The year is 2100. Geena is the proud new owner of Emit, a state-of-the-art robot. She has just unwrapped him, the packaging strewn across the dining room floor. Emit is designed to replicate the outward behaviour of a human being down to the last detail (except that he is rather more compliant and obedient). Emit responds to questions in much the same way humans do. Ask him how he feels and he will say he has had a tough day, has a slight headache, is sorry he broke that vase, and so on. Geena flips the switch at the back of Emit's neck to ‘on’. Emit springs to life.

Thinking Tools is a regular feature that introduces pointers on thinking clearly and rigorously. Here I tell a cautionary tale about flying saucers and take a brief look at the virtues of ‘open-mindedness’.

In many academic circles today, Susan Haack observes, we encounter a ‘new almost-orthodoxy’ which distrusts the notions of truth, fact and evidence and rejects such ideals as honest inquiry and respect for evidence. Supporters of this ‘Higher Dismissiveness’, noting, correctly, that ‘truth’ is very often only what the powerful have managed to get accepted as such, draw the mistaken conclusion that those who still speak of knowledge and truth are guilty of naivete and ‘white male thinking’.

In this paper Haack argues that the Higher Dismissiveness is not only confused, but dangerously so.

Piers Benn, lecturer in medical ethics at Imperial College, London, discusses two recent medical cases involving the so-called ‘right to die’ explaining how the cases differ legally and, perhaps, ethically.

In this regular series, Michael Clark, editor of Analysis, presents some of the most intriguing philosophical paradoxes. Here we examine the paradox of Buridan's ass.

One of the most intriguing of philosophical puzzles concerns other minds. How do you know there are any? Yes, you're surrounded by living organisms that look and behave much as you do. They even say they have minds. But do they? Perhaps other humans are mindless zombies: like you on the outside, but lacking any inner conscious life, including emotions, thoughts, experiences and even pain. What grounds do you possess for supposing that other humans (including even me) aren't zombies? Perhaps less than you think. Anita Avramides tackles this fascinating question.

In this regular series Michael Clark, editor of the philosophy journal Analysis, presents a number of the most intriguing philosophical paradoxes. We begin with The Ship of Theseus.

Is morality relative? Might what is morally ‘right’ for one culture be morally ‘wrong’ for another? Issue two contained two pieces (one by myself) arguing against this kind of moral relativism. Here, Michael Lacewing suggests that there may be more truth in relativism than was suggested.

Thinking Tools is a regular feature that introduces tips and pointers on thinking clearly and rigorously. Here we get to grips with two everyday reasoning errors.

According to relativists, people who speak simply of what's ‘true’ are naïve. ‘Whose truth?’ asks the relativist. ‘No claim is ever true, period. What's true is always true for someone. It's true relative to a particular person or culture. There's no such thing as the absolute truth on any issue.’

This sort of relativism is certainly popular. For example, many claim that we are wrong to condemn cultures with moral codes different from our own: their moralities are no less valid. Similarly, some claim that while astrology and Feng Shui might be ‘false’ from a Western, scientific viewpoint, they are ‘true’ when viewed from alternative, New Age points of view. What's ‘true’ and what's ‘false’ ultimately depend on where one is standing.

Is this sort of relativism about truth tenable?

Issue two contained three pieces arguing against relativism: the view that what is true from one individual's or community's perspective might be false from another, that there is no ‘absolute’ truth on any issue. Here David Mills, an anthropologist, argues that, even if we are right to reject philosophical relativism, there is still value in embracing a methodological form of relativism.

In this article, John Hyman argues that beauty does not consist in mathematical perfection; that Hume was mistaken in claiming that beauty exists only in the mind; that we can discover what is really beautiful by learning to give reasons for our preferences; and that some things in the world are beautiful—probably many more than we imagine.

Is what's true ultimately relative to your point of view? So that what's true as viewed from over here might be false if viewed from over there? In this article, Simon Blackburn grapples with the suggestion that what's true is ultimately just a matter of perspective.

Many try to justify their moral positions — whether on murder, infanticide, homosexuality or abortion — by appealing to the Bible. But to what extent can we rely on what the Bible has to say about morality? In this paper, James Rachels, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Alabama at Birmingham, raises questions about the legitimacy of such Biblical justifications.

The recent murder of two schoolgirls in Soham provoked calls for a return of the death penalty. Piers Benn examines the case for execution.

Many seek to play the lottery by crossing boxes at random across their card. But do they really choose their numbers at random? As John Haigh here explains, probably not. And, surprisingly, that is likely to affect how much they win. If you play the lottery and want to win big, then read on…

Many people are upset by Richard Dawkins. Mary Midgley, in particular, has argued that Dawkins'‘crude, cheap, blurred genetics […] is the kingpin of his crude, cheap, blurred psychology. ’Dawkins is often also suspected of having sinister political motives, and of morally condoning selfish behaviour. Here, Jeremy Stangroom explains how he believes Midgley and others have systematically misunderstood Dawkins.

In this regular series Michael Clark, editor of the journal Analysis, presents some of the most intriguing philosophical paradoxes. Here we examine the paradox of Achilles and the tortoise.

You have a rich inner life of conscious experiences. For example, you have pains and other sensations. And you have sensory experiences, such as that produced by chewing on something bitter. Scientists are currently puzzling over how to explain this inner life in scientific terms. Can we, for example, ‘explain’ consciousness by appealing to certain facts about our brains?

Here, Oswald Hanfling explains why he believes the scientific ‘problem’ of ‘explaining’ consciousness is ultimately a pseudo-problem. There is no problem!