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Chapter 1 - Contextualizing Paid Military Service

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 May 2024

Charlotte Van Regenmortel
Affiliation:
University of Liverpool

Summary

This chapter provides the historical and scholarly context to the book’s main argument, and hence treats the military and economic developments that engulfed the Greek world in the late Classical and early Hellenistic periods. arguing that these should be seen as intrinsically connected. Following discussion of scholarly approaches to the economic transformation of the Greek world at this time, paying special attention to the old formalist–substantivist debate, the chapter advocates a closer look at the types of markets available, especially the market for labour. This market, the book contends, first appeared in a full form in the military sphere; accordingly, the chapter questions scholarly approaches and attitudes towards paid military service, debating especially the notion of ‘mercenary’ soldiers, who should better be conceived of as military wage labourers.

Type
Chapter
Information
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2024

In a seminal 1986 article, Michel Austin argued for the need to combine the military and economic developments of the Hellenistic period into a single explanatory framework.Footnote 1 His argument goes that because the Hellenistic kings’ legitimacy was based on military prowess and armies were composed of paid soldiers, numerous and frequent campaigns were fought to justify the current balance of power and to keep intact the military funds required to retain the soldiers’ loyalty. In this regard, military and economic developments consistently fed into each other.

This study builds on the arguments first advanced by Austin. It aims to provide an analysis of the intersection between early Hellenistic military and economic developments and does so from a labour history perspective. The research is thus firmly placed within the ‘new military history’, which advocates for the inseparability of military and societal developments.Footnote 2 The use of the paradigms developed in labour history leads the research to focus on questions such as the nature of the relations between soldiers and commanders, as well as the ways in which soldiers had a role to play as agents of socio-economic change. It is the conceptualization of soldiers as labourers – specifically as wage labourers – that allows for the transition from military into economic history.

This chapter introduces both the historical and scholarly context of the present research. To that end, it will first offer a brief historical background, focused on the military and economic developments that took place during the late Classical and early Hellenistic periods. In the military sphere, the most prominent developments are the continued expansion of both military participation and professionalization, while the economies, too, appear to have advanced significantly across these years, showing increased performance, integration, and sophistication. Subsequently, the chapter will give an overview of the debate on the ancient economy and how this has informed discussion of the Hellenistic economies; it will emphasize the need to study the existence and types of markets, especially labour markets, to enhance understanding of the economic changes witnessed. Finally, the chapter will argue that the conceptualization of the soldiers of the royal armies as mercenaries requires revision, before presenting the alternative view of soldiers as wage labourers.

1.1 Towards the Hellenistic World: A Brief Military and Economic History

The Hellenistic world has long been seen as socially, politically, and economically distinct from preceding epochs. Although recent scholarship has stressed the continuities between the Classical and Hellenistic periods,Footnote 3 the changes that engulfed the ancient Mediterranean and beyond, roughly from the conquests of Alexander onwards, should not be downplayed. In this period, the vast area that had long been populated by independent polis communities, scattered across the Aegean, with the Achaemenid Empire to the east, largely fell under the control of a handful of kingdoms. The Ptolemaic kingdom in Egypt had formed a stable power-bloc from Ptolemy’s appointment as governor in 323. To the east, the Seleucid kingdom was established when Seleucus ousted Antigonid control of the region in c. 312. The Antigonid kingdom controlling Macedonia and a large part of the Greek mainland emerged as a stable territory in c. 275, when Demetrius’ son Antigonus II Gonatas managed to solidify the dynasty’s hold of the region. The Attalids in Pergamon formed another important power-bloc but did not act independently until 261, when the Attalid ruler Eumenes cut ties with the Seleucids, and it was not formally a kingdom until 238, when Attalus I took the title of king. These powers were headed by kings whose rule can best be characterized as a form of stable authoritarianism. Indeed, the subjugation of Greece under Philip II of Macedonia in 338, and, a few years later, the conquest of the Achaemenid Empire by Alexander, had for the first time united this vast stretch of territory under single rule, leading the way to the emergence of a globalized Mediterranean, in which contacts between people in widely distant localities intensified.Footnote 4

The prevalence of military conflict immediately stands out: war itself became one of the period’s dominant characteristics and one that is said to have permeated the Hellenistic world in all its facets; it was on an unparalleled scale and occurred with unrivalled frequency.Footnote 5 The apparent need for incessant war-making has been explained by the role it had to play in legitimizing the kings’ rule. A king, it is argued, was firstly a military leader, whose authority thus depended on his military prowess – as best illustrated by the fact that the various Successors who took the title of king were generals who did so only after a significant military victory.Footnote 6 This pattern of royal legitimacy and military success endured across the following generations and thus remained a crucial driving force behind the military activity of the period.Footnote 7

The need for military superiority to ensure political survival was, however, not a feature reserved for the Hellenistic period, but instead finds its roots in the rise of Philip II of Macedonia. Philip came to power in 359,Footnote 8 when his brother, Perdikkas, fell in battle against the Illyrian king Bardylis, alongside 4,000 of his forces.Footnote 9 The kingdom inherited by Philip was in a precarious state, beset on all directions of the compass by hostile neighbours – most notably the Illyrians – who were intent on expansion. Philip’s position and life were likewise in danger, and rivals to the Macedonian throne soon appeared on the horizon.Footnote 10 By Philip’s death in 336, however, all hostile neighbouring areas had been incorporated into the Macedonian kingdom, and Philip was de facto king of the wider Greek mainland.Footnote 11 Much of his success has been attributed to diplomatic skills, but his military reforms were crucial and indeed marked a turning-point in the kingdom’s military capacities.

Briefly stated, Philip’s reforms in terms of military hardware consisted of the introduction of a lighter cuirass and shield, and the replacement of the short hoplite sword and spear with the long spear known as the sarissa.Footnote 12 These changes in equipment allowed for an altogether more mobile army that could fight at long range. In this regard, his reforms marked the death of the hoplite phalanx, whose members had been weighed down by heavy armour and had been forced to fight at close range. Furthermore, unlike the forces of the Greek poleis, the Macedonian army made extensive use of cavalry, whose skills had quickly fostered their reputation as a deadly force. More importantly, perhaps, Philip is said to have subjected his soldiers to a continuous and intensive training regime,Footnote 13 because of which the quality of his army stood in marked contrast to that of the ‘amateur’ forces of the Greek poleis. Philip also heavily invested in the development of technology, of which improvements in siege warfare are the best example.Footnote 14

The demands of Alexander’s extensive and long-term campaign arguably left little time for such large-scale technological reconsiderations; yet we see innovation when circumstances required strategically savvy solutions, such as the building of a mole for the siege of Tyre in 332. The Successors, who were equally under constant pressure from competitors for power, displayed a renewed interest in military technology, and this process continued under the Hellenistic kings in later generations. Thus, the already lethal Macedonian cavalry was supplemented with elephants; ship sizes were ever amplified; and siege equipment, including artillery, became more sophisticated.Footnote 15

