hans Ulrich Obrist (H.U.O.) and architect Rem Koolhaas, as part of the Serpentine Gallery’s first 24-hour interview marathon in 2006 (Obrist & Koolhaas 2006). It is an art celebrity event and among those being interviewed are Damien Hirst, Doris Lessing, Brian Eno and Zaha Hadid. H.U.O. notes that Doreen’s text, “London Inside-Out”, was key to their preparations of “this whole marathon. It’s a text that we always came back to.” As the interview progresses, H.U.O. returns to her influence: “You are, as a professor of geography, in terms of influence, venturing into all kinds of other fields. Many of my artist friends are unusually inspired by your books.” And then he asks, “I was wondering what are your inspirations. What are your … I mean heroes is kind of a big word.” She ventures that she does not have heroes. Rather, there are lives that she finds fascinating:

Asked more explicitly about her disciplinary influences, she turns instead to her geographical preoccupations, foremost that of reconceptualizing space. When Rem Koolhaas asks her “Is this space you are talking about the same space that architects work in?”, she replies, “I’ve wondered about that for donkey’s years because I have worked with architects a lot.” She concedes that her preoccupation is more abstract. Perhaps

We are now in a position to illustrate quantitatively the evolution of the Italian economy over the period 1945–2016. Typically, it is not an easy exercise to piece together over a long period data published by national statistical offices (in Italy Istat, founded in 1926 by the statistician Corrado Gini). These data are constructed to produce short-term comparisons and, as a result of international agreements, the methods of construction of aggregates often change, making it difficult to compile long-run series. Fortunately, as part of the celebrations in 2011 of the one hundred and fiftieth anniversary of a unified Italy, both Istat and the historical office of the Bank of Italy have collected and homogenized existing historical series, precisely for the purpose of building up a coherent long-run analysis. In particular, the historical office of the Bank of Italy, which had already began to revise Italian GDP historical series at the time of its hundredth anniversary in 1993, decided to complete the task by producing a renewed and highly sophisticated 1861–2013 GDP series. In this chapter I will examine five key macroeconomic aspects of the Italian economy: 1) population and employment; 2) GDP, productivity and the movement of prices; 3) the foreign sector: exports, imports and the balance of payments; 4) the public sector: the budget, public debt and the welfare state; and 5) monetary policies. A final section will be devoted to institutions, which have only recently undergone measurement.

To keep the chapter manageable, I have not detailed in the tables each single year, but only those years marking watersheds or in need of specific explanations. The regional breakdown of the series is presented when relevant, using North-West (NW), including Piedmont, Liguria and Lombardy; North-East (NE), including Venetia, Friuli, Trentino-Alto Adige, Emilia-Romagna; Centre (C), including Tuscany, Marche, Umbria, Latium; and South (S), including all the remaining regions. International comparisons are used chiefly to highlight the current situation of Italy. An examination of the detailed features of the productive structure of the Italian economy is deferred to Chapter 4, while Chapters 5 and 6 will provide an analysis of two strategic dimensions: the human factor and the social factor. Here, in this chapter, one can find the aggregate picture.

One important element in recent feminist analyses of gender has been the investigation and deconstruction of dualistic thinking. This paper takes up one aspect of this issue of dualisms and the construction of gender. It examines the interplay between two particular dualisms in the context of daily life in and around high-technology industry in the Cambridge area of England. The focus on dualisms as lived, as an element of daily practice, is important (see Bourdieu 1977; Moore 1986), for philosophical frameworks do not exist ‘only’ as theoretical propositions or in the form of the written word. They are both reproduced and, at least potentially, struggled with and rebelled against in the practice of everyday living. The focus here is on how particular dualisms may both support and problematize certain forms of social organization around British high-technology industry.

