The essay examines medical metaphors in the discourse on government from a cross-cultural perspective. Drawing on George Lakoff and Mark Johnson's theory of metaphor, a comparison of medical metaphors in the political writings in late medieval Europe (c. 1250–c. 1450) and Tokugawa Japan (1602–1867) demonstrates that the European notion of medical treatment as the eradication of the causes of diseases magnified the coercive and punitive aspects of government, while the Japanese notion of medical treatment as the art of daily healthcare served to accentuate the government's role of preventing conflicts and maintaining stability. These differing images of medical treatment metaphorically structured contrasting conceptions of government in the two historical worlds.

Because these books have not received as much scholarly attention as Nietzsche's other writings, Paul Franco's article “Nietzsche's Human, All Too Human and the Problem of Culture” should be welcomed by students of Nietzsche. However, Franco fails to take advantage of the opportunity to really engage with the small secondary literature and move the debate about the significance of these neglected works forward. While Franco mentions most of the other works on Human, All Too Human (henceforth, HH), he barely interacts with what those who have gone before him have said. His decision not to heap “stone upon stone, brick upon brick” (as Nietzsche recommends) is problematic for three related reasons. It (1) forfeits the opportunity to build on what exists—either by affirming, correcting, or adding to the secondary literature in one area of Nietzsche studies where this is possible; (2) makes it impossible for readers to assess the originality of Franco's contribution; and (3) fails readers who should be able to rely upon reputable scholarly writings as fair and faithful guides to the literature on Nietzsche.

Let me begin by addressing what seems to be the central issue that Abbey raises about my article: What does looking at Human, All too Human (henceforth, HH) in the context of the problem of culture add to our understanding of that text? She acknowledges my point that most commentators on HH have focused their attention on Nietzsche's investigation of the “history of the moral sensations” and its connection to his later “genealogy of morals.” She even seems to concede that my attempt to understand HH in terms of Nietzsche's long-standing concern with culture is distinctive. Her problem with my analysis is that it “fails to demonstrate clearly the heuristic value of [its] focus on culture” and it does not sufficiently explain “how reframing the problems of morality as a concern about culture really does illuminate Nietzsche's purposes and achievements in this work.” She attributes this failure to my focusing primarily on the text of HH instead of—to repeat the refrain of her reply—engaging with the relevant secondary literature.