This chapter provides an overview of the book. It presents the outcome of interest: the political strategies of teachers or the different ways that teachers mobilize in politics. These strategies are referred to as instrumentalism (strategic alliances), movementism (recurrent protests), and leftism (alliances with left parties). The chapter explains the significance of these strategies in relation to the labor movement and education politics, and it introduces the main argument. This chapter shows that examining the ways in which teachers mobilize in politics helps to shed light on normative questions about how they shape education policy and democratic governance.

The penultimate chapter is about the reliquary shrine of Saint Charlemagne known as the Karlsschrein. It explores both the political and the religious significance of the monument and how the local convent, the city and the imperial court all participated in its making. By delving deep into the history of Aachen and its surrounding region, the ex-Kingdom of Lotharingia, Sulovsky shows how every single inconsistency was deliberately chosen to make a political or religious point. Thus, where previous scholars only focused on the major figures on the shrine, this book presents dozens of overlooked depictions both of symbolic animals and of humans, including representations of the local community. Moreover, where scholars struggled to find an exact purpose for the shrine’s appearance, the author makes it clear that the papal–imperial negotiations for the introduction of hereditary monarchy served as the foundation for the new vision of the Holy Roman Empire. Indeed, the Karlsschrein is shown to refer not only to Charlemagne’s foundation of the city and church of Aachen, and also of the Empire, but to the centuries-long papal–imperial alliance.

The Introduction previews cycles of silence theory, which seeks to explain how criminal groups constrain citizen cooperation with the police. The Introduction focuses on laying out the book’s central contributions. Theoretically, the book provides a new explanation for how criminal groups prevent cooperation with the police, highlighting the role of their violence in suppressing perceived norms favoring cooperation. The theory speaks to the political science literatures on state-building, political conflict, and criminal governance as well as literatures from other social science disciplines including criminology. Methodologically, the study bridges research divides between the Global North and Global South by testing the theory in both regions. The study also employs realistic survey experiments including a virtual reality–based survey experiment. Finally, the Introduction puts the study into perspective: While the book’s focus may be centered around the effect of violence, the violence should not be interpreted as a defining feature of communities that endure criminal groups.

This chapter shows how factional divisions in FECODE shaped electoral mobilization and ideological rigidity. It links the repertoire of leftism to competition among rival factions in internal union elections. Contrary to the Argentine tendency toward ongoing and disruptive protests, protests by FECODE were easier for the government to manage owing to the political priorities of union factions. The next section shows how factionalism and ideological rigidity produced rival negotiating strategies that limited the influence of union leaders on the policy process. The final section shows that leftism remained the central tendency of political mobilization for the union throughout the 2010s.

This chapter details cycles of silence theory explaining how criminal groups constrain citizen cooperation with the police. Criminal group violence not only reduces cooperation by heightening retaliation risk to cooperators but also by making community norms favoring cooperation appear weaker than they are to citizens. Due to violence- induced retaliation risk, citizens who support cooperation are forced to keep that support private. The potency of social norms in driving human behavior means that this suppression of norms that favor cooperation ultimately reduce witnesses’ willingness to come forward with information. The chapter also interrogates the theory’s central premise that underlying support for cooperation exists in communities. Perceptions of police and criminal group legitimacy are an important driver of support, so cycles of silence dynamics primarily operate in communities where criminal groups have failed to gain legitimacy. The chapter then theorizes why criminal groups’ primary goal of illicit economic gain undermines their legitimization efforts.

This chapter argues that the organizational structure of the Argentine teachers’ confederation (CTERA), with power rooted in provincial and municipal actors, is crucial for explaining why teachers engaged in ongoing protests. It examines the process of union rebuilding in the wake of democratization, after harsh repression during the military regime. Even if newly elected leaders offered little support to the union because of the debt crisis, union leaders made some progress in consolidating CTERA through their own initiatives. The chapter then turns to decentralization under President Carlos Menem as a point of inflection. This undermined national union leaders, weakening their hold on the base. Once organizational hierarchies were weakened, movementism became the union’s political strategy.

This chapter discusses the concept of wage labour and its history and proposes a definition of wage labour that includes the provision of remuneration in exchange for labour power, but also emphasizes the labourers’ continued free status and their concomitant ability to influence the price of their labour power, and thus the level of their wages – thereby allowing the price of labour power to be set on the market. From this follows discussion of the role of wage labour in debates on the ancient economy – in part asking which workers can be seen as wage labourers – and, further, of how paid military service can constitute a form of wage labour. It is argued that for soldiers to constitute wage labourers, their service needs to be voluntary, of temporary nature, and remunerated in coin or in kind.

Hired soldiers had to be incentivized to enlist, and subsequently induced to continue their service. Hence, together with the growing reliance on paid, voluntary tropps, we see the development of increasingly sophisticated systems of remuneration, comprising rewards in both coin and kind. Enlistment across all ranks of the royal armies was incentivized and, indeed, made possible via the provision of armour and equipment, or via grants of land to those recruited into elite divisions. Coined payments going beyond mere rations, as well as occasional bonuses, formed the bulk of the remuneration attested in both the textual and numismatic record. Additional benefits and privileges – such as the occasional right to plunder, tax breaks, legal protections, and family support – were also sometimes granted. Together, these incentives seem to have offered soldiers of the royal armies an above-average standard of living, as indicated by the qualitative and (sparse) quantitative evidence.

This dossier, included for ease of reference, contains the texts and translations of a selection of inscriptions cited in this volume, presented in chronological order. In each case, the text is accompanied by core information on the stone and bibliographical details of editions; the edition printed is indicated in bold. This is followed by the date, and discussion where major controversy exists. Abbreviations follow SEG and the Liste de Sigles of L’Année Philologique ; for all other publications, see the Bibliography.