The technological and strategic advancements that began with the reforms of Philip have been much discussed, and are generally seen as the critical factor behind early Macedonian military dominance.Footnote 16 However, as argued by Ellis, Philip’s principal military innovation was simply expansion,Footnote 17 and the continuous enlargement of armies, underpinned by expansion of Macedonian-controlled territory and integration of its sub-regions, persisted well into the Hellenistic period: indeed, the rate of military participation in the Classical period pales in the face of the numbers fielded after the death of Alexander, even for small battles. Although the reliability of numbers of military participants reported in ancient authors is sometimes questioned, those found in relation to the battles of the Hellenistic world are seen as acceptable,Footnote 18 as are the numbers for Greek troops in the Archaic and Classical periods.Footnote 19 A cursory overview of forces recruited by the various poleis from among the citizens shows that, despite the many grand narratives of war stemming from the Classical period, battle was then a relatively small-scale affair.Footnote 20 The extent of Athenian forces as enumerated by the Thucydidean Pericles, for instance, consisted of 13,000 hoplites, 1,200 cavalry, and 1,600 archers, in addition to the 16,000 young and veteran soldiers deployed as garrisons.Footnote 21 Whether these numbers are a deliberate exaggeration is difficult to tell, but they certainly seem to represent an absolute maximum. In fact, Beloch has argued that Athens could not deploy more than 6,000 men.Footnote 22 The accounts of various military engagements of the fifth century seem to indicate as much: the number of soldiers deployed ranges typically between 1,000 and 2,000.Footnote 23 Even at the outset of the Sicilian expedition in 415, Thucydides, in praise of the magnitude of the assembled army, reports a mere 4,000 hoplites and 300 cavalry.Footnote 24 The same range of numbers is attested for other poleis: at Delion in 424, the Boeotian League mustered 8,000 men, to whom 10,500 auxiliary forces were added;Footnote 25 and in the Boeotian War in 378, Sparta and its Peloponnesian allies had a total of 18,000 men at their disposal.Footnote 26 Even during the Hellenistic period, polis-based military participation did not significantly expand:Footnote 27 in 217, for instance, the Achaean League managed to raise a standing army of 8,000 mercenary infantry and 500 cavalry, in addition to 3,000 picked citizen infantry and 300 cavalry.Footnote 28

In contrast, at the battle of Chaeronea in 338, Philip II of Macedonia brought a force of 32,000 men, made up of Macedonians and allies.Footnote 29 From this moment onwards, the size of Macedonian armies grew rapidly: Alexander set out with 32,000 infantry, and 4,500 cavalry,Footnote 30 to which the expeditionary force under the command of Parmenion, which set out in 336, and the 13,500 men left under arms in Macedonia should be added.Footnote 31 The trend towards increasingly larger armies continued under the Successors and Hellenistic kings. In 317, for instance, Antigonus fielded 36,500 men against Eumenes’ 35,000.Footnote 32 These numbers, however, do not come close to the forces reportedly mustered in later generations, when Ptolemy IV’s army is said to have comprised 75,000 soldiers, against Antiochus III’s army of 62,000 at the battle of Raphia in 217.Footnote 33 As we shall see, this expansion in numbers can be attributed to an apparent shift in attitudes towards military service, and the increased acceptance of non-citizen forces to fill the ranks of the respective armies allowed rulers to recruit from unprecedented pools of manpower.

However grim the picture painted by the predominance of near-constant and more efficient warfare may seem, the Hellenistic age was not all tumult and disruption. Quite the contrary: as argued by Davies, ‘the world which the Romans overran had advanced economically well beyond that which Alexander knew’.Footnote 34

The chief economic development was heightened monetization, as indicated by the elevated output of coins of various denominations.Footnote 35 The general adoption of the Athenian weight standard under the Successors – except for Ptolemy in Egypt – had at least the hallmarks of a single monetary system.Footnote 36 This push, supported by the establishment of mints across the territories in which the armies of Alexander and his Successors were active, has rightly been associated with the need to pay troops; this was made possible initially through the acquisition of immense amounts of bullion from the Achaemenid treasuries.Footnote 37

While military needs were the crucial factor in the drive towards monetization and thereby the extraction of resources from conquered areas, the wealth generated also allowed for the cultivation of specialists of a non-military kind. The Hellenistic kingdoms especially made considerable investment in human capital. Ptolemaic cultivation of intellectuals in Alexandria is particularly conspicuous, but similar royal investments are seen in the call on other specialists, such as the artists and architects in the service of the Attalids of Pergamon;Footnote 38 the engineers responsible for the increasingly large and more effective warships;Footnote 39 and even professional diplomats cited on the royal payrolls.Footnote 40

The scale of economic activity – and not only that of the royal economies – is shown by growth in trade, and thus in goods produced and transported, apparent, as so often, from proxy evidence. An oft-cited piece of data is the increase in the number of shipwrecks dated to the Hellenistic period, predominantly found off the coast of south-east Turkey,Footnote 41 which, as it happened, was also one of the leading regions for the production of amphorae.Footnote 42 As argued by Gibbins, the preponderance of shipwrecks dated to this era ‘suggests this was a period of intensified maritime trade in general’.Footnote 43 The number and types of commodities traded across the geographical extent of the Hellenistic world were substantial and ranged from necessities such as timber and salt to spices and other luxuries, and even to elephants.Footnote 44

These economic developments went hand in hand with increased standards of living, for which the size of city dwellings and the sophistication of construction are an oft-used proxy. While such growth is already seen from c. 800 onwards,Footnote 45 significant improvements come in the Hellenistic period. Davies has highlighted the importance of large-scale construction projects in the period, notably palaces and temples.Footnote 46 Similarly, non-elite housing displays dwellings of higher quality.Footnote 47 Such proxies for growth are not without problems, and the improvement in and enlargement of accommodation, of course, need not imply improved standards of life. Yet it is nonetheless clear that the (early) Hellenistic period reveals multiple signs of economic well-being for at least some people outside the royal economies. This is evidenced also, for instance, by individuals’ generous gifts to poleis or to temples.Footnote 48 At the same time, as will be argued, the royal money paid to soldiers, private contractors, or merchants must have found its way into civic economies.Footnote 49

However, the boom in the Hellenistic economy was not universal. Despite the sweeping developments on the grand scale, Reger stresses the need to consider regional differences,Footnote 50 arguing that most local economies remained small-scale, subsistence economies.Footnote 51 Chaniotis shares this view in the context of Hellenistic Crete: although some increase in trade is witnessed, the island nonetheless retained a subsistence economy; that is to say, it remained a ‘traditional’ economy based on agriculture, pastoralism, and primary extraction combined with relatively short-distance exchange networks. Thus, with the exception of timber, few to no goods appear to have been produced for export, and Crete was seemingly not integrated into the wider economic networks of the Hellenistic world.Footnote 52 The period’s military vicissitudes must likewise have negatively affected regional economies to varying degrees,Footnote 53 while also serving as a driving force behind the (positive) economic developments witnessed.Footnote 54 However, although these regional economic continuities should be acknowledged, other scholars, such as Davies, prefer to stress macro-economic developments, and indeed observe a general move towards more integrated economies across the Hellenistic world: they thereby postulate significant economic development,Footnote 55 leading to the characterization of these economies as proto-capitalist in nature.Footnote 56

Recent studies on the Hellenistic period, therefore, reveal a world that had many continuities with the world of the Classical polis, but also significant differences. Politically, it saw the rise of the Hellenistic monarchies within an increasingly globalizing Mediterranean; militarily, vast technological improvements and changes in the nature of military service led to the most effective and largest armies the ancient world had seen thus far; economically, we see good evidence for the rise of increasingly integrated economies and improved economic conditions. These developments should be seen as two sides of the same coin; they should, however, be analysed in terms of economic structures, and for the role that the changing military institutions, so intimately connected to royal policy, played in them.

