Small and poor countries pose a challenge for the World Trade Organization (WTO). These countries have acquired a significant say in WTO decision-making. However, they have limited ability to engage in the reciprocity game that is at the heart of the WTO, and have limited interests in the broader liberalization agenda because of their preferential access to industrial country markets. Accommodating the interests of the small and poor countries is desirable in itself, but would also facilitate expeditious progress in the Doha Round. The stark reality facing the system is that the desirable ways of addressing their concerns – providing them additional financial assistance and nonpreferential market access – is proving infeasible. As a result, the system is gravitating toward the less desirable option of relieving these countries of obligations, including those that might be welfare-enhancing for them.

This article examines the relationship between antidumping duties and strategic industrial policy. We argue that the dynamic between the two instruments is more complex and elaborate than that offered by the conventional account. We use the recent China–X-Ray Equipment dispute as a case study to show that linkage between the two instruments may not be the consequence of a government-led policy but instead a result of firm-driven responses to an industrial policy. This in turn may lead to antidumping tit-for-tat behavior between WTO members. We also analyze how WTO litigation serves as a means to alter the payoff and discuss the implications and unresolved questions that remain following the China–X-Ray Equipment ruling by the WTO.

By disentangling productivity- from quality-sorting in horticultural exports, this paper investigates the impact of food safety standards and consumers’ preference for quality on developing countries’ capacity to export high care and differentiated agricultural products (HCAs). Using a unique database on US import refusals, the empirical analysis shows that a shock to reputation has a downgrading effect, reducing the capacity to participate and benefit from trade in HCAs. The occurrence of at least one refusal in the current year reduces HS 6-digit average unit export price by over 8% and the long-run propensity suggests a 25% cut.

In the softwood lumber dispute, the United States argues that Canada's forestry practices, especially the fees charged by provincial governments to private firms to harvest trees on public lands (stumpage rights), result in undue subsidization of Canadian lumber. Within the World Trade Organization, the concept of subsidy is defined as a ‘government financial contribution’ that confers a ‘benefit’ on firms and that is ‘specific’. In US–Softwood Lumber IV, the WTO authorities ruled that stumpage rights were specific and constituted a financial contribution through the provision of a good (timber). However, in order to demonstrate whether and to what extent these rights confer a benefit on lumber producers, the United States still has to ensure that its methodology to assess the ‘adequacy of remuneration’ is compatible with WTO provisions and to conduct a satisfactory ‘pass-through’ analysis of the alleged input stumpage subsidy to unrelated downstream lumber producers.

This paper addresses the issues of whether the linking of core labor standards with multilateral or bilateral trade agreements is an effective way of promoting the improvement of labor standards. We review the determinants of core labor standards over time and conclude that efforts to improve these standards have to be tailored to the economic and social circumstances prevailing in a country at a specific time. Legalistic means to prod governments into revising their domestic laws or enforcing them will therefore be unsuccessful unless economic incentives can be changed to erode prevailing social norms and ease the way for the acceptance of new norms that will meet with public approval and be consonant with the distribution of political power. Moral suasion from both domestic and external sources may work more slowly than more legalistic means but is preferred because it contributes to altering the social norms that underlie and will reinforce the acceptance and effectiveness of labor standards.

Export restrictions imposed on various food products and natural resources have been subject to extensive public attention. Most recently, China's restrictions of its exports of certain minerals and rare earth metals have led to heated debates. The United States (US), European Union (EU), and Mexico have already filed a WTO dispute case against China on this matter. This paper describes the policy objectives and the global welfare implications of export restrictions. It summarizes the relevant WTO regulation, and offers a detailed analysis of the China–Raw Materials case which is before the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). It argues that although export restrictions is arguably an area of ‘under-regulation’ or ‘regulatory deficiency’ in the WTO law, it is strongly biased against the late accession Members, including China. Yet, the way that China institutes its export restrictions raises serious questions about its role in the multilateral trading system, which it relies on for its economic prosperity. Hence, this is an area where China is likely to feel the implications of its so-called ‘WTO-plus’ commitments on its domestic and trade policies.

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has brought with it an unprecedented number of agreements. BRI agreements consist of primary agreements (particularly MOUs) and secondary agreements (like performance agreements). They are a distinct, landmark feature of the BRI. Focusing on primary agreements and their close link with secondary agreements, this paper explores the following questions: What are the legal status and characteristics of primary agreements? Why are they adopted by China? What challenges do they face? BRI primary agreements can be regarded as a form of soft law, but that repurposes soft law characteristics for project development rather than rule development. BRI primary agreements have the following unique characteristics: (i) minimal legalization, (ii) a coordinated, project-based nature, and (iii) a hub-and-spoke network structure. While BRI primary agreements benefit from the advantages of soft law (e.g., reduced contracting costs, flexibility), they face challenges including those concerning underlying interests and their effectiveness.

