Despite the fundamentally binary character of justification (an act is either right or not, permissible or impermissible), an upsurge in recent Anglo-American scholarship offers some highly sophisticated and widely diverging conceptions of “partial justification” in criminal law. In the present article we identify eight distinct conceptions of partial justification. We find, however, that each of them is predicated on a different conceptual fallacy. Any sound concept of partial justification in criminal law ought to meet the dual challenge of utility and consistency: it should usefully convey a message that advances the conduct-guiding function of criminal law and retain some consistency with the key attributes of complete justification, particularly its allowing function and the implications of its typically universal nature. We maintain that none of the conceptions offered to date meets this challenge. The different meanings attached to partial justification do not further the guiding function of criminal law beyond what is achieved by the scalar concept of wrongfulness; indeed, they undermine the guiding utility of criminal law by obscuring the distinction between the permissible and the impermissible, thereby also diminishing the expressivity of the criminal conviction. Furthermore, extending partial universality to the proposed notions of partial justification implausibly marks retaliating victims and intervening third parties, who react to allegedly partially justified conduct, as partly blameworthy, whereas present legal doctrine rightly affords them a full defense.

Christopher Wellman is the strongest proponent of the natural-duty theory of political obligations and argues that his version of the theory can satisfy the key requirement of “particularity”; namely, justifying to members of a state the system of political obligations they share in. Critics argue that natural-duty theories like Wellman's actually require well-ordered states and/or their members to dedicate resources to providing the goods associated with political order to needy outsiders. The implication is that natural-duty approaches weaken the particularity requirement and cannot justify to citizens the systems of political obligation they share in. I argue that the critics’ diagnosis of natural-duty approaches is correct, whereas the proposed implication is false. I maintain that 1) only natural-duty approaches can justify political obligations, and that 2) weakening the particularity requirement contributes to the theory's ability to justify a range-limited system of political obligations among compatriots.

In this paper I argue that economic theories have never been able to provide a coherent explanation of the causation requirement in tort law. The economic characterization of this requirement faces insurmountable difficulties, because discourse on tort liability cannot be reduced to a cost-benefit analysis without a loss of meaning. More seriously, I try to show that by describing causation in economic terms, economic theories offer an image of the practice in which the participants incur in logical contradictions and develop patterns of inference that are far from intuitive. For this reason, efficiency cannot be the fundamental principle underlying tort law. Finally, I suggest that economic analysis of law can provide a genuine explanation of certain aspects of legal practice if it relinquishes its reductionist claims.