1.2 Debating the Ancient Economy: The Relevance of the Labour Market

The long and extended debate on the nature of ‘the ancient economy’, and thus on the economic structures that governed the ancient world, has been characterized as ‘an academic battleground’, in which ‘no new weapon is lethal, and none of the battles is decisive’.Footnote 57 This debate has taken on several forms but essentially revolves around the question of whether the economies of the ancient world operated in the same way as those of the modern world, and, if so, whether they can or should be studied along the same parameters.Footnote 58 Despite much scholarly engagement with the question, which gained momentum in the 1970s when the so-called Finley Orthodoxy took the fort by storm, consensus was hard to come by; subsequently, scholarship sought refuge in new paradigms – predominantly, but by no means universally – by employing the framework and methods of the New Institutional Economics (NIE). However, as argued by Mattingly and Salmon, the original debate ‘has refused to die, because both sides are right’,Footnote 59 and it appears that no entirely different theoretical paradigm, but rather a more flexible approach to the role of the market is the direction in which to make progress.

The debate had originally commenced during the turn of the nineteenth century when Karl Bücher and Eduard Meyer clashed head-on: Bücher proposed that the ancient economy formed an example of a primitive economy,Footnote 60 whereas Meyer argued that ancient Greece showed all the characteristics of modern developed economies.Footnote 61 Thus the schism emerged between ‘primitivists’ and ‘modernists’, who in essence debated whether the ancient economy lagged in its development or else had developed to the same level as that of the modern world, with the same kinds of institutions. The discussion gained sophistication in the later emergence of the opposing camps of ‘formalists’ and ‘substantivists’.Footnote 62 While formalists assume the universality of economic laws and behaviour and therefore apply the theory and methods of neo-classical economics to all known economies, substantivists argue that those are features of the industrialized world and that the economies of previous periods accordingly need to be studied in quite different ways.

Among ancient historians, the predominant proponent of the substantivist view has been Moses Finley, whose The Ancient Economy, first published in 1973, long dominated the study of and approaches to ancient economic behaviour.Footnote 63 Finley’s central hypothesis is that the structures of ancient economies differed significantly from our modern ones, that the ancients lacked economic consciousness and therefore rationalism, and that consequently the application of modern economic theories to the ancient world is bound to fail since they are anachronistic. While there was an economy of sorts, manifested by, for instance, trade or by the presence of production of goods and services, there were no ‘economics’; that is to say, economic behaviour was aimed at and governed by the acquisition of necessities, not by a desire for profit. Features of modern economies such as markets, business cycles, mass production, or credit effectively did not exist in the ancient world, and it is spurious to look for them.

The substantivist view as exposed by Finley has, of course, not been without its critics. Economic principles were undoubtedly discovered in the ancient world,Footnote 64 and there was at least an awareness of profit-making behaviour.Footnote 65 Recent work, exploiting especially the growing body of archaeological data, has also questioned Finley’s alleged lack of growth in the ancient world.Footnote 66 In fact, Finley’s use, and at times suppression of evidence, in which he appears to be guided by almost dogmatic adherence to the theory, caused unease from the moment of The Ancient Economy ’s publication.Footnote 67 Criticism appears to have come predominantly from the Roman side of the spectrum,Footnote 68 while scholars of the Archaic and Classical Greek worlds seem more sympathetic to the substantivist model.Footnote 69 This divergence of opinion might be attributed to the available sources for the respective periods and to scholars’ core interests, but hard data such as the variations in lead pollution levels found in the Greenland icecaps indicate that the Greek and Roman economies were conducted on significantly different scales, implying a different structure.Footnote 70

Perhaps worn down by the continuous yet inconclusive debate along these lines, more recent scholarship advocates an allegedly new approach altogether, and studies the ancient economy from the viewpoint of the New Institutional Economics (NIE).Footnote 71 North, one of the approach’s leading theorists, argues that ‘the task of economic history is to explain the structure and performance of economies through time’.Footnote 72 Acknowledging that different societies in history saw different economic structures, the NIE contends that the study of a given economy should be the study of the said economy’s accompanying institutions, defined as the formal or informal ‘rules’ that govern behaviour.Footnote 73 The predominant institutions that emerge as requisite for the successful allocation of goods and services, therefore, dictate the structure of the economy.

For many, the NIE appears to have provided a safe escape route from the debate. Offering an alternative vocabulary and methodologies, it certainly would seem to be a novel approach; however, while it is often presented as a solution to the deadlock in which the debate has found itself,Footnote 74 it nonetheless assumes the universality of economic behaviour. The institutions come into play in so far as they curtail the market, and they do so in different ways. Adherence to the neo-classical paradigm reveals itself in the NIE’s focus: rather than studying economic structure, it studies performance, making full use of neo-classical concepts and, at times, vocabulary. Of these, the focus on growth stands out. While the NIE studies how institutions either curbed or facilitated the market and growth, it does not in fact question whether growth could exist in the first place.Footnote 75

Rather than addressing the debate’s central question, namely whether the ancient economy was market-based or not, arguably the NIE has jettisoned the question from the discussion altogether.Footnote 76 Instead, it assumes that the market always existed but was curtailed in different ways and to varying degrees. While this approach incorporates the societal aspect through an analysis of institutions and their impact on economic processes, the acceptance of the universality of economic behaviour as postulated under market society nonetheless means that the NIE merely masquerades as a synthesis of the substantivist and formalist theories.

However, there is another route out. As recently advocated by Harris and Lewis, the terms of the debate ought to be restated: rather than question whether the market existed or not – which sets up a stark dichotomy which is ultimately unhelpful – the question that needs asking is what types of price-setting markets existed and where.Footnote 77 This approach is indeed more flexible and will cover differences in economic behaviour as well as patterns of market exchange within potentially substantivist economies, while not succumbing to a formalist view altogether.Footnote 78

Such an approach to the role, extent, and presence of the market is reminiscent of the substantivist attitude as advocated by Karl Polanyi, who envisaged three models of exchange, namely reciprocity, redistribution, and market exchange. Only in the third form is the economy a separate sphere of activity to which formalist views and neo-classical economics apply.Footnote 79 The other two forms are instead examples of ‘embedded economies’, which form the predominant modes of exchange to varying degrees in pre-industrial societies. Reciprocity refers to a system of multiple obligations in which the exchange of goods and services or the transfer of wealth occurs in concord with existing social bonds. In a redistributive economy, on the other hand, goods and services are acquired by a centre of some sort – usually of a political or religious nature – and redistributed among the members of the society. Market economies, then, are characterized by exchanges of goods and services occurring solely on the market, with both social and personal obligations no longer informing the nature of the transactions.

