The Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, completed in 1994, has fundamentally transformed the legal landscape of the world trading system, making the WTO arguably the most powerful international economic institution in the world. Yet, the systemic problems that have dogged the WTO since its establishment in 1995 have their roots in the nature of this transformation and its implications for developing countries, especially African states. Developing countries, hitherto excluded from GATT rules, became subject to expanded WTO legal rules and disciplines on a range of new areas, including services, intellectual property rights and investment measures. The possibility of deepening and widening the rule-base of the trade regime is also likely with the Doha agenda, which includes possible negotiations on new rules dealing with investment, competition policy, trade facilitation, and transparency in government procurement.

Clearly, the increasing legalization and internationalization of trade rules have implications for weak states. International legalization involves sophisticated bargaining where power relations play a significant role. The purpose of this article is to explore, in the context of some of the theories of international law and political economy, how the preferences and interests of African countries are reflected in international rule making that involves both weak and powerful states. The article traces the institutional and legal evolution of the world trading system and how African countries have been affected by these developments. The new Doha agenda is examined with a view to establishing whether it holds out any real hope of redressing the imbalances in the system. Finally, suggestions are made as to how global trade rules can be fair, and therefore made to work for poor states.

In this article, a brief statistical account of the participation of developing members in the WTO dispute settlement system is given. This account is set against a consideration of the criteria for measuring the participation of developing members in the WTO dispute settlement system. This is followed by a focus on how the “developing condition” has been argued and taken into consideration in the dispute settlement practice of the WTO. Finally, some of the principal problems involved in participation, along with suggested reforms, which relate to the participation of developing members in the WTO dispute settlement system, are considered.

Geographical indications (GI's) for foods link a quality or characteristic of a product to its locality of origin. GI's usually represent traditional or artisanal knowledge and techniques, yet they are recognized as a form of intellectual property. A GI may propel a food or beverage product from commodity status (blue cheese) into the high value niche or gourmet market (Roquefort cheese) and, consequently, can have a positive social and economic impact on farmers and rural development. African teas, coffees and other special products might benefit from greater international recognition and protection of GI's. Geographical indications are defined in but receive very limited international protection under the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Inellectual Property (TRIPS). Most regulation of GI's in national (e.g., in the Cote d'Ivoire and South Africa) or regional (e.g., the Bangui Agreement and in the E.C.). At the WTO and during the Doha Development Round discussions Kenya, Mauritius, Nigeria and South Africa, among other African countries, have argued for the expansion of the TRIPS rules, as have the E.C. and Switzerland. Ausralia, Japan, and the U.S., several countries in Latin America, and others conside GI's as likely protectionist measures and prefer to rely on trademarks. Each African country must determine whether the potential benefits of GI's—including their positive impact on rural development—sufficiently balance the costs of implementing some form of an international system.

Having been elected from the same pool from which state and federal officials have emerged, it might, on the face of it, seem rather unjustifiable to deny local government council (LGC) officials the autonomous tax imposition authority, which is ordinarily inherent in any government. But this is what the 1999 Constitution seems to have done in denying the autonomous power of rating to the LGCs, however, this constitution has used words made ambiguous by their historically varying content such that even the highest Nigerian court has been misled. The drafting has led to the impression that LGCs may “impose”, rather than merely “collect”, rates or any other such taxes by their own authority.

This article attempts to discover the character and consequences of this hermeneutic problem, the apparent misconceptions that have led to it, and the doctrinal and historical approaches the courts may adopt for its solution. In trying to appreciate or rationalize the court's misapprehension of this part of the constitution, the article suggests that the major reason is the drafter's attempt to create a three-tier federation while at the same time retaining the traditional two-tier constitutional structure for allocation of federalist power.

To return the courts to the right path, this article proffers historical approaches for clarification of the conceptual haze. It then concludes that, although the Nigerian constitution allows a delegation of rating power to LGCs, contrary to the current position of the Supreme Court, this rating authority is not autonomous.

This paper examines the status of the certificate of occupancy in relation to the question of title to land in Nigeria. This is with a view to determining whether or not the present state of real property registration laws in Lagos State of Nigeria permits the registration of a caution on the certificate of occupancy so as to reveal any charge or encumbrance on the certificate of occupancy upon a cursory examination. In this regard, the paper investigates the question of whether or not the certificate of occupancy is a document of title, which assures the existence of a right of occupancy in favour of the holder.