The last decade has seen a proliferation of measures requiring data to be stored within national borders. Such restrictions, known as ‘data localization measures’, disrupt digital trade and run counter to the borderless reality of the internet. But the effectiveness of existing WTO rules to adequately discipline data localization measures remains inconclusive. In the absence of meaningful progress at the multilateral level, FTA negotiations are developing new models to address such barriers. This article compares how data localization measures would be disciplined under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) framework. It argues that the CPTPP represents a significant advance on the GATS and strikes an appropriate balance between facilitating businesses’ growing need to transfer and store data across national borders while preserving governments’ right to regulate in the public interest.

This article analyses the relationship between national climate change policy instruments and WTO rules with particular emphasis on the case of Germany. Our main finding is that national policies whose aim is to reduce greenhouse gases can be brought into compliance with international trade law. Compliance can be achieved, first, through various methods of labelling electricity from renewable resources. Second, it can be achieved through trading systems for green certificates that respect basic WTO principles. Third, it can be achieved through energy taxes. To offset the competitive impacts of such taxes, border tax adjustments are a possibility. Although WTO law has not yet clearly defined the eligibility of border tax adjustments for energy taxes, the balance of evidence suggests that it would support such adjustments under certain circumstances. Fourth, compliance with WTO rules can be achieved through financial incentives to the producers of energy from renewable sources which are conferred in such a way that they do not pass through the hands of the government. Hence, climate change policies can even rely on ‘subsidies’ (in the economic sense) without getting into conflict with WTO rules. Fifth, when compliance cannot be achieved, national policies aiming at international environmental protection can claim an exception under GATT Article XX (b) or (g) if measures are not applied in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner. In addition, countries should further strive to find solutions to the global climate change problem in the Kyoto process.

This article aims at analysing the merits and limits of ‘cross-retaliation’ as a mechanism to induce compliance in WTO dispute settlement, specifically from the perspective of developing countries. The focus is on cross-agreement retaliation, in particular with respect to the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), as this seems to be the most ‘promising’ area for developing countries. Although there are several legal, economic, and administrative difficulties related to the implementation of a suspension of TRIPS obligations and there is so far no practical experience, this seems to remain an interesting option for developing countries – or at least for the largest ones among them – wishing to obtain greater leverage in the system.

In the traditional theory of international trade, multilateral trade agreements should be easy because self-interested governments unilaterally commit to reduce their own protection and, as a bonus, they reap positive externalities from liberalization by other nations. In practice national governments do not behave as though they are maximizing the welfare of a representative citizen, but instead they respond to pressure from a diverse mix of constituencies and competing special interests. Governments attempt to manage domestic trade-offs within international negotiations, so progress is slow and protection persists. The practical operation of trade negotiations, emblemized by the infamous ‘green rooms’, is characterized by factionalism, horse-trading, and brinkmanship.

After eight years of effort, the 15 Asian members involved in the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) met in a virtual ceremony to sign the final document on Sunday, 15 November 2020. The final deal matches the original objective – to knit the region together and allow firms to build supply chains across the region to deliver goods, services, and investment to Asian markets more seamlessly. Getting this free trade agreement (FTA) to this point involved repeated missed deadlines, the loss of one important negotiating partner, and thousands of miles of travel for a rotating cast of officials, trade ministers, and leaders. RCEP began in late 2012 as an effort to unravel what has often been called the ‘spaghetti or noodle bowl’ of overlapping and inconsistent rules that can impede trade. While most of the countries in the region have extensive experience in trade and are outward oriented, trade in Asia has been bedeviled with challenges. This includes a range of both tariff and non-tariff obstacles that have made it more difficult than might be expected to trade, especially for final products, within the region.

