For roughly a century—if we take the years from Fourier and Bentham to the triumph of Freud—the study of politics concerned itself mainly with institutions. Fourier, in plotting a Utopia, took his individuals just as they were, expecting by the perfection of social arrangements to turn individual weakness and vice into virtues. Bentham also by-passed the infinite problem of the individual (this was relegated to religion) and concentrated on the finite reform of institutions; the greatest happiness of the greatest number was never the principle of an individual psychology, although since 1832 Bentham's formula has grown ironically appropriate as the individual in a mass society has become, characteristically, a quantity.

In the past few years a large number of books, articles, and pamphlets have been published on the future problems of underdeveloped countries. In most of these accounts, economic, cultural, or administrative questions receive chief attention. Mr. Staley has now produced a book in which the international political problems of the underdeveloped countries are given primary emphasis. In particular, the book concentrates on one problem area: what role do underdeveloped countries play in the present division of the world into a Communist and a non-Communist bloc; what are the doctrines and strategies the Communists have worked out for underdeveloped countries; what chances are there of the underdeveloped countries falling under Communist domination; and, finally, what policies can be adopted by the non-Communist countries, particularly the United States, in order to keep free from Communist infiltration and subversion as large a portion of the world as possible?

The onrush of enormous changes that struck American foreign relations in 1940-1941 brought with it most of the current problems in the administration of foreign affairs. For one change, the conduct of foreign relations has become not only the largest function of the federal government, but also the largest function of all governments in the United States. In 1948, at midpoint between World War II and war in Korea, the costs of foreign relations, including military outlays, accounted for 54 per cent of all money spent by all governments, federal, state, and local, for all public purposes. No matter whether we measure the relative size in costs, in personnel devoted to it, in impact upon the political economy, or in commitments of the United States, this work of government has exceeded all other.

There are times when these two volumes seem to repeat each other; common to each is a core of interest in investment and economic growth, and if the titles divide the terminology, the books share the territory. Nevertheless, each of the authors approaches the problem from his own point of view, and for all the overlap, there are wide areas of individual treatment. Moreover, even where both deal with the same questions, the evidence produced is usually different, and the reader can only be grateful for his double feast of tables, graphs, and citations.

In seeking a rational solution to policy problems, we select and approach the relevant facts in the light of underlying assumptions. Both knowledge of the object and rational certainty about the course to be taken can be attained only by proceeding from assumptions concerning values as well as causal relations. Our thinking is scientific (or, if one prefers another term, rationally disciplined rather than merely emotional) insofar as these indispensable assumptions are made deliberately, methodically, and critically. In applying thought to the problem of international organization, we have not done as well in this respect as we ought. It may be worthwhile, therefore, to call attention to the task of critically examining the assumptions on which the study of problems of international organization actually proceeds.