We examine the criteria used to validate the use of nonhuman organisms in North-American alcohol addiction research from the 1950s to the present day. We argue that this field, where the similarities between behaviors in humans and non-humans are particularly difficult to assess, has addressed questions of model validity by transforming the situatedness of non-human organisms into an experimental tool. We demonstrate that model validity does not hinge on the standardization of one type of organism in isolation, as often the case with genetic model organisms. Rather, organisms are viewed as necessarily situated: they cannot be understood as a model for human behavior in isolation from their environmental conditions. Hence the environment itself is standardized as part of the modeling process; and model validity is assessed with reference to the environmental conditions under which organisms are studied.

This paper examines the earthquake monitoring and prediction program, called “collective monitoring, collective defense,” in communist China during the Cultural Revolution, a period of political upheavals and natural disasters. Guided by their scientific and political ideas, the Chinese developed approaches to earthquake monitoring and prediction that emphasized mass participation, everyday knowledge, and observations of macro-seismic phenomena. The paper explains the ideas, practices, and epistemology of the program within the political context of the Cultural Revolution. It also suggests possibilities for comparative analysis of science, state, and natural disasters. The paper redefines the concept of “citizen science” and argues that the concept provides a useful comparative perspective on the intimate relationship between science and the macropolitics of modern state and society.

This essay takes a close look at specially selected features of the Göttingen mathematical culture during the period 1895–1920. Drawing heavily on personal accounts and archival resources, it describes the changing roles played by Felix Klein and David Hilbert, as Göttingen's two senior mathematicians, within a fast-growing community that attracted an impressive number of young talents. Within the course of these twenty-five years Göttingen exerted a profound impact on mathematics and physics throughout the world. Many factors contributed to the creation of a special atmosphere that served as a model for several other important centers for mathematical research. Göttingen exemplified a dynamic new way of doing mathematics within a highly competitive community in which the spoken word often carried more weight than did information conveyed in written texts. This oral dimension of the Göttingen culture played an important, till now overlooked role in the early development of Einstein's general theory of relativity.

Argument

The recent development of molecular genetics has created concern that society may experience a new eugenics. Notions about eugenics and what took place in the 1930s and 1940s are actively shaping questions about which uses of the new genetics should be considered illegitimate. Drawing upon a body of historiographical literature on Scandinavian eugenics, this paper argues that the dominant view of eugenics as morally and scientifically illegitimate is not tenable when it comes to the uses of compulsion, political motivation, and scientific acceptability. In spite of a general condemnation of eugenics, health authorities today are trying to prevent individuals with deviant behavior from reproducing or at least from rearing children. This may not be argued with reference to the risk of transmitting defective genes, but rather the risk of producing undesirable social problems. Drawing on a Foucauldian approach, the paper concludes that eugenics and new genetics should be seen as two historically specific forms of biopower.

In the theory-dominated view of scientific experimentation, all relations of theory and experiment are taken on a par; namely, that experiments are performed solely to ascertain the conclusions of scientific theories. As a result, different aspects of experimentation and of the relations of theory to experiment remain undifferentiated. This in turn fosters a notion of theory-ladenness of experimentation (TLE) that is too coarse-grained to accurately describe the relations of theory and experiment in scientific practice. By contrast, in this article, I suggest that TLE should be understood as an umbrella concept that has different senses. To this end, I introduce a three-fold distinction among the theories of high-energy particle physics (HEP) as background theories, model theories, and phenomenological models. Drawing on this categorization, I contrast two types of experimentation, namely, “theory-driven” and “exploratory” experiments, and I distinguish between the “weak” and “strong” senses of TLE in the context of scattering experiments from the history of HEP. This distinction enables identifying the exploratory character of the deep-inelastic electron-proton scattering experiments – performed at the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center (SLAC) between the years 1967 and 1973 – thereby shedding light on a crucial phase of the history of HEP, namely, the discovery of “scaling,” which was the decisive step towards the construction of quantum chromo-dynamics as a gauge theory of strong interactions.

This article investigates the reasons behind the disappearance of Francis Glisson's theory of irritability during the eighteenth century. At a time when natural investigations were becoming increasingly polarized between mind and matter in the attempt to save both man's consciousness and the inert nature of the res extensa, Glisson's notion of a natural perception embedded in matter did not satisfy the new science's basic injunction not to superimpose perceptions and appetites on nature. Knowledge of nature could not be based on knowledge within nature, i.e., on the very knowledge that nature has of itself; or – to look at the same question from the point of view of the human mind – man's consciousness could not be seen as participating in forms of natural selfhood. Albrecht Haller played a key role in this story. Through his experiments, Haller thought he had conclusively demonstrated that the response given by nature when irritated did not betray any natural perceptivity, any inner life, any sentiment interiéur. In doing so, he provided a less bewildering theory of irritability for the rising communities of experimental physiology.

