We study the role of the contractual time horizon of chief executive officers (CEOs) for CEO turnover and corporate policies. Using hand-collected data on 3,954 fixed-term CEO contracts, we show that remaining time under contract predicts CEO turnover. When contracts are close to expiration, turnover is more likely and is more sensitive to performance. We also show a positive within-CEO relation between remaining time under contract and firm risk. Our results are similar across short and long contracts and are driven neither by firm or CEO survival, nor technological cycles. They are consistent with incentives to take long-term projects with interim volatility.

How does informed trading affect liquidity in limit order markets, where traders can choose between market orders (demanding liquidity) and limit orders (providing liquidity)? In a dynamic model, informed trading overall helps liquidity: A higher share of informed traders i) improves liquidity as proxied by the bid–ask spread and market resiliency, and ii) has no effect on the price impact of orders. The model generates other testable implications, and suggests new measures of informed trading.

We show how to conduct asymptotically valid tests of model comparison when the extent of model mispricing is gauged by the squared Sharpe ratio improvement measure. This is equivalent to ranking models on their maximum Sharpe ratios, effectively extending the Gibbons, Ross, and Shanken (1989) test to accommodate the comparison of nonnested models. Mimicking portfolios can be substituted for any nontraded model factors, and estimation error in the portfolio weights is taken into account in the statistical inference. A variant of the Fama and French (2018) 6-factor model, with a monthly updated version of the usual value spread, emerges as the dominant model.

We develop a theoretical model providing a new rationale for venture capitalist (VC) syndicate formation and empirically test our model predictions. An entrepreneur obtains financing and two different value-adding inputs from a single VC or from two different VCs, each operating in his area of expertise. We characterize the entrepreneur’s equilibrium choice between contracting with a single VC, individually with multiple VCs, or with a VC syndicate. We show that syndicates mitigate VCs’ moral hazard problem in value addition. We also analyze the dynamics of VC syndicate composition. The results of our empirical analysis are consistent with our model’s predictions.

Using data from the Stockholm Stock Exchange (SSE), we study the value added by (as distinct from the abnormal returns to) analysts’ recommendations. Recommending brokers’ clients trade profitably around positive recommendations at the expense of other brokers’ clients. Significant profits come from transactions before recommendation dates. Value added is greatest for upgrades to large caps, and largely insignificant for downgrades and recommendations of small caps, despite high abnormal returns. Brokers making profitable recommendations generate abnormally high commission income, recouping much of their clients’ abnormal profits, and their abnormal commission income varies in line with the abnormal profits for their clients.

In the capital structure literature, speed of adjustment (SOA) estimates are similar whether book or market leverage is used. This robustness is suspect, given the survey evidence that firms target their book leverage and the empirical evidence that they don’t issue securities to offset market leverage changes caused by stock price changes. We show that existing market SOA estimates are substantially upward biased due to the passive influence of stock price fluctuations. Controlling for this bias, the SOA estimate is 16% for book leverage and 10% for market leverage, implying that the trade-off theory is less important than previously thought.

We use the introduction of direct flights as an exogenous shock to the travel time between mutual funds and firms to estimate the causal effects of proximity on fund investment decisions and performance. We find that a fund invests significantly more in firms that become more proximate following the introduction of direct flights and that these more proximate investments exhibit superior performance. Our findings are robust to including a variety of fixed effects and potential confounders such as firm-level shocks, fund-level shocks, and time trends. Collectively, our results indicate that proximity enhances investors’ ability to acquire value-relevant information about firms.

We examine whether underwriters price up weakly demanded initial public offerings (IPOs) to prevent withdrawal. Our empirical strategy exploits a discontinuity in the distribution of IPO prices around the low boundary of the filing range. Offerings with a high ex ante withdrawal probability that are priced at this boundary are likely priced up to meet issuers’ reservation prices. We compare the aftermarket returns of these IPOs to the returns of other weakly demanded offerings where issuers’ reservation prices were likely not binding, and we identify a negative 8.4-percentage-point differential attributable to the aggressive pricing inherent in setting the price at the low boundary when withdrawal risk is high.

We study the link between information barriers in global markets and the organizational form of asset management. Fund families outsource funds in which they are at an informational disadvantage to generate performance. Using a structural model of self-selection, we endogenize the outsourcing decision and estimate positive gains from outsourcing of 4–14 basis points per month, thereby reconciling underperformance of outsourced funds with performance maximization by fund families. The gains from outsourcing provide a novel proxy for the information barriers that segment global financial markets: The more segmented the underlying markets where the funds invest, the larger the gains from outsourcing.

The psychology literature suggests that individual commitment has a positive effect on team performance by mitigating the free-rider problem. With its detailed management-team information, the mutual fund industry provides a unique opportunity to study how individual managerial commitment is related to performance. Committed fund managers are defined as those who work only for one fund. With few incentives to acquire private information, teams with no committed members underperform those with committed members. These findings remain robust after we incorporate various controls. We also explore why non-committed teams have been used increasingly often despite their poor performance.