Nonetheless, despite this distinction between market societies and others, it is important to bear in mind that in Polanyi’s model markets can exist in otherwise substantivist economies.Footnote 80 For just as there are different types of exchange, there are also different types of market, not all of which will affect wider socio-economic structures.Footnote 81 For instance, markets known as ‘peripheral’, such as those dealing in luxury goods; ‘controlled’ markets, where goods are sold for fixed prices; or limited markets, which cater only to specific members of a community, are all unlikely to affect a community’s entire socio-economic structure.Footnote 82 It is only so-called ‘dominant’ markets that are associated with the disembedded economies. The markets are dominant when communities are reliant on them for the acquisition of goods and services. These markets ought to be seen as ‘self-regulating’, in so far as they inherently respond to the laws of supply and demand, which means that ‘the quantity of all goods supplied at a specific price will equal the demand at that price’.Footnote 83 Exchanges that occur on this market are negotiated between parties, and are, in principle, voluntary. At the moment of exchange, the transaction ends and thus creates no further social obligations.Footnote 84 Thus, market economies are characterized by the dominance of market exchange, manifested by individuals’ dependence on it for the provision of goods and services. In embedded economies, market-based exchange, as well as profit-driven behaviour, may therefore very well exist, but the scale and extent of these processes determine whether it can be characterized as a market economy.

Polanyi’s model therefore allows for the existence of several forms of exchange alongside one another, but one form is always dominant. In his view, ancient Greece was a redistributive economy but contained some markets within that framework – the flexibility of his approach in contrast to that of some more dogmatic substantivists is evident in his acknowledgement of variations within the ancient economies. For instance, despite his assessment of ancient economies as embedded, he also postulated that Classical Athens may have been on the brink of disembedding itself,Footnote 85 while the Hellenistic world is presented as the one ancient market-based society.Footnote 86 Thus, in Polanyi’s paradigm, markets and their associated behaviour can exist within an embedded economy, but they are not dominant. In this regard, the study of markets in non-market economies relates to their scale, type, and extent, while changes in economic structure are indicated by transformations in the balance between the various forms of exchange.

The process by which self-regulating markets can become dominant is closely related to the types of goods exchanged on such potentially peripheral self-regulating markets. As we shall see, in Polanyi’s model, particularly when the so-called ‘fictitious commodities’ of labour, money, and land are commodified, and therefore exchanged on the self-regulating market, the economy turns itself into a market economy, ushering in ‘the great transformation’.Footnote 87 The existence of a labour market is therefore indicative of an economy that is about to disembed itself, or has already done so. Here, therefore, the importance of the study of labour becomes apparent, and especially that of wage labour.Footnote 88 As we shall see, wage labourers are at once producers and consumers. In contrast to work performed in subsistence economies within which the household’s work generates its daily necessities, wage labour’s accompanying division of labour warrants a limit on the types of work performed by the individual. In addition, the fruits of a wage labourer’s work are rarely diversified, and usually consist of remuneration paid out in coin. Wage labour therefore results in an acute need for markets, so that workers can obtain the goods and services requisite for their daily upkeep.

Thus, a market for labour is by far the most important one in relation to changing economic structures, not least because of the role it plays in the structuring of patterns of production and subsequent exchange.Footnote 89 Its potential existence is therefore a crucial variable to add to the discussion on the changing economic structures of the late Classical and Hellenistic periods. As this study argues, such a market ought to be looked for in the military sphere, where payment and voluntary service became increasingly common.

1.3 Questioning the Mercenary Paradigm

There is no shortage of studies on the military developments of the late Classical and early Hellenistic periods, and the consensus is that, from the rise of Philip onwards, both soldiers and armies became more professional, and military participation increased significantly. These developments can be associated with the widespread introduction of pay for service, which allowed for more trained soldiers and wider pools of manpower from which to recruit. In discussing this, scholarship is virtually unanimous in labelling the soldiers manning the royal armies as ‘mercenaries’.Footnote 90

However, the concept of the mercenary soldier is not without problems. As will be highlighted below, definitions are often uncritical and hinder proper identification of paid service in the sources, especially of paid military activity of troops not traditionally considered as mercenary. Simultaneously, as paid service grew more commonplace, the line between mercenary and other soldiers was blurred, and the traditional dichotomy between mercenary and citizen soldiers became untenable. Given that pay and voluntary enlistment are the two key variables in distinguishing troop types, this section argues that we are better served when conceiving of this type of military service as a form of wage labour.

The second quarter of the twentieth century saw a peak in scholarly interest in paid military service in the Hellenistic period, when three monographs on the topic were published in rapid succession.Footnote 91 These studies set much of the tone in which the narrative would come to develop, in so far as they highlighted the importance of mercenaries and established the criteria through which they are perceived. And so, in his 1933 volume, entitled Greek Mercenary Soldiers, Parke did not overtly question the nature of mercenary service, being content to refer to these soldiers simply as ‘professionals’Footnote 92 whose increasing presence on the battlefield gradually ousted more traditional forms of service. In 1935, Griffith similarly equated mercenaries with professionalism,Footnote 93 viewing them as a specialist class that saw its heyday in the late fourth and early third centuries.Footnote 94 Launey, whose focus was slightly different in that he was concerned with the Hellenistic armies in general, rather than the mercenaries specifically, nonetheless also argues that the Hellenistic military was the domain of the true professional soldier – one who served as a means of employment.Footnote 95 By focusing on professionalism,Footnote 96 these studies draw a distinction between the mercenary and the citizen soldier, whose service was based within the polis community and was often unremunerated. These studies also imply, and at times explicitly state, the mercenary soldiers’ foreign status and overriding desire for pay.

Thus, the main criteria established in these studies fit the definition of mercenary service as used in common parlance, in which the mercenary is a professional soldier employed in a foreign army.Footnote 97 The term, however, can also be used to describe individuals motivated solely by personal gain,Footnote 98 and such negative connotations have found their way into scholarship on the ancient mercenary as well. Griffith, for instance, emphasized that for soldiers to be described as mercenaries, they would have to be motivated by monetary gain and fighting for a cause ‘that means nothing to them’,Footnote 99 a characteristic echoed in the more recent definition provided by Aymard.Footnote 100

And yet while the use of the modern term ‘mercenary’, and its common-sense definition, was long current across disciplines and subjects, it is met with increasing resistance from scholarship, in relation to both modern and ancient manifestations of this type of military service. Thus, in his study on the implications of the modern use of private armies for the current world order, McFate highlights the apparent lack of theoretical analysis in studies on the figure of the mercenary, in particular the uncritical use of common definitions.Footnote 101 The term ‘mercenary’, he argues, is a highly subjective one, and coloured by moralistic overtones. Scholarly interpretations of what constitutes mercenary service, furthermore, are often based on legal definitions, which arguably have no theoretical relevance.Footnote 102 In his study of military enterprise in early modern Europe, Parrott raises similar concerns, rightly remarking that:

The concept of a mercenary as it is usually understood, and as it was used by its detractors in early modern Europe, is both an overly specific and in many cases irrelevant means to define the character of much military organization. Behind it of course is the moralizing potential for identifying troops whose service is justified as crudely monetary – literally mercenary – and unredeemed by any higher loyalty to country, home or natural ruler.Footnote 103

These studies hence share a concern with the definitions applied, citing especially the moralistic and subjective criteria that inform identification, while also emphasizing the potential irrelevance of the identifying characteristics used.