Despite the enormous historical attention psychoanalysis has attracted, its popularization in Britain (as opposed to the United States) in the wake of the Great War has been largely overlooked. The present paper explores the sources and fate of the sudden “craze” for psychoanalysis after 1918, examining the content of the books through which the doctrine became widely known, along with the roles played by religious interests and the popular press. The percolation of Freudian and related language into everyday English was effectively complete by the 1930s. Crucially, it is argued that in Britain the character of psychoanalytic theory itself demonstrably converged with the psychological needs of the British population in the postwar period. The situation in Britain was clearly different in many respects from that in the United States. This episode bears on numerous questions about scientific popularization, the distinctiveness of British psychoanalysis, and though it is treated here only peripherally the epistemological status or nature of psychoanalysis. More generally the present paper may be read as an exercise in reflexive disciplinary historiography, in which the levels of discipline (“Psychology”) and subject matter (“psychology”) are viewed as interpenetrating and mutually constitutive.

Discussions of the scientific uses of moving-image technologies have emphasized applications that culminated in static images, such as the chronophotographic decomposition of movement into discrete and measurable instants. The projection of movement, however, was also an important capability of moving-image technologies that scientists employed in a variety of ways. Views through the microscope provide a particularly sustained and prominent instance of the scientific uses of the moving image. The category of “education” subsumes theses various scientific uses, providing a means by which to bridge the cultures of scientific and popular scientific moving images.

The group of mathematicians known as Bourbaki persuasively proclaimed the isolation of its field of research — pure mathematics — from society and science. It may therefore seem paradoxical that links with larger French cultural movements, especially structuralism and potential literature, are easy to establish. Rather than arguing that the latter were a consequence of the former, which they were not, I show that all of these cultural movements, including the Bourbakist endeavor, emerged together, each strengthening the public appeal of the others through constant, albeit often superficial, interaction. This codependency is partly responsible for their success and moreover accounts for their simultaneous fall from favor, which, however, can clearly be seen as also stemming from different internal problems. To understand this dynamics, I argue that Bourbaki's role can best be captured by using the notion of cultural connector, which I introduce here.

Argument

After more than half a century of eclipse, the mind (in contradistinction to brain and behavior) emerged in the 1950s as a legitimate object of experimental and quantitative research in natural science. This paper argues that the neural nets project of Warren S. McCulloch, in frequent collaboration with Walter Pitts, spearheaded this cognitivist turn in the 1940s. Viewing the project as a spiritual and poetic quest for the transcendental logos, as well as a culturally situated epistemology, the paper focuses on McCulloch’s and Pitts’ efforts of logical modeling of the mind and on the social conditions that shaped that mission.

From McCulloch’s “experimental epistemology,” the mind–purposes and ideas–emerged out of the regularities of neuronal interactions, or nets. That science of mind thus became a science of signals based on binary logic with clearly defined units of perception and precise rules of formation and transformation for representing mental states. Aimed at bridging the gulf between body and mind (matter and form) and the technical gulf between things man-made and things begotten, neural nets also laid the foundation for the field of artificial intelligence.

Thus this paper also situates McCulloch’s work within a larger historical trend, when cybernetics, information theory, systems theories, and electronic computers were coalescing into a new science of communication and control with enormous potential for industrial automation and military power in the Cold War era. McCulloch’s modeling the mind as a system of command and control contributed to the actualization of this potential.

We build our castles in the air,

And from the air they tumble down,

Unless we carry them up there

Until they crack the pate they crown.

And we must lug them everywhere,

From garden walk to crowded town;

We build our castles in the air,

And from the air they tumble down.

And lucky, if when sere and brown,

Before our eyes too lofty stare,

We scape with life and pate, though bare,

On which to plant an honest frown.

We build our castles in the air,

And from the air they tumble down.

Warren S. McCullochOf McCulloch’s literary work only two thin volumes, One Word After Another (1945) and The Natural Fit (1959), have been published. Most of his poetic output was unpublished and is deposited at the American Philosophical Society (hereafter APS) in the McCulloch Papers, BM 139. The poem, originally published in The Natural Fit, is quoted after McCulloch 1989, vol. 3, 917. For commentary on his poetry, see Vasalis 1989.