This paper provides limited comments on portions of the Appellate Body (AB) judgment. With respect to the existence of a subsidy under contracts with NASA and DOD, we find the discussion of whether Boeing has received a financial contribution to be a distraction from the core issue – whether the mix of monetary compensation, access to government personnel and facilities, and IP rights ‘overcompensated’ Boeing for the services it rendered (or whether the government paid more for those services than they were worth to the government). The panel's analysis of this core issue, which focused on whether Boeing was the principal beneficiary of the contracts, is flawed, but the alternative approach of the AB is equally flawed. The analogy between an R&D joint venture and equity infusion is dubious, and the existence of a benefit simply does not turn on how one dimension of the contract (the allocation of the resulting intellectual property rights (IP)) is specified. We also argue that even a contract that confers a ‘benefit’ (or economic rent) on Boeing could still be an efficient arrangement for the allocation of cost and prospective revenues between the two partners. With respect to adverse effects, we argue that the panel and AB failed to develop an adequate counterfactual with respect to product developments; that is, it is not implausible that if Boeing had not received a subsidy and would accordingly have developed the 787 later, Airbus would also have delayed the development of the A350. To determine the existence of adverse effects, the panel and AB should have considered the profit (or sales) of Airbus relative to what would have happened in this counterfactual world. Finally, we observe that the analysis of lost sales and ‘price suppression’ fails to consider the specific features of competition in the aircraft industry. Unlike what happens in the market with posted prices, when contracts are individually negotiated, whether the outcome of competition is affected by a subsidy depends on the relative cost position of the bidders. When Boeing is the lowest cost bidder, the only effect of the subsidy is to increase its rent, with no effect on sales or prices for Airbus.

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) may potentially reduce trade barriers between China and countries along the Belt and Road (BR) route, affecting the positions in Global Value Chains (GVCs) of agricultural products of these countries. This study explores the BRI influence on the GVC positions using a global computable general equilibrium (CGE) model and focusing on China and the BR countries. The study finds that the reduction of tariff barriers and non-tariff barriers between countries along ‘the Belt and Road’ results in increased producer prices and volumes of almost all agricultural products exported from China, which improves the position of China in the GVCs of these agricultural products in our best estimate scenario. Countries along the BR route also benefit from the reduction in trade barriers, with improved positions in the GVCs of agricultural products in the best estimate scenario, especially those products that have comparative advantages in GVCs.

Transparency in the multilateral trade system is fundamental. Monitoring the compliance of WTO members with their obligations is an important part of that transparency, and timeliness in the notification of compliance is crucial. In the case of domestic support to agriculture, the notifications of compliance with obligations has been slow and opaque. But another database exists that could both illuminate the extent to which policy instruments are correctly notified and provide a convenient way to ensure timely ‘pre-notifications’ in the event that delays occur in the future. This note shows how the OECD database can be used, for example, to shed light on the extent to which payments to producers that require production as a matter of eligibility are presently notified to the WTO as having no effect on production. We also demonstrate the feasibility of using OECD data to construct ‘pre-notifications’ by calculating the (as yet un-notified) domestic support notifications for the EU for the years 2009/10 and 2010/11.

The Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) of China came into effect in August 2008. In less than a decade, China has made remarkable strides to enforce this law; no other jurisdiction with a competition law system – over 130 to date – comes close to matching China's accomplishments in the first decade of its competition regime. However, China's progress in implementing competition policy remains uncertain.

In July 2009, Chinese steel producers of grain oriented electrical steel filed anti-dumping (AD) and countervailing duty (CVD) cases against US and Russian producers. The US challenged the duties for a variety a reasons, many of which involved deficiencies in the producers' application to China's investigating authority, the Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China (MOFCOM). The US also challenged certain aspects of MOFCOM's injury analysis. The Panel and Appellate Body ruled in favor of the US on virtually every issue. Given the deficiencies in the application and China's handling of the case, the Panel and AB decisions were justified. In a larger sense, however, we believe China may well emerge as the ‘winner’ in this dispute as this case establishes important standards for allegations and evidence in applications, standards that other countries (including the US) likely have failed to meet when they have imposed AD and CVD orders on the largest target country, China.

The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) was adopted in order to establish meaningful liberalization rules, while preserving the right of Members to regulate. To that end, three provisions form the centerpiece of liberalization: market access (Article XVI GATS), national treatment (Article XVII GATS), and domestic regulation (Article VI GATS). Although these provisions contain different obligations, in certain conditions they can overlap. How this issue is resolved could undermine the delicate balance between liberalization and the right to regulate. As the GATS provides no guidance, the task of determining the applicable rules has been delegated to the World Trade Organization (WTO) adjudicating bodies. This paper examines how the three provisions have been interpreted, and analyzes the most applicable way to address the diversity of barriers to trade in services.

International trade law, organized around the goods-services dichotomy, is about to meet the Internet of Things (IoT). How will rules written for the world of 1994 fare in a world of talking teapots and connected cars? IoT will especially raise governmental concerns with respect to privacy, security, and standards. Indeed, governments have already begun taking adverse measures against foreign IoT suppliers based not on the hardware, but on the digital features of the products. This paper argues that IoT devices comprise both goods and services, therefore calling into application multiple WTO disciplines, with the specific agreements that are applicable dependent on the particular governmental measure subject to challenge.