Similar concerns have been raised in relation to studies on the ancient mercenary, too.Footnote 104 The need for concrete definitions was stressed most emphatically by Trundle, who complicates current approaches to the ancient mercenary and advocates for a broader understanding of the phenomenon so as not to miss potentially mercenary activity in the sources.Footnote 105 Yet while critical evaluation of the term is an important way forward, that might not be enough. For instance, in his study on Greek soldiers serving in the armies of the Near East, Rop remarks that characterizing these men simply as mercenaries is ‘anachronistic and inaccurate’, and instead that they ought to be seen as political agents, whose service provides strong evidence of Greek political foreign influence.Footnote 106 The mere use of the term, and the connotations it carries, can therefore hinder analysis of these soldiers’ wider societal role.

The dangers of uncritical application of the concept emerge in the way in which mercenary soldiers of the Archaic and Classical periods are identified in the ancient sources. Often, this is done solely based on ancient terminology that fits the criteria of mercenary service outlined above. Ancient Greek, however, had no term to specifically denote mercenary soldiers, and soldiers designated as such by modern scholarship are the troops referred to in the primary sources first as epikouroi (ἐπίκουροι), then as xenoi (ξένοι), and finally as misthophoroi (μισθοφόροι).Footnote 107 Literally translated, these ‘helpers’, ‘foreigners’, and ‘wage earners’ fit the core criteria of mercenary service, yet the sources are flexible in their use of the terms, and troops’ mercenary status often has to be deduced from context. This can be seen in the use of epikouros, which was used in the sense of ‘ally’ in the Homeric epics,Footnote 108 as well as in Herodotus.Footnote 109 The mercenary connotation only comes into play when it can be confirmed by soldiers’ background and terms of service, as is the case for Greeks who enlisted as epikouroi with Psammetichus I, whose mercenary status was dependent on the fact that they did so in exchange for remuneration.Footnote 110 Likewise, xenos, while often translated as mercenary when used in a military context, continued to also carry the connotation of ‘guest friend’.Footnote 111 The term misthophoros was not reserved for paid soldiers alone, but used to describe anyone who received payment for services rendered.Footnote 112 Trundle remarks that these terms had a certain euphemistic quality,Footnote 113 which would reveal a negative attitude towards this type of service. However, the increasingly specific terminology, crystallizing in specific reference to these soldiers’ employment, might simply indicate more specific understanding and usage of the mercenary soldier. The flexibility in terminology and its varied usage in the primary sources should, in any case, alert us to the fluidity of the concept in the Greek mind.

Of course, that is not to say that these troops did not constitute a somehow different category in the ancient military landscape. Indeed, the aforementioned contrast drawn by Parke, Griffith, and Launey between citizen and mercenary soldiers appears to have applied to the military organization of the Classical polis, in which the so-called mercenary troops existed in stark opposition to the citizen hoplite, around whom an extensive ideology was built,Footnote 114 and whose societal presence was akin to that of the ‘status warrior’ of old. In the case of the citizen hoplite, military service was at once a duty and a reward, insofar as it was enforced through conscription and restricted on the basis of legal and financial parameters – soldiers were expected to have citizenship, and to be able to provide their own armour and upkeep;Footnote 115 in Sparta, military service was dependent on the ability to afford the citizen tax.Footnote 116 At least in Athens, these conditions also meant that hoplite soldiers did not continuously engage in military training, and hoplites’ martial activity appears to have been limited to the campaigning season.Footnote 117 Although it is now agreed that other categories of soldiers actually took part in battle,Footnote 118 ideologically speaking, access to hoplite service was restricted on both the political and the economic level. Military service was thus the domain of the citizen who could foot the bill.

Troops considered mercenary in the ancient sources are usually discussed in contrast to this ideal of the citizen hoplite. Often, such depictions are unfavourable, and the idea that the citizen hoplite was a more reliable soldier, first expressed by Herodotus in his account of the Athenian victory at Marathon, found its way into assessments of ancient non-citizen forces. Aristotle, for instance, readily praised the mercenary soldiers’ skill, but presumed their cowardice,Footnote 119 a view echoed by Plato.Footnote 120 These concerns feature in the military advice given by Demosthenes as well: in discussing how to face the Macedonian threat, he recommends interspersing mercenary contingents among the citizen soldiers, with the latter overseeing conduct in the field,Footnote 121 and he warns against a propensity of hired troops to desert when offered better prospects elsewhere.Footnote 122 Such anxieties are also echoed in the view that poverty inspired mercenary service; Isocrates, for instance, characterizes the Ten Thousand who accompanied Cyrus in 401 as individuals no longer deemed worthy of living in society,Footnote 123 and whose alleged poverty-struck condition made them resort to banditry and lawlessness.Footnote 124 However, negative characterizations of non-citizen troops went hand in hand with the polis’s increased reliance on such troops: Demosthenes, in fact, emphasizes that he is not blaming the mercenary soldiers, but rather those Athenians who are shirking their citizen duties.Footnote 125 Ancient depictions that fit modern conceptions of the mercenary soldier, therefore, seem to serve a rhetorical purpose within the context of the polis, and are used specifically to contrast with the ideal of the citizen soldier.

While ancient attitudes towards hired troops complicate identification based on terminology alone, ancient vocabulary can also hide other military activity that can arguably be deemed mercenary. The characteristics of pay, foreign status, and professionalism are also found among the crews manning the Athenian navy.Footnote 126 Levied from across the various social classes of the polis and beyond, the naval crews comprised not only citizens but also metics and freedmen, slaves, and foreigners,Footnote 127 all of whom were professionals engaged in training,Footnote 128 while receiving remuneration for their efforts.Footnote 129 That the crews display the behaviour commonly associated with mercenaries is indicated by the events detailed in Demosthenes’ oration Against Polykles.Footnote 130 Here it is discussed how, at the start of a number of naval operations in 362, the demesmen recruited to man the ship of the trierarch Apollodoros appeared only in small numbers, and that those who did appear were incompetent. These conscript sailors were dismissed by Apollodoros, who instead mustered a group of highly skilled voluntary sailors whom he incentivized with bonuses and advance payments,Footnote 131 financed from his own private funds.Footnote 132 However, when this capital was exhausted, many of the crew abandoned him and either enlisted on land or joined the crews of the opposing ships of the Thasians and Maronites, who likewise offered high pay and substantial advances.Footnote 133 The men’s behaviour was warranted by their particular terms of service, which allowed them to change employer at will, while their skill set turned them into a precious source of military labour. As we shall see, the terms of service in the Athenian navy as well as the crews’ conduct were similar to those of the soldiers in the royal armies.

In summary, while the term ‘mercenary’ might be a useful means of distinguishing between citizen soldiers and others, the concept’s relevance and viability should not be pushed too far. On the one hand, characteristics usually associated with mercenary soldiers are useful in distinguishing them from citizen troops, yet the concept is applied by both ancient sources and modern scholarship to draw a distinction that serves an ideological purpose. The somewhat subjective use of the concept is further illustrated by the case of the Athenian naval crews: although these sailors fit all criteria usually associated with mercenary service, they are rarely described as such. Therefore, the concept of mercenary service does not further our understanding of types of service, while blind adherence to terminology can obfuscate the character of soldiers whose service is characterized by voluntary enlistment, pay, and outsider status.