We expand upon the notion of the “credibility cycle” through a study of credibility engineering by the food industry. Research and development (R&D) as well as marketing contribute to the credibility of the food company Unilever and its claims. Innovation encompasses the development, marketing, and sales of products. These are directed towards three distinct audiences: scientific peers, regulators, and consumers. R&D uses scientific articles to create credit for itself amongst peers and regulators. These articles are used to support health claims on products. However, R&D, regulation, and marketing are not separate realms. A single strategy of credibility engineering connects health claims to a specific public through linking that public to a health issue and a food product.

Focusing on the celebrations of Newton and his work, this article investigates the use of the concept of genius and its connection with debates on the methodology of science and the morality of great discoverers. During the period studied, two areas of tension developed. Firstly, eighteenth-century ideas about the relationship between genius and method were challenged by the notion of scientific genius as transcending specifiable rules of method. Secondly, assumptions about the nexus between intellectual and moral virtue were threatened by the emerging conception of genius as marked by an extraordinary personality – on the one hand capable of breaking with established methods to achieve great discoveries, on the other, likely to transgress moral and social conventions. The assesments of Newton by nineteenth-century scientists such as Brewster, Whewell, and De Morgan were informed by these tensions.

Despite more than fifty years of debate on the Merton thesis, there have been few attempts to substantiate Merton's argument through empirically based comparative studies. This study of the Jesuit scientific tradition is intended to serve as a test of some of Merton's central claims.

Jesuit science is remarkable for its scope and longevity, and is distinguished by its markedly empirical and utilitarian orientation. In this paper I examine the ideological structure of the Society of Jesus and find at its core an “apostolic spirituality” that explains the legitimation of these forms of science within the Society. The values of apostolic spirituality (diligence, practicality, learning, etc.) strongly encouraged an activist mentality among Jesuits, which in turn led to the formation of apostolates in education, at court, and in the overseas missions. The values associated with apostolic spirituality led to the initial acceptance of active-empirical sciences within the Society, which became established as traditions because they were useful in fulfilling the goals of the Society's apostolates.

This study, by providing a qualified confirmation of Merton's central claims, suggests the importance of a supra-confessional sanctification of labor and learning in the growth of active-empirical sciences.

The paper is divided into the two parts. In the first, I examine the relations among molecular biology, gene technology, and medicine as some aspect of the consequences of these relations with respect to the human genome project of the consequences of these relations with respect to the human genome project. I argue that the prevailing momentum of early molecular biology resided in argue that the prevailing momentum of relay molecular biology resided in crating the technical means for an extracellular representation of intracellular configurations. Assuch, its medical impact was rather limited. With the advent of recombinant DNA technology is based on the prospects of an intracellular representation of extracellular projects—the “rewriting” of life. Its medical impact is potentially unlimited. In the second part, I question the very opposition between nature and culture that implicitly underlies the notion of medicine as a “cultural system.” I argue that both on a macroscopic level (global ecological changes) and on a microscopic level (genetic engineering), the “natural” and the “social” are no longer to be seen as ontologically different.

In its uncanny oscillation between retrospection and foresight, between description and proclamation, and between assertion and hesitation, this essay translates an uneasiness that I have not been able to overcome while writing it. The essay conveys the tangled views of a hybrid author who himself cannot but oscillate between the perspectives of an actor in the field of molecular biology, a participant in the field of science studies, and a citizen

What kind of objects are computer programs used for simulation purposes in scientific settings? The current investigation treats a special case. It focuses on “event generators,” the program packages that particle physicists construct and use to simulate mechanisms of particle production. The paper is an attempt to bring the multiplex and unfolding character of such knowledge objects to the fore: Multiple meanings and functions are embodied in the object and can be drawn out selectively according to the requirements of a work setting. The object's conceptual complexity governs its application in some contexts, while the object is considered a mere “black box,” transparent and ready-to-hand, in others. These two poles span a full spectrum of object aspects, functions, and conceptions. Event generators are ideas turned into software, testing grounds for models, just a tool to study the performance of a detector, etc. The object's multiplex nature is submitted to negotiation among different actors.