High-technology industry in various guises is seen across the political spectrum as the hope for the future of national, regional and local economies (Hall 1985) and it is important, therefore, to be aware of the societal relations, including those around gender, which it supports and encourages in its current form of organization. In the United Kingdom, ‘high tech’ has been sought after by local areas across the country and has been the centrepiece of some of the most spectacular local-economic success stories of recent years. In particular, it is the foundation of what has become known as the ‘Cambridge phenomenon’ (Segal Quince and Partners 1985). The investigation reported on here is of those highly qualified scientists and engineers, working in the private sector in a range of companies from the tiny to the multinational, who form the core of this new growth. These are people primarily involved in research and in the design of new products. This is the high-status end of high tech. The argument in this paper takes off from two important facts about the scientists who work within this part of the economy: first, that the overwhelming majority of them are male; and, secondly, that they work extremely long hours on a basis which demands from them very high degrees of both temporal and spatial flexibility (see Henry and Massey 1995).

INTRODUCTION

The sports betting market in the USA is representative of the ambiguous situation of sports betting regulation at world level. Although the activity has long been forbidden by federal law (except, notably, in Nevada), it is estimated that between $50 billion and $400 billion is bet illegally with bookies and offshore websites (Miller 2015). Recent police investigations have enabled us to understand the high volume and reach of such illegal betting networks. Meanwhile, the evolution of betting products (in particular, mobile betting and the popularity of fantasy sports) is forcing authorities to further scrutinize the effectiveness of the prohibitory regime on sports betting. A number of states are officially contesting the federal ban on betting, including New Jersey, West Virginia, Mississippi, Arizona, Louisiana and Wisconsin. Sports representatives, such as the NBA commissioner in November 2014 (Silver 2014), are also progressively advocating an opening up of betting regulation. This push for legalization has already swept across the European Union, where national regulatory authorities chose to open up the activity to collect much-desired tax revenues and supervise, if not control, a lucrative market. Hence, although prohibition (or state monopoly) remains the norm at world level, the EU stands as an exception and mostly accepts non-prescriptive, if not permissive, regulatory regimes for betting. Czech Republic, the Netherlands and Sweden are among the latest countries that are considering adopting, or have adopted, a liberal approach to open up the market.

The ambiguity of betting and gaming’s legal status comes from the fact that the regulation of the activity is limited to the national level, although the Internet gave the activity a worldwide dimension. Whether states want to prohibit or constrain it, the market exists de facto. Most of the states enforce a prohibition regime, and, among the countries who have legalized the activity, many chose to implement a monopolistic regime (China, for example) or to severely limit the number of licences granted (France and Belgium, for example). But, in the meantime, some jurisdictions preferred an open regime and implicitly let operators target every potential consumer in the world.

CLASS AND OTHER AXES OF DIVISION

One strand of change within class analysis over the years, and one that is widely if not universally reckoned to have represented “progress”, has been the increasing attention paid to the intersection of class with, or its incorporation of, other axes of social differentiation and inequality. […]

It also seems clear […] that the debate over what one might call the “depth” of the relationship between class and other axes, has shifted. On the whole, it seems, the claims now being made are for a deeper level of interaction. At a number of points it is argued, for instance, that not only are social classes in their social outcomes empirically gendered or racialized but so too are the processes of class formation themselves. Thus Anne Witz, focusing on gender, provides a detailed explication of this in her examination of occupational structures, arguing that “gender matters in a further, more embedded, sense that has much more to do with the processes and mechanisms … underlying the historical specificities of forms of the social division of labour, of which occupational structure is one aspect” (p. 43). In other words, the construction of occupational positions must be taken to be part of class theory, and not assumed to be pre-given to it, and moreover that process of construction is itself gendered. For these reasons, she argues, “we need a new concept of class formation in order to describe the processes and mechanisms whereby occupational structures of ‘places’ emerge and gendered ‘persons’ come to be associated with them over time and, indeed, how these two processes are not necessarily sequential” (p. 43). Now, there are a number of ways in which such processes and mechanisms may operate, and both Witz and other authors in the collection engage with a range of them. There is, for instance, the way in which the bureaucratic career has been constructed as a male career. There is the dependence of career jobs on the existence of routine and non-career jobs, the former held more by men, the latter more by women.