These problems of categorization and identification are exacerbated in the royal armies of the late Classical and early Hellenistic periods, when a steep increase in documentation of so-called mercenary service can be observed.Footnote 134 For although such soldiers serving for remuneration outside their home communities are attested among our earliest sources, they appear to have been active in small numbers, appearing only sporadically in the sources.Footnote 135 During the Peloponnesian War,Footnote 136 the Greek poleis made infrequent use of these troops in order to strengthen their citizen militia, but professional soldiery becomes especially prominent in the fourth century.Footnote 137 Scholarship has sought to explain this rise in paid service in line with contemporary depictions of paid soldiers as destitute and driven into this life by economic needs. For instance, Shipley speculates that overpopulation on the Greek mainland made available masses of men in search of a livelihood who could subsequently be recruited by those in need of manpower.Footnote 138 However, the simple availability of willing recruits does not in itself explain why more use was made of them. As argued by Lendon, the fifth century saw its fair share of poverty, too, but it did not directly create a market for military employment in response.Footnote 139 There were, after all, few opportunities for employment within the Greek system dominated by citizen soldiers.Footnote 140 Outside Greece, potential markets were found either among tyrants or in the Near East, but both were likewise problematic. With regard to the armies of the tyrants, such as those in Sicily, it is uncertain whether these soldiers were of Greek provenance.Footnote 141 With the exception of the expedition of Cyrus in 401,Footnote 142 Persian use of Greek mercenaries was seemingly limited to the western satrapies until Issus in 333,Footnote 143 and Near Eastern use of them may not have been based on need, but was rather a way of retaining political influence.Footnote 144 The crucial factor in the rise of paid military service therefore ought to be looked for in terms of demand, rather than availability of soldiers.

Consistent demand was created by Philip of Macedonia, who, as we shall see, readily accepted and indeed encouraged voluntary enlistment of troops, a process that continued under Alexander. The turbulent years following his death, during which his Successors waged war over his former empire, also led to territorial instability that hindered traditional recruitment through conscription. In addition to increased recruitment of voluntary forces incentivized by pay, this gave rise to a situation in which soldiers had multiple political accountabilities, and loyalty was expected to both polis and king. The traditional distinction between citizen and non-citizen troops was therefore significantly complicated. The erosion of such distinctions is duly reflected in the contemporary terminology, and the Hellenistic evidence refers to all troops simply as stratiōtai (στρατιῶται) – soldiers.Footnote 145

To avoid the problems associated with the concept of the mercenary soldier, this study analyses troop types in accordance with the nature of soldiers’ initial enlistment and chooses to categorize troops as either conscript or voluntary. Soldiers’ terms of service remain important: although remuneration is granted especially to voluntary soldiers, pay for service is by no means exclusive to the voluntary recruit alone, and characteristics associated with mercenary soldiers are found in relation to conscript troops, too. In doing so, the present analysis aims to avoid the problems encountered through use of the concept of mercenary service: by focusing on enlistment and terms of service, the moralizing connotations inherent in the term ‘mercenary’ can be avoided, while paid, voluntary service is not identified on the basis of terminology alone.

Footnotes

1 Reference AustinAustin 1986; Austin’s view was more recently endorsed by Reference Davies, Archibald, Davies, Gabrielsen and OliverDavies 2001, 36–9, whose only criticism of Austin’s original argument was that he did not take it far enough.

2 See, for example, Reference CitinoCitino 2007.

3 For discussion, see, for example, Reference ShipleyShipley 2000, 1–5 and Reference Shipley2018a, esp. 243–5 on the Peloponnese.

4 For a description of the ‘globalized’ Hellenistic world, see, for instance, Reference ThonemannThonemann 2016, esp. 1–9.

8 Whether Philip was immediately appointed king, or whether he first acted as regent of his predecessor’s young son, Amyntas, as argued by Just. Epit. 7.5.9–10, remains a matter of debate; see, for instance, Reference AdamsAdams 1986; Reference AnsonAnson 2009, 285–6 for an overview and argument in favour of Philip’s immediate appointment as king by the army in 359. At any rate, for our purposes it suffices to say that Philip acted as ruler from 359 onwards. For an overview of the debate on the role of the army in the appointment of Macedonian kings, see Reference BorzaBorza 1990, 232–6; Reference KingKing 2018, 48–55.

9 Diod. Sic. 16.2.5 reports the loss of 4,000 men; Reference Hammond and GriffithHammond and Griffith 1979, 406 point out that the casualties alone number a far larger Macedonian army than any previously heard of.

11 For overviews, see, for example, Reference ErringtonErrington 1990, 40–4 for Macedonia’s expansion westwards; 45–58 eastwards; 50–69 for its expansion into Thessaly; and 70–98 for its essential subjugation of the Greek poleis; or Reference KingKing 2018, 70–107.

12 See Reference AnsonAnson 2010 for 359 as the date of the sarissa ’s introduction; Reference HammondHammond 1980 on training. For its strategic importance, see, for example, Reference Lloyd and LloydLloyd 1996; Reference Sekunda, Roisman and WorthingtonSekunda 2010, 449–52; Reference 221CawkwellCawkwell 1978, 30–5; Reference KingKing 2018, 110–14.

13 Polyaenus, Strat. 4.2.10 on initial training and equipment; Diod. Sic. 16.3.1; Frontin. 4.2.4; Ael. VH. 14.48 on discipline; on continuous training, see Dem. Or. 8.11; 9.50.

15 See Reference Bugh and BughBugh 2006, 275–88 for an overview; Reference ShipleyShipley 2000, 334–41 and Reference CuomoCuomo 2007, 41–77 for discussion of advances in military engineering and technology; Reference Serrati, Campbell and TritleSerrati 2013 emphasizes the difference in scale.

16 See, for instance, Reference KingKing 2018, 110–14; Reference KarunanithyKarunanithy 2013, 3–4; for comparison, see Reference MatthewMatthew 2009; Reference GoldsworthyGoldsworthy 1997 for discussions of the traditional technique of othismos – the practice by which soldiers essentially pushed against each other.

19 Reference RubincamRubincam 2003; Reference Rubincam, Foster and Lateiner2012 considers ancient methods and conceptions of quantification; although approximations, numbers reported are not necessarily unreliable.

20 Reference BelochBeloch 1886, 23–6; exceptions such as the c. 10,000 troops reportedly assembled at Marathon (cf. Nep. Milt. 5; Paus. 10.20; Plut. Mor. 305b; with Reference WhatleyWhatley 1964, 132 on these numbers) are still small in comparison to the numbers gathered in later years.

21 Thuc. 2.13, see also Thuc. 2.31, where the 13,000 hoplites appear to have been deployed en masse at Megara.

23 For instance, Thuc. 1.107 on the battle of Tanagra in 457, in which the Athenian army (including numerous allies) consisted of 14,000 men, deployed against 1,500 Spartans and 10,000 of their allies; Thuc. 1.111 on the Athenian attack on Sicyon reports a force of 1,000 hoplites; for the revolt at Potidaea in 432, Thuc. 1.57 reports the deployment of 1,000 Athenian hoplites, to which a further 2,000 were added at a later stage (Thuc. 1.61); at the battle of Spartolus in 429, Thuc. 2.74 reports 2,000 hoplites and 200 cavalry; at Solygia in 425, Thuc. 4.42.1 reports 2,000 hoplites and 200 cavalry; in 412 at Bolissus, Thuc. 8.25 reports 1,000 Athenian hoplites aided by 2,000 allies.