While there has been muchattention given to experiment in modern science studies, there has been astoundingly little concern spared over the practice of quanitataive measurment.Thus myths about the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematice in science still abound. This paper presents: (a) An explicit mathematical model of the stabilization of quantitative constants in a mathematical science to rival older Bayesian and classical accounts;(b)a framework for writing a history of pracitces with regard to treatment of quantitative measurement erroe;(c) resourece for the comparative sociology of differing discipliness in this regard;and (d) a prolegonmena to a critique of orthodox economics and accounting theories. The key to all these diverse themes is the realization that no one individual alone is capable of fixing the magnitude of a quantitative error estimate, and therefore the social construction of error must be given a more precise meaning, an therefore the social construction of error must be given a more precise menaing, and that this occurs through the istrumentality of meta-analysis

Argument

The life of the pioneer electroencephalographer, William Grey Walter, initially appears to be a paradigmatic example of the process of network building and delegation identified by Michel Callon and Bruno Latour. In his professional career, Walter continually repositioned himself, moving from an unhappy beginning as an expert in the apparently useless and suspect technology of the EEG, to become a self-styled crucial mediator in subjects as diverse as medical diagnosis, forensic detection, marriage counseling, and international diplomacy. This position was achieved moreover through the construction and co-option of human and mechanical accomplices – laboratory assistants, electrical tortoises, and mechanical analyzers – which sustained his research and propagated his arguments. However in contrast to Callon and Latour’s atomistic account of scientific power and agency, this paper will extend their analysis to explore the impact of network building and delegation on domestic life, human desire, and personal identity. Walter’s engagement with the complexities of love and the human brain demonstrates how the transformative power of scientific rhetoric extends simultaneously into both the organization of the world and the subjectivity of the individual.

What would be the use of a neuroscience which cannot tell us anything about love?

Programs of the Brain (Young 1978, 143)

In the early 1950s the neurophysiologist and electroencephalographer, William Grey Walter, began to speculate on the future evolution of the human brain. Rejecting the vision of disembodied nervous systems and dome-headed descendants proposed by the populist authors of pulp science fiction, Walter instead imagined a series of linked transformations that would encompass our neural organization, technology, and society. He argued that our future evolution would be an indirect process, in which the development of new mechanisms of information storage and communication would allow the brain to shake off its mundane operations and embark instead on a process of mental growth through play and speculation. As Walter wrote:

The exteriorization of tedious or controversial reasoning will no doubt have as profound an effect upon the brain and society as the introduction of skilled and respectful servants has on a humble household. … But the future of the brain is more intriguing than a mere holiday from drudgery, for it is only when the servants of thought have done their work and retired unobtrusively to their quarters that the master brain can discover its own place and settle down to its proper work. (Walter 1953, 194; 1961, 234)

Through a detailed study of the group surrounding Andronov and Grekhova, this article highlights how the configuration of the interaction between techno-science, the State, and production appears to be very specific to the Soviet Union, as compared to the United States or France. We are often used to thinking of the relationship between science and its (social and cultural) context by postulating that the core of scientific content is universal while context is variable. This study suggests rather the opposite. For indeed, the local and specific nature of the scientific culture and tradition of nonlinearity in Gor'kiy must be emphasized. It is the political context of World War II and of the Cold War that forced the unification with Western science, in that they set theoretical targets and technical objectives, and stimulated the manufacture of identical products, such as radar and nuclear devices, automated systems, etc. In short, in the relationship of politics and science that is examined here, it is the politics which created unity and universality.

Recent historiography of the Scientific Revolution has challenged the assumption that the achievements of seventeenth-century natural philosophy can easily be described as the ‘mechanization of the world-picture.’ That assumption licensed a story which took mechanization as self-evidently progressive and so in no need of further historical analysis. The clock-work world was triumphant and inevitably so. However, a close examination of one key group of natural philosophers working in England during the 1670s shows that their program necessarily incorporated souls and spirits, attractions and congruities, within both their ontology and their epistemology. Any natural philosophical strategy which excluded spirits and sympathies from its world was condemned as tending to subversion and irreligion. This examination shows that the term ‘mechanical philosophy’ was a category given its meanings within local contexts and carries no universal sense separate from that accomplished by these natural philosophers. It also shows how the experimental praxis was compelled to treat souls and spirits, to produce them through experimental labor, and then to extend these experimentally developed entities throughout the cosmos, both social and natural. The development of mechanical philosophy cannot be used to explain the cognitive and social structure of this program, nor its success: instead, the historical setting of experimental work shows how a philosophy of matter and spirit was deliberately constructed by the end of the seventeenth century.

Argument

The influence of Galen on the subsequent interpretation of the history of ancient medicine has been substantial. This paper explores the consequences of adopting a non-Galenic perspective in two different areas of research. It argues that Galen's own career, and his own views of the ideal physician, cannot be taken as typical of most ancient medical practitioners; and that the theory of the four humors, blood, bile, black bile, and phlegm, did not become a universal standard until after Galen. That theory was merely one of several variations on the theme of body fluids, and entered Greek medicine relatively late. Hippocratic contemporaries of Galen accepted it alongside other theories from the Corpus, e.g. Diseases I, that modern scholars have viewed as incompatible.