[…]

MARXISM AND THE ANALYSIS OF CAPITALISM

[…]

Flows of value and the analysis of class relations

The phenomena and the causal processes which figure in [Spatial Divisions of Labour] are conceptualised in terms of class, and in more general terms social, relations and not in terms of value. This, I have come increasingly to believe, is an important distinction. Value analysis and class analysis are of course not mutually exclusive approaches; they are indeed clearly related. And value itself, as is oft repeated, is a social relation. However, they do often exist uneasily side by side in empirical analysis. Moreover it seems to me to make an important difference to the whole tenor of an analysis, which of the two is adopted as the main entry-point. This is quite apart from the byzantine entanglements into which the ‘law of value’ has fallen and which make it, in my view, unusable in any empirical economic calculus. This is not to say that the concept of value is not useful for thinking through the broad structures of the economy and for forming the absolutely necessary basis for some central concepts – exploitation, for instance. But that is quite different from the, in my view vain, attempts to use it as a basis for empirical economic calculation – the frequent references in some literature to things such as ‘the organic composition of capital’, for instance, often being in fact references to capital intensity measured in terms of price. However besides all these technical objections it seems to me that there are also important implications for the nature of analysis which arise from taking class rather than flows of value or even of capital as the initial frame.

Perhaps most obviously, class interests as perceived by the members of any class are not necessarily the same as economic interests and particularly not necessarily the same as short or medium-term economic interests. Moreover class interests may override immediate economic interests, or may hold the key to understanding why long-term rather than short-term economic advantage proved to be decisive as a basis for action.

Former US Speaker of the House of Representatives, Tip O’Neill is credited with the observation that “all politics is local”. Geographer Doreen Massey, more than anyone, has brought clarity to the complicated conceptual and political questions that this well-worn phrase brings in its train. Her work addressed questions such as: What is the local? How do we conceptualize places? Can politics be simultaneously rooted and progressive? What kinds of complications do feelings of belonging, home, and place bring in a globalizing capitalist world? Are such attachments bound to be reactionary and/or exclusionary? How do we theorize in ways that take into account social inequality and differences of all sorts? In addition to developing carefully worked-out, politically progressive, arguments on these issues, Doreen Massey articulated her arguments in distinctive ways. Doreen Massey’s voice and her presence were different from those of other leading scholars, and this difference mattered.

PLACE, DIFFERENCE AND DEBATE

Questions about the local, and about place, globalization and difference remain important questions, but they were especially pointed in the 1980s and early 1990s. I will start by discussing the significance of Doreen Massey’s thinking through personal recollections of the impact of her thinking on me as a young geographer during those very stimulating times. In the mid-1980s, I was teaching at a technical college in Cambridge (1986–7 academic year) and I used to sneak into Open University lectures and other free talks at Cambridge University given by the likes of Derek Gregory, David Harvey and Edward Soja. Their lectures were all about retheorizing capitalism, about structure and agency, and about the role of space in social life. These scholars (among others) were bringing ideas about postmodernism and postmodernity into geography. Their readings of French and German theorists and their arguments about space and how the experiences of space and of time were changing seemed fresh, exciting and important – and they certainly changed geography.

The end of the decade, 1989 to be exact, saw the publication of Edward Soja’s Postmodern Geographies and David Harvey’s The Condition of Postmodernity.

The nineteenth century saw the expansion of capitalist relations of production in Britain. It was a geographically uneven and differentiated process, and the resulting economic differences between regions are well known: the rise of the coalfields, of the textile areas, the dramatic social and economic changes in the organization of agriculture, and so forth. Each was both a reflection of and a basis for the period of dominance which the UK economy enjoyed within the nineteenth-century international division of labour. In this wider spatial division of labour, in other words, different regions of Britain played different roles, and their economic and employment structures in consequence also developed along different paths.