24 Thuc. 6.31, pointing out that a force of the same size accompanied Pericles to Epidauros and Hagnon to Potidaea.

25 Thuc. 4.93.

26 Diod. Sic. 15.32.

27 See Reference GriffithGriffith 1935, 80–107 for an overview of (mercenary) forces in third-century armies of the Greek mainland.

28 Polyb. 5.91.6; see Reference 243Walbank, Walbank, Astin, Frederiksen and OgilvieWalbank 1984, 244–6 for an overview of the organization and members of the Achaean League, whose membership is believed to have comprised ten to eleven poleis upon its revival in 280. Reference GriffithGriffith 1935, 99–101 provides an overview of the fluctuating number of soldiers in the Achaean army. As highlighted by Plut. Arat. 9.4, the army remained small, with the bulk of troops consistently recruited from pools of mercenaries, rather than from the citizen bodies.

29 Diod. Sic. 16.85.5.

30 Diod. Sic. 17.17.3–4; for an assessment of the numbers reported in the various sources, see Reference BosworthBosworth 1980, 98–9.

31 Diod. Sic. 16.91.1 and 17.17.5, respectively.

32 Diod. Sic. 19.27.

33 Polyb. 5.79; cf. Polyb. 5.65, where Ptolemy’s total force consists of 76,000 men.

34 Reference Davies and BughDavies 2006, 76; Reference de Callataÿde Callataÿ 2005b arrives at the same conclusion based on the number of known Hellenistic shipwrecks and the evidence of lead and silver production from the lead deposits in the Greenland icecaps; on the latter, see Reference McConnell, Wilson, Stohl, Arienzo, Chellman, Eckhardt, Thompson, Pollard and SteffensenMcConnell et al. 2018.

37 Reference ThonemannThonemann 2015; see, for instance, Reference de Callataÿ and Metcalfde Callataÿ 2012 on the wealth of the Hellenistic kings; Reference Meadows, Bernholz and VaubelMeadows 2014 on mints and spread of coinage.

38 For Pergamene artistic production, see, for example, Reference PollittPollitt 1989, 79–110.

39 Reference CassonCasson 1971, 107–16; see Athenaeus Mechanicus 5.203–204.

41 Reference Gibbins, Archibald, Davies, Gabrielsen and OliverGibbins 2001, with fig. 10.2; see 297–304 for a catalogue of known Hellenistic shipwrecks; Reference Davies and BughDavies 2006, 84–5 on the implications such evidence has for the economy. See Reference de Callataÿde Callataÿ 2005b, 369–70, who emphasizes that the peak for the eastern Mediterranean occurs during the Hellenistic period, whereas it was under the Romans in later years for the west, with Reference McConnell, Wilson, Stohl, Arienzo, Chellman, Eckhardt, Thompson, Pollard and SteffensenMcConnell et al. 2018.

46 See, for instance, Reference NielsenNielsen 1999; for an evaluation of the economic consequences, see Reference Davies, Archibald, Davies and GabrielsenDavies 2005.

51 Reference Reger and ErskineReger 2003, 332. These arguments are based on the economy of the island of Delos, the economic activities of which have recently been re-evaluated, and arguably showcase similar developments as those of the wider Hellenistic world, cf. Reference ChankowskiChankowski 2019.

52 Reference Chaniotis and ChaniotisChaniotis 1999, esp. 210–12; see also Reference Chaniotis, Archibald, Davies and GabrielsenChaniotis 2005b for similar arguments (tentatively) based on inscriptions on pottery.

53 Reference ChaniotisChaniotis 2005a, 121–40; see Reference Chaniotis, Archibald, Davies and GabrielsenChaniotis 2011 on the poleis’ response to the economic demands generated by warfare; Reference ShipleyShipley 2018a, 172–84 on the Peloponnese.

57 Reference Hopkins, Garnsey, Hopkins and WhittakerHopkins 1983, ix; Reference Cohen, Cartledge, Cohen and FoxhallCohen 2002, 1, summarizing the various warnings accompanying debates on the ancient economy, concludes that some of these admonitions are ‘more appropriate for the packaging of tobacco products’.

58 Comprehensive overviews of the debate are found in, for example, Reference BressonBresson 2016, 2–18 and Reference O’HalloranO’Halloran 2019, 15–36.

62 For a recent overview of the historical schools leading the reframing of the questions see, for example, Reference BressonBresson 2016, 4–8.

63 See, for instance, Reference Launaro, Jew, Osborne and ScottLaunaro 2016 for discussion.

64 For a substantivist view of these ‘discoveries’, see Reference Polanyi, Polanyi, Arensberg and PearsonPolanyi 1971.

65 For examples, see, for instance, Arist. Pol. 1.8, which questions methods of ‘acquiring wealth’ and adduces Thales’ monopoly of olive presses as an example; more generally, see also Xenophon’s Poroi or Ps. Aristotle’s Oeconomica.

67 See, for example, Reference FrederiksenFrederiksen 1975, a review of The Ancient Economy. See Reference Morris, Saller, Scheidel, Scheidel, Morris and SallerMorris, Saller, and Scheidel 2007, 6–7 for further discussion and examples; recent scholarship presenting the Roman case as fundamentally different includes Reference Hitchner, Manning and MorrisHitchner 2005; Reference 241TeminTemin 2012.

69 Reference BintliffBintliff 2012, for instance, while accepting a more important role of markets and economic rationality than professed by Finley, nonetheless maintains that, except for Athens during the time of the empire, the economies of Greece in the Archaic and Classical periods were subsistence economies; see 234–83, esp. 282–3.

74 For instance, both Reference Morris, Saller, Scheidel, Scheidel, Morris and SallerSaller, Morris, and Scheidel 2007 and Reference BressonBresson 2016 conclude their overviews of the debate with an emphasis on the need to study performance and the value of the NIE.

77 Reference Harris, Lewis, Harris, Lewis and WoolmerHarris and Lewis 2016, 10; cf. Reference Migeotte, Roman and DalaisonMigeotte 2008, 61, who distinguishes between local markets, regional exchanges, and large-scale markets for luxuries.

79 Reference PolanyiPolanyi 2002 [1944]; see, for instance, Reference DaleDale 2010, esp. 137–87, for discussion of Polanyi’s take on archaic societies; see 189–206 for the economy’s ‘embeddedness’. An excellent and succinct overview of Polanyi’s thinking on ancient Greece is found in Reference Tandy, Neale, Duncan and TandyTandy and Neale 1994.

81 A helpful overview of the different types of market is provided by Reference TandyTandy 1997, 117–25, who identifies peripheral, controlled, limited, and dominant markets.

82 Note that these markets are numerous in history but are often erroneously identified as ‘self-regulating’ markets, as highlighted by Reference TandyTandy 1997, 119.

86 Reference PolanyiPolanyi 1977, 273–6; see Reference DaleDale 2010, 166–7 for discussion. On Polanyi’s view of the Hellenistic world as the only other market economy aside from our own, see Reference Tandy, Neale, Duncan and TandyTandy and Neale 1994, 20–3.

