In 1901, The Times of London announced the “colonial debut” of Austria-Hungary following the acquisition of land in mainland China (Georg Lehner, Die Chinapolitik Österreich-Ungarns 1896-1917: Eine Studie zur Stellung der Habsburgmonarchie im Fernen Osten, Diplomarbeit [Vienna, 1992], 88). Even though a misguided belief that Austria-Hungary never possessed overseas colonies still pervades some minds, Michael Falser's latest book does much to uncover this surprisingly complex history of the Austro-Hungarian “micro-colony” in Tianjin (天津 Tientsin). Occupying a total of 150 acres for just sixteen years, up until the Republican Chinese declaration of war in 1917, the exclave in the port city of Tianjin—now the sixth most populous metropolis in the Peoples’ Republic of China—formed one of eight international zones known as concessions that fell under foreign control as spoils for subduing the Boxer Rebellion (1899–1901) during the final years of the Qing dynasty. Austria-Hungary, led by avaricious ministers hungry for overseas opportunities, played a relatively minor role in the rebellion's demise by supplying some 500 troops and a total of four cruisers for the recapture of Tianjin and Beijing. Although there had been European concessions in fifteen other Chinese cities, the Eight Nation Alliance that suppressed the uprising included Austria-Hungary, and as a result, Austria-Hungary gained an opportunity for a territorial foothold. As a strategic harbor at the confluence of several important waterways, Tianjin allowed for a vibrant export market close to the imperial capital, but the economic benefits were hardly important for Austro-Hungarian markets that had seen little trade with Qing China. Instead, officials in Vienna came to view the territorial sliver in Tianjin as a marker of political prestige and over the subsequent years of occupation sought to remodel their concession into a representation of the Austro-Hungarian state.

The present work by Michael Falser does much to expand the relative paucity of material dedicated to this interesting colonial interlude in several unique ways. To begin, it rests upon a large body of archival material that receives scholarly attention for the first time. Foremost among these sources is a series of 115 photographs contained within an album unearthed by the author in the Austrian National Library (reproduced in full, with annotations in German and English, 187–259). Using this album in combination with the available state papers in the Viennese archives, Falser reconstructs both the logic of Austro-Hungarian interests in Tianjin as well as its built environment. His emphasis on the architectural and spatial modification of the concession stems from his own scholarly background and provides authors with another unique line of enquiry into the colony that complements politically focused works. In doing so, Falser offers an impressive and comprehensive account of the colony's development that is rounded off with a contemporary reflection (161–82) on the structural legacies of the Austro-Hungarian concession in the Chinese metropolis today, where remnants of an “Austrian riverfront” and promenade—cut during the early years of the concession period (97–100)—can still be seen.

This work serves to underscore the intricate ways in which the Austro-Hungarian Empire of the early twentieth century had become inextricably linked with the rest of the world. Following decades of maritime exploration across the world's oceans and rivalling attempts at colonialism in the wider Pacific, Austria-Hungary found itself with an unusual colonial possession in Tianjin. Falser does much to tease out the functionality of this contact zone and its “cultural brokers between the local population and foreign power” at work in the administration of the Austro-Hungarian concession (71). Under the consulship of Carl Bernauer, whose voluminous reports feed much of the narrative, the concession became remoulded into a model form of display colonialism with the aim of enticing further settlement and investment regardless of the material cost, including supplies transported over the Alps and via the Adriatic for consular buildings as well as nearly 7,000 Chinese graves that were relocated outside the concession boundaries (114–15). Such efforts ultimately fell short. Grumblings at home in Austria-Hungary—a continual bugbear of the whole endeavor—are well exposed by Falser's commentary based upon press releases and internal policy documents that give some credence to his characterization of Austria-Hungary as a rather “reluctant coloniser in the ‘scramble for China’” and a “hesitant actor within the international concession game” (9).

In such a novel and well-illustrated work, it is only right that Georg Lehner, a doyen of Austrian sinology, chose to supplement this book with an extensive historical introduction (13–44). Lehner's comments serve to underscore the difficult negotiation in Austria-Hungary's rise to territorial ownership in Tianjin and then its duty as a colonial administrator. Together, Falser and Lehner have published not only a synthesis of the not-so-meager literature on Sino-Austro-Hungarian relations but have also provided translations of various primary documents for the first time in addition to a helpful glossary of specific terms (271). Both display an acute awareness for the colony's reception domestically, with Falser dedicating particular attention to the various Austro-Hungarian visitors to the concession, whose accounts are somewhat tediously quoted at length (80–82). One finds this tendency to overuse verbatim language a gripe within this work, which is also sadly riddled with stylistic Germanisms forming often clunky and obfuscating passages that an editor might have weeded out.

In the end, the narrative drive of the work is outweighed by an important section on the “heritagization” (182) of the concession's remaining edifices that have not only been restored in part but even accentuated and expanded upon, leading to a curious state of what we might call a Chinese city with Austrian characteristics. Falser's account of Tianjin's past from a “contested history” to a “glorious heritage”—or even a “global theme park” (182)—is a particular strength to be commended as it relies upon a keen eye for detail in the built environment, an understanding of the historical condition, and his personal expedition to the city in 2018. Present-day China's “rediscovery” of the Tianjin legacy and its reappropriation functions now as an invitation to continue the modernizing process initiated by the public works begun during the concession period. Here, Falser's argument fits well into wider debates about the post-Maoist reconciliation with China's history and does much to reconfigure the conventional focus on narratives of humiliation and imperialistic subjugation about the concession period. It is a shame, therefore, that the same deft treatment of exhaustive contextualization is not made when considering this wider framing of Chinese interpretations of an Austro-Hungarian legacy or the concession era in general, though the fact that this book appears in English rather than German might allow for scholars to run with Falser's ground-breaking baton and continue to pay heed to the far-reaching influence of a short-lived but significant example of Austria-Hungary's commitment to maintaining a colonial world power status during a period of feverish imperialism.