But the spread of capitalist relations of production was also accompanied by other changes. In particular it disrupted the existing relations between women and men. The old patriarchal form of domestic production was torn apart, the established pattern of relations between the sexes was thrown into question. This, too, was a process which varied in its extent and in its nature between parts of the country, and one of the crucial influences on this variation was the nature of the emerging economic structures. In each of these different areas ‘capitalism’ and ‘patriarchy’ were articulated together, accommodated themselves to each other, in different ways.

It is this process that we wish to examine here. Schematically, what we are arguing is that the contrasting forms of economic development in different parts of the country presented distinct conditions for the maintenance of male dominance. Extremely schematically, capitalism presented patriarchy with different challenges in different parts of the country. The question was in what ways the terms of male dominance would be reformulated within these changed conditions. Further, this process of accommodation between capitalism and patriarchy produced a different synthesis of the two in different places. It was a synthesis which was clearly visible in the nature of gender relations, and in the lives of women.

This issue of the synthesis of aspects of society within different places is what we examine in the following four subsections of this chapter.

Reading the “locality debates” in the late 1980s and early 1990s centred on Doreen Massey’s work propelled my transformation from an economist to a geographer – along with my conception of the world more generally. I was utterly compelled by her feminist reformulation of space and place, which came to me at a crucial conjunctural moment: the end of the Cold War; the apartheid regime’s unbanning of the African National Congress and other political parties; and returning to my native South Africa in 1990 after an absence of 19 years. It has profoundly shaped my research since the 1990s, and remains central to my teaching and political engagements.

Going back to re-read some of Doreen’s work for purposes of this chapter has reaffirmed her powerful influence – but it has also made clear to me our different relations to Marxism, and how they have diverged more widely since the mid-late 1990s. Yet reflecting on these differences and divergences itself represents yet another moment in a spatial education – one that has pushed me to think more carefully about changing interconnections of political and analytical commitments in different spatiohistorical conjunctures.

MOMENTS OF CONVERGENCE

Let me start with a brief account of how Massey appeared on my radar through the locality debates. During the height of debate in the late 1980s and early 1990s, I was teaching at MIT where a different though related debate was raging around what the industrial future would look like after the implosion of the Fordist–Keynesian compromise and, what in retrospect, we can see as the neoliberal onslaught. On one side were Michael Piore and Charles Sabel, with their celebratory account of what they called flexible specialization in The Second Industrial Divide: Possibilities for Prosperity (1984), and their insistence that “industry should abandon its attachment to standardized mass production” and emulate small-scale, innovative forms of modern-day craft production such as those in central and northwestern Italy. Fiercely contesting notions of flexible specialization, Ben Harrison maintained that “contrary to prevailing wisdom, the big firm is not only alive and well but is becoming more flexible and efficient”.

INTRODUCTION

The transnational characteristics of money laundering and terrorist financing have forced international and regional organizations to actively cooperate in the development of a countering framework. The Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF) and its recommendations have played the most significant role in the development of the European Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) Directives. The Directives’ primary elements are the criminalization of money laundering and terrorist financing and the preventive duties of the private sector. This chapter will evaluate the history of the current AML/CFT legislation and highlight certain specifics, such as the eff ectiveness, transparency, risk-based approach (RBA) and the challenges with respect to fundamental rights and freedoms.