88 See below, especially Chapter 2, Section 2.1, for discussion; cf. Reference Zürcher and ZürcherZürcher 2013, 18 describes the various stages apparent in the military labour relations in accordance with Polanyi’s taxonomy of economic structures, and thus refers to ‘tributary’, ‘reciprocal’, and ‘commodified’ labour.

95 Reference LauneyLauney 1949, 26, ‘le soldat par excellence, le soldat du métier, le mercenaire’.

96 Note that these studies do not explicitly define ‘professionalism’, and the term could refer to soldiers’ skill, their service as a form of employment, or even military service as a closed-off profession. For discussion of the meaning of professionalism and the difficulties inherent in its definition, see Reference Sarfatti-LarsonSarfatti-Larson 1977, 2–8.

97 In the military sense, the Oxford English Dictionary (OED) defines mercenary as ‘a soldier paid to serve in a foreign army or other military organization’.

98 When ‘mercenary’ is used as an adjective, OED gives ‘a person who works merely for money or other material reward; a hireling […] a person whose actions are motivated primarily by personal gain, often at the expense of ethics’.

100 Reference AymardAymard 1967, 487; see Reference TrundleTrundle 2004, 21–2 for discussion.

101 Reference McFateMcFate 2014; see also Reference PercyPercy 2007 for similar concerns in relation to the use of the concept in scholarship on modern international relations.

102 For his criticism of the concept, see Reference McFateMcFate 2014, 10–12 and especially 23–40.

104 For critical readings of the term ‘mercenary’ and the commonly applied defining characteristics, see, for example, Reference CravenCraven 2017, 9–19; Reference RopRop 2019, 19–29. See Reference Low, Ñaco del Hoyo and Lopéz SanchézLow 2017, 36–40 for specific discussion of the notion of its relation to modern understanding of nationhood.

105 In doing so, Reference TrundleTrundle 2004, 24 decides that employment and remuneration are critical in defining the mercenary, but his study is concerned predominantly with soldiers denoted as mercenary by the primary sources.

106 Reference RopRop 2019, 19; see 19–26 for discussion of the use of the concept of mercenary service in relation to these soldiers more generally.

109 Reference TrundleTrundle 2004, 13 with examples.

110 Thus Hdt. 2.152.5, describing how Psammetichus enlisted Ionians and Carians as epikouroi in exchange for great rewards. Note that these men’s mercenary intentions can be debated: according to Hdt. 1.152.3, they were active as plunderers, and only happened to be forced ashore in Egypt. On these men as pirates, rather than mercenaries, see Reference De SouzaDe Souza 2009, 22–3. For (likely) epigraphic attestation of these soldiers, see M&L, no. 7, with one in command of ‘those of foreign speech’ (ἀλογλόσος). For a relatively recent summary of the evidence, see Reference Schipper, Bar, Kahn and ShirleySchipper 2011, 270–1, which includes discussion of Assyrian sources, which imply these troops were sent to Egypt by King Gyges of Lydia.

111 See Reference TrundleTrundle 2004, 14–15. The Athenians appear to have used xenos predominantly in reference to their subject allies; see Reference FinleyFinley 1954, 104–5; Reference GauthierGauthier 1971, 44–79. For xenos as mercenary, see Reference LorauxLoraux 1986, 36.

113 Reference TrundleTrundle 2004, 1–39 passim.

114 See Reference Van Weesvan Wees 1992; Reference Van Wees2004; Reference Van Wees, Sabin, van Wees and Whitby2007; Reference Raaflaub, Heckel, Müller and WrightsonRaaflaub 2015; see Reference LowLow 2002 on the ideological prominence of the hoplites over the cavalry. On the absence of naval imagery in Classical art and its implications for military ideology, see Reference Strauss and van WeesStrauss 2000.

115 On soldiers’ need to provide their own equipment, see, for instance, Lys. Or. 31.15–16; Th. 6.31.3; for discussion of this process and their relative prosperity, see Reference PritchardPritchard 2018, 88–43 for the hoplites, and 60–4 for the cavalry. See Reference Jarva, Campbell and TritleJarva 2013 for an overview of armour and equipment; Reference RidleyRidley 1979, 520–1 on the cost. Aristophanes, Peace, l. 1224 and l. 1251 has the – probably exaggerated– price of 1,000 drachmas for a breastplate and 50 drachmas for a helmet. While pay for service is attested from the 420s onwards, this likely covered only the expenses incurred on campaign; see Reference PritchettPritchett 1971, 3–28, esp. 3–6, 23; Reference PsomaPsoma 2009, 264–5. For further discussion of military wages and reimbursement, see Chapter 4.

116 See Reference HodkinsonHodkinson 1986; Reference Hodkinson2000, 187–93 for an overview of Spartan taxes (mess duties or otherwise).

117 Note that professionalism was not limited to so-called mercenaries; for military skill outside of Athens, see for instance Reference CartledgeCartledge 1977 on Spartan military sophistication. See Reference HansonHanson 1988; Reference CawkwellCawkwell 1972 on the Theban military revolution. For the training of Athenian naval crews, see Reference Strauss, Sabin, van Wees and WhitbyStrauss 2007, esp. 226–8.

119 Arist. Nic. Eth. 3.8.9.

120 Pl. Lach., esp. 190D–191D; Pl. Leg. 697e expresses concerns regarding the soldiers’ reliability.

121 Dem. Or. 4.20–21.

122 See, for instance, Dem. Or. 4.24; Isoc. Or. 8.48.

123 Isoc. Or. 4.146; for the view of mercenaries as outcasts, see also, Isoc. Or. 5.96; Epist. 9.9.

124 Isoc. Or. 8.48; for instances in which a more sympathetic view is expressed, see Isoc. Or. 5.121, 4.168.

125 Dem. Or. 3.36. See Reference ChristChrist 2006, 45–87 on Athenian shirking of military duty.

126 For crews as mercenaries, see Reference TrundleTrundle 2004, 16–17.

127 For discussion of composition of the crews, see Reference PritchardPritchard 2018, 98–104.

128 See Reference Strauss, Sabin, van Wees and WhitbyStrauss 2007, 226–37 for an overview of crews’ training and skills.

129 Reference Van WeesVan Wees 2013, 69–75 argues the naval crews received a fixed rate between 3 obols and 1 drachma per day, of which at least 2 obols were to be spent on provisions; see Reference Van Wees, Fagan and Trundlevan Wees 2010 for a similar situation in Archaic Eretria.

130 Dem. Or. 50, dated to 359.

131 Dem. Or. 50.7, δωρείας καὶ προδόσεις δοὺς ἑκάστῳ αὐτῶν.

132 Dem. Or. 50.7–9, 13.

133 Dem. Or. 50.14.

137 On the fourth century increase, see Reference ParkeParke 1933, 228–30; Reference MillerMiller 1984, esp. 153; Reference CartledgeCartledge 1987, 315; Reference McKechnieMcKechnie 1989, 22–9.

140 Reference TrundleTrundle 2004, 5–6; Reference ParkeParke 1933, 14–15; Reference GriffithGriffith 1935, 2–6. During the Peloponnesian War, both Athens and Sparta, of course, resorted to the use of mercenaries as auxiliary troops, yet these were used inconsistently and in lower numbers; for discussion, see Reference TrundleTrundle 2004, 6–7; Reference ParkeParke 1933, 15–18.

142 Reference RoyRoy 1967, 292–323.

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