We investigate how ownership structure influences operating performance and implied agency costs. Our sample includes over 42,000 U.K. private and public firms. We document several new results of considerable economic significance relating to i) horizontal agency costs arising from unequal ownership within private firms, ii) amplification of agency costs from joint presence within the same firm of horizontal agency problems and vertical agency problems arising from separation of ownership and control, iii) mitigation in agency costs wrought by a second large shareholder, iv) impact of complex ownership structures, and v) agency cost differences between public firms and comparable private firms.

Hedge fund activists transfer relevant prior work experience to their activism campaigns. Categorizing activists based on past employment at investment banks (generalists), private equity or special situations partnerships (specialists), or other firms (nonfinancial experts), we relate activists’ prior work experience to their choices and outcomes. Both generalists with codifiable skills and specialists with tacit skills contribute to successful outcomes, but differences in these skills lead to differences in activism processes. Activist choices, market responses, target firm responses, and procedural aspects of activism vary with activist identity. Our analysis examines activists’ heterogeneous skills and highlights their importance in shaping activist interventions.

Several theoretical studies suggest that coordination problems can cause arbitrageur crowding to push asset prices beyond fundamental value as investors feedback trade on each others’ demands. Using this logic, we develop a crowding model for momentum returns that predicts tail risk when arbitrageurs ignore feedback effects. However, crowding does not generate tail risk when arbitrageurs rationally condition on feedback. Consistent with rational demands, our empirical analysis generally finds a negative relation between crowding proxies constructed from institutional holdings and expected crash risk. Thus our analysis casts both theoretical and empirical doubt on crowding as a stand-alone source of tail risk.

We examine the value impact of independent directors nominated by activists (Activist IDs). Firms appointing Activist IDs experience larger value increases than firms appointing other directors, particularly when Activist IDs have private firm experience and when their nominators remain as shareholders. This value increase persists over a long period and is greater than that of activism events without director appointments. The increase is also higher among firms with greater monitoring needs and entrenched boards. Moreover, the appointments of Activist IDs are greeted more positively by the market, and Activist IDs obtain more favorable shareholder votes and additional future directorships.

Firms with higher R&D intensity subsequently experience higher stock returns in international stock markets, highlighting the role of intangible investments in international asset pricing. The R&D effect is stronger in countries where growth option risk is more likely priced, but is unrelated to country characteristics representing market sentiments and limits-of-arbitrage. Moreover, we find that R&D intensity is associated with higher future operating performance, return volatility, and default likelihood. Our evidence suggests that the cross sectional relation between R&D intensity and stock returns is more likely attributable to risk premium than to mispricing.

How does social capital affect trust? Evidence from a Chinese peer-to-peer lending platform shows that regional social capital affects the trustee’s trustworthiness and the trustor’s trust propensity. Ceteris paribus, borrowers from regions with higher social capital receive larger bids from individual lenders and have higher funding success, larger loan sizes, and lower default rates, especially for low-quality borrowers. Lenders from regions with higher social capital take higher risks and have higher default rates, especially for inexperienced lenders. Cross-regional transactions are most (least) likely to be realized between parties from regions with high (low) social capital.

CEO trustworthiness is positively related to long-term excess returns after buyback announcements. When the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) is trustworthy, statements that the stock is undervalued are more credible. CEO trustworthiness is initially measured by the extent to which people in the county where the company headquarters is located trust each other. Further, the positive impact of trustworthiness on excess returns is higher when the CEO has been a long-term resident of a high-trust county, and correspondingly, trustworthy CEOs are less likely to be accused of financial misreporting. Our conclusions are confirmed when we use alternative measures of trustworthiness such as employee trust and CEO integrity.

Using unique real estate data that allow for accurately measured capital gains, we examine whether sell propensities depend on the magnitude of a seller’s capital gain. We find that short-term sell propensities are flat over losses and increasing in gains. Consistent with their higher sell propensities, selling prices are lower for properties with larger gains. Large-sized short-term stock investments also have sell propensities that are flat over losses and increasing in gains, although the sell propensities of typical-sized short-term stock investments are V-shaped. Our findings provide empirical support for theories of realization utility.

We study the agency implications of increased disclosure using a regulatory change in the mutual fund industry as an experimental setting. This quasi-natural experiment mandated more frequent portfolio disclosure, which we show imposes managerial skill-reassessment risks from investors on funds with high relative performance volatility. In turn, this risk translates into greater agency costs to investors. We show that high-volatility funds, relative to low-volatility funds, responded to the increased skill-reassessment risk after regulation with an increase in management fees and a decrease in risk taking. These actions get transmitted to fund investors in the form of inferior net performance.

Prior research has suggested that sitting on the board of a poorly performing firm (PPF) can be undesirable to directors. Still, almost 60% of such firms are able to appoint new directors following director departures. Contrary to a quality matching explanation, we do not find that only poorly performing directors join these firms. Upon joining PPFs, directors are more likely to fill leadership positions without necessarily receiving higher pay. These directors subsequently receive career benefits, especially those who are relatively junior in the pool. As such, the evidence is consistent with the leadership positions providing a certification effect.

Exploiting exogenous variations in corporate ratings due to sovereign credit downgrades and sovereign ceiling policies, we assess how firms respond to a reduction in credit ratings. We find that firms bounded by the sovereign ceiling significantly increase information production in response to a sovereign downgrade. The effects are stronger for firms relying more heavily on external finance and operating in a more opaque environment. Enhanced information production, in turn, affects firms’ subsequent access to bond markets. These findings suggest that firms actively manage information environments to maintain access to public debt markets.

We examine the relationship between dividend smoothing and firm valuation across 21 countries using several empirical methods and smoothing measures. Our main results show that dividends are capitalized at significantly larger values for high-smoothing firms than for low-smoothing firms. We also find that dividend-smoothing premiums are higher in countries with weak shareholder protection – suggesting that smoothing serves as a substitute mechanism to reduce agency costs. Overall, our findings support the view that managers use dividend smoothing predominantly as a bonding mechanism to reduce agency costs (Leary and Michaely (2011)), and not as a rent extraction mechanism (Lambrecht and Myers (2012)).