THE EMERGENCE OF A GLOBAL APPROACH TO COUNTER MONEY LAUNDERING AND TERRORIST FINANCING

The evolution of technology and internationalization of the financial market go hand in hand with burgeoning criminal finance (Pieth 2004). The number of cross-border financial transactions has multiplied rapidly, thanks to the speed with which businesses can transfer large amounts of money, with a click of the mouse, to anywhere in the world (Fijinaut 2000). Together with other financial instruments, such as bank-to-bank loans, international mortgages and over-the-counter derivatives, this may ease the commission of financial offences. With the cross-border dimension of the transaction, national legislation and enforcement authorities often fall short in fighting this kind of illicit behaviour. It is, therefore, unsurprising that money launderers and terrorist financiers have little difficulty in finding loopholes in domestic jurisdictions. Evidently, the fight against these crimes requires an international approach, which encompasses cooperation and the implementation of international legislation (Mitsilegas 2003; Gilmore 2004).

Mature, transnational criminal organizations are a big concern, as they “have developed extremely complex organizational structures, reminiscent of multinational corporations […] designed to maximize profits and minimize risks” (Gilmore 2004). Even though these organizations appear most effective in their home states (Europol 2013), because of their long-established networks, they are often involved in cross-border crimes to maximize their profits.

This chapter examines in more detail the nature of capitalism in Italy and its distinctive features, in particular its strong manufacturing specialization in hundreds of niche areas in which many Italian SMEs are world leaders. The “made in Italy” brand, a synonym for high quality and advanced design, does not comprise only of fashion, but also of other sectors of industry, mostly metal-engineering (see Table 4.1). Traditional industry (textiles, clothing and leather) declined from 31.4 per cent of the labour force in 1951 to 13 per cent in 2011, while over the same period metal and engineering products have risen from 30.1 per cent to 42.8 per cent. The impact of this shift on value added (VA) is even greater and, as we shall see, the impact on exports is overwhelming.

Big business in Italy is not widespread, and today is largely made up of the legacy of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), partly privatized. Table 4.2 shows the great “de-concentration” of Italian industry after 1971. In the years of the economic miracle, one quarter of the labour force worked in companies with more than 500 employees, while today it is only 10 per cent. There were 241 firms with more than 1,000 employees in 1991, with an average number of workers equivalent to 3,228; in 2011 that figure had reduced to 176 with an average of 2,438 workers, totalling only a little over 400,000 workers. The only two sizes of firm to have substantially enlarged over time are the 10–19 employees and 20–49 employees, while those between 50 and 499 have fluctuated at around 30 per cent of the total. Today, the average size of a manufacturing firm in Italy is around 10 workers. We should qualify this statement by recognizing that Italian entrepreneurs often prefer to build groups of smallish enterprises that are formally autonomous, rather than seek to merge their labour force into one single unit. This has only become apparent after the approval of legislation in 1991 that obliges companies to have a consolidated budget, but even after 1991, there are plenty of groups inside which there are companies that remain unconsolidated, making it difficult to produce a precise quantitative analysis.

Doreen Massey, socialist feminist, engaged geographer and influential public intellectual, died during the night of 11 March 2016, aged 72. Tributes poured in through social media. “Now we understand what everyone else felt about David Bowie”, was one attempt to convey the scale of our loss. Doreen’s body could sometimes be frail but her mind was brilliant and tough. As a character she was strong, passionate, curious and also imbued with modesty and kindness. She radiated political energy and humanity, sparkling with a cheeky wit.

With a steady flow of books, such as For Space, The Anatomy of Job Loss, and Space, Place and Gender and contributions to the books of others such as Huw Beynon’s Digging Deeper, a collection on the politics of the 1984/85 miners strike, she worked alongside others such as David Harvey, to establish geography as the intellectual source of a powerful, integrated critique of predatory capitalism in the age of climate change and the corporate driven global market.

Her academic base was the Open University to which she was strongly loyal because of its openness and accessibility to all who wanted to learn. She turned down professorships from elsewhere, including from Oxford, which she considered too exclusive and elitist for her far-reaching educational mission. She became a mentor, both through her writings and through a tireless round of talks and personal conversation, to generations of young geographers; their appreciation was evident in the Twitter storm that followed the shock of her death.

