I criticize Brian Earp's ‘Some Writing Tips for Philosophy’. Earp's article is useful for someone who wishes to do well in analytic philosophy as currently practised but it also casts doubt on why such analytic philosophy would be of interest to someone who wants to learn something new. In addition to its good tips, Earp's article contains two bad tips which, if followed, will tend to produce a paper that says next to nothing. I list the two faulty tips, show how the practices of great philosophers and scientists contradict them, then set out some contrary good tips for philosophers who aim to write a paper that makes a contribution to our knowledge.

Assuming God exists, should we worship God? This article contends that even if God is omniscient, omnipotent and omni-benevolent, and created and sustains the world, we should adopt the attitude towards God exhibited by Abraham in Chapter 18 of Genesis. There, having been informed of God's willingness to destroy Sodom, Abraham persuades God that if the city contains ten innocent inhabitants, justice requires the plan to be altered. The story undermines the divine command theory of morality, demonstrates that God is subject to change, and suggests that God is prepared to be challenged rather than worshipped.

Peter Lyth claimed that my argument against an infinite temporal regress of events conflates number as an abstract entity with number as a number of events or things. I show that my argument does not depend on such a conflation.

Sometimes people wonder why we should look at the morality of property at all. Property rights are taken to be legal constructs. Their validity rests, as Hume suggested, on their utility. In this context it makes little sense to focus on the specific provisions of property law and ask about their moral foundation. What has a foundation in morality is the whole system of property itself: laws, distributions, expectations, conventions. And the general usefulness of this arrangement is so large a question, so fraught with uncertainty, that it is almost beyond serious discussion.

The first six articles in this issue of THINK have the theme “Good without God”. Here, Richard Swinburne argues that the existence of God is not a precondition of there being moral truths, but his existence does impact on what moral truths there are.

According to Socrates, an unexamined life is not worth living. This view is controversial. Is the unexamined life worth living or not? Most philosophers disagree about the answer. While some argue for the worthlessness of an unexamined life, others support the superfluity of self critical examination. In his recent article, Jamison pooh-poohed the claim that an unexamined life is not worth living. According to Jamison, not only is an unexamined life worth living; the rigorous examination of life should not be encouraged due to its possible negative effects on the participants and the entire society. In Jamison's view, a consistent and unregulated examination of human life produces a feeling of ecstasy (a specie of spiritual feeling) in those who engage in it. The feeling, if allowed, could endanger both the thinker and the entire society. For Jamison, “once you get a taste of this kind of thing, you do not want to give it up”. Someone who engages in self-critical examination eventually becomes entangled with it. Socrates became entangled in dialectics, became unpopular, was accused of corrupting the youth and eventually sentenced to death.

Many are growing increasingly skeptical of the claims by government officials about winning the war against drugs. Should this war be supported because a smaller percentage of teenagers use marijuana, or should it be opposed because a larger percentage of teenagers and young adults use cocaine and crack in the USA? Should people be optimistic when multi-billion dollar shipments of cocaine are confiscated, or pessimistic that seizures continue to increase yet have such little impact on price and consumption? Drug prohibition was doomed to failure from the start, no less so than alcohol prohibition, and the best alternative is an immediate return to complete legalization of such drugs.

‘Bah! Humbug!’ It's the most famous line in Charles Dickens' A Christmas Carol, but is it the most important? Surely not, for this Christmas classic is not centrally about Christmas, but about a man, the holiday being the convenient setting for his transformation. What kind of transformation? Why a moral transformation of course, because the man, Ebenezer Scrooge, through multiple encounters with the spirit world, becomes a good man by the end of the story. But where does this story begin, what are we to think of Scrooge at the outset and how is his transformation accomplished? These are the questions I take up here, for while Scrooge is tightfisted, covetous and hard-hearted, he is still a man of principle. Judged by the standards of some views on ethics, Scrooge isn't actually all that bad. How can that be? Let's start with a quick overview of two centuries of ethical theory.

At a time of acute danger, people commonly petition God for help for themselves or their loved ones. Such prayer seems natural and, indeed, for believers, reasonable and acceptable. But once we closely examine what is actually happening in such situations, we see that frequently such prayer is not morally innocuous. I present a number of examples which illustrate the difficulty, and argue that even assuming the benevolence of the deity does not suffice to make such prayer legitimate.

There exists today an infinite variety (literally) of formal logics, different systems with incompatible properties. One way to explain the existence of many logics is to posit logical pluralism: to suppose that there is in fact more than one correct logic. In this selective guide – designed for non-logicians – we look at some examples of how different logics come into apparent conflict with each other. Then we look at different ways of understanding the idea of logical pluralism. Our question throughout will be a basic one: does logical pluralism have any limits?

Some people have engaged in acts of civil disobedience to protest against the climate policies of their governments and corporations. This article argues that these disobedient actions are justified at present since governments fail to do all they reasonably can to respond to this pressing issue.

This article argues that it is a mistake to assume that atheism entails naturalism, that naturalism is what leads someone to embrace atheism, and that atheists must sign up to a ‘naturalistic world-view’.

If emotions such as sympathy are to play the role Oatley envisages for them, they cannot be condescending; they must be based on some real understanding. This is an essay about the difficulty of understanding, and, consequently, the difficulty of sympathy. So, it is a challenge to any philosopher who seeks to understand morality by assigning a strong role to the emotions.

Human beings are social animals. A solitary life would be horrible for most of us. What makes life worthwhile is being with others and engaging in shared projects with them. To do justice to these facts, philosophers need to pay more attention to the first-person plural, we/us, and to rethink their accounts of value and virtue.

Compassion (or ‘feeling with’) has attracted fervent admiration and vehement condemnation. Among the critics are some Stoics and early Christians, and early modern philosophers such as Kant and Spinoza. Characteristics that are regarded as ideal in humans tend to be regarded as divine perfections as well. Accordingly, traditional Christian and Jewish theology includes the belief that God is ‘impassible’, that is, both emotionless (in general) and incapable of suffering (in particular). Divine compassion is precluded on both grounds.

Texting while driving is morally equivalent to driving drunk. In this dialogue, I illustrate why moral arguments from analogy are a valuable part of moral reasoning by considering how texting while driving is, morally speaking, no different from drunk driving.1

Reitsma and Bassham introduce a sporting paradox.

There has recently been a great deal written about philosophy in schools and in this article I shall be addressing some of the main concerns raised in objection to philosophy with young people. By young people I have in mind those in primary school from reception through to Year 6 (ages 4–11).