She was proud of winning the Prix Vautrin Lud (“Nobel de Geographie”) and she organized a celebration with her large and varied circle of friends in typically convivial Doreen style. On the other hand, she was appalled to hear that the vehemently hated establishment wanted to award her an Order of the British Empire (OBE). The result was an urgent phone call to get contact details of other refuseniks of royal awards Ken Loach, John Palmer and more in order to plan how to ensure that her refusal had a maximally antiroyalist impact.

INTRODUCTION

In 1978, on a brisk, bright Friday morning in early spring, the dozen or so of us taking Jacquie Burgess’s third-year philosophy of geography course at University College, London, trooped down Tottenham Court Road, took a right on Goodge Street, and walked the mile or so to the architecturally brutal modernist Polytechnic of Central London. We were there to participate in a day-long conference on ideology and geography. Sir Peter Hall (although then still a commoner), Ron Johnston (not yet a recipient of the Order of the British Empire, or OBE) and Doreen Massey (not yet having refused an OBE) were speakers. From my perspective, the event was perfectly timed. My course paper was on ideology and geography, pretentiously called, “Never mind the truth, here’s the ideologues”. The title was a riff on the Sex Pistols’ album, Never Mind the Bollocks, Here’s the Sex Pistols, released a few months before. Because of the record title’s profanity, you had to buy the album in a plain brown paper bag. Ratcheting up the pretension, I handed in my paper to Jacquie Burgess in a plain brown paper bag. Like the Queen’s reaction to the Pistols’ version of “God Save the Queen”, Jacquie Burgess was not amused. “Bollocks”, she said. That is, Jacquie Burgess, not the Queen.

For my course paper, I read everything in Volume 5, issue 3, of Antipode, “Ideology in Geography”, including Doreen Massey’s (1973) contribution, “Towards a Critique of Industrial Location Theory”. It was brilliant, the first piece I’d read in economic geography that took on the neoclassical economic underpinnings of spatial science. It showed how each of the presumed universal assumptions of neoclassicism were not so universal, their deployment producing only inconsistency and contradiction. Massey argued that the end of neoclassical theory, as well as industrial location theory, was not to explain the world but only to justify and legitimate ideologically what it studied, industrial capitalism.

INTRODUCTION

Globalization is the process by which businesses or other organizations develop international influence or start operating on an international scale. Globalization has been encouraged by many organizations, such as the European Union (EU), the North American Free Trade Agreement, as well as the World Trade Organization. These institutions have fostered and enabled the opening of economies for international trade and cooperation in the past decades because globalization has been a force for good; it has increased global wealth, by growing economies and creating employment; and it has brought more people out of poverty than has been achieved at any other point in history.

An essential part of globalization is the incorporation of capital, information and technological expertise into one market, allowing the participants in this process to approach other parts of the world at a more rapid pace and with lower costs (Schroeder 2001). The financial sector, therefore, gains particular benefits from globalization. In fact, it is often stated that the financial market is the only sector that “has realized globalization in the true sense of ‘globalization’” (Shangquan 2000). One of the unintended effects of a globalized financial system, however, has been the globalization of crime.

Variously defined as “deviant behaviour [that] violates the prevailing norms and cultural standards on how humans ought to behave”, as a “public wrong” and as an exploit “injurious to the community” (Ormerod 2005), crime exists and endures because it offers the individual an opportunity to gain. Crime provides the individual with a cost-effective source of power, influence and authority, and so crime, it must be recognized, is the unavoidable consequence of human ambition and creativity, and the flip side of entrepreneurial spirit. It is held to be “wrong” and “injurious” because the private gains it creates typically benefit the criminal far less then they cost society. Estimates place the cost of crime to the US, for example, at about $1 trillion per annum (Anderson 1999; Reuter & Truman 2004; Takats 2007). Thus, inevitable as it may be, society can tolerate only a low level of crime, and all “injurious” behaviour must be criminalized.