Determining when states can use force legitimately is the central normative problematic in world politics. Domestically, constraining the state’s use of force with social and legal norms that confine state-sanctioned violence to a limited and clearly defined set of purposes and circumstances is essential to the maintenance of civil society and the protection of basic human rights. Internationally, circumscribing the conditions under which states may use force legitimately is critical to the maintenance of peace and stability in international society. And the degree to which legitimate force may be used internationally to constrain illegitimate force domestically lies at the heart of the problematic relationship between order and justice in world politics.

Over the last decade, critical historiographers have established that the story of a First Debate, which tells of a struggle between idealism/utopianism and realism between the 1920s and 1940s, is a misleading characterisation of the history of academic international thought. This article adds to this critical literature by exploring how the story of a First Debate became a part of disciplinary orthodoxy between the 1950s and 1990s. Our analysis reveals that scholars produced the myth of a First Debate by detaching the concept of a struggle between idealism and realism from the unique historical milieu in which it was conceived, and employing this dichotomy for a new set of rhetorical purposes. We use these findings to suggest refinements for the historiographical methods employed to understand past international thought, and to illuminate the historical contingency of contemporary notions of scholarly purpose in international relations.

Why did Great Britain remain neutral during the American Civil War? Although several historical arguments have been put forth, few studies have explicitly used International Relations (IR) theories to understand this decision. Synthesising a discursive approach with an ontological security interpretation, I propose an alternative framework for understanding security-seeking behaviour and threats to identity. I assess the impact Abraham Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation had upon the interventionist debates in Great Britain. I argue that the Proclamation reframed interventionist debates, thus (re)engendering the British anxiety over slavery and removing intervention as a viable policy. I conclude by proposing several issues relevant to using an ontological security interpretation in future IR studies.

in an excellent and thoughtful piece in the april 2005 issue of review of international studies, david dunn draws our attention to seven myths about american isolationism. his points are well made and generally unexceptionable. however, since david dunn takes an article i wrote in 1999 as the starting point for several of his criticisms, i thought i would take the opportunity to offer a response. i have three main points to make.

This article examines the concepts and practices of global governance as a definitively liberal project. It provides an analysis of how TFCAs intersect with wider neoliberal debates about the efficacy of global environmental governance, and explores the power and limitations of that governance. In particular, this article investigates the complex local contexts which global environmental governance schemes such as TFCAs encounter; in so doing it highlights the ways that local activities subvert and challenge global-level conservation schemes. Through an analysis of transfrontier conservation areas (TFCAs) in Central America, it contends that specific forms of global environmental governance require some rethinking to accommodate their potentially fragile and uneven nature, and that it is more open, opaque or uneven than many theorists suggest.

The aim of this article is to draw attention to the work of a conflict analyst whose theory of ‘protracted social conflict’ – developed in a sustained series of publications over a twenty-year period from the early-1970s – has been neglected in mainstream international relations, strategic studies and security studies circles. The first section offers a conceptual context for assessing the originality and significance of Azar's approach. The second section outlines his theory of protracted social conflict. The third section evaluates his theory in the light of developments in conflict analysis in the 13 years since his death. The conclusion is that Azar's work does not merit such neglect and that it still offers useful pointers for an understanding of the sources of major armed conflict in the turbulent and contested arena of post-Cold War politics.

china’s situation lends itself to hyperbole. the people’s republic of china (prc) has the largest population in the world, the fastest growing economy in the world, the largest army in the world, the largest middle class in the world, a permanent seat on the united nations security council, a manned space programme, a nuclear arsenal, and so on. but analysts, commentators and policymakers have yet to decide just how to understand china.

Three different types of arguments were used to justify the 2003 Iraq War. The first was based on the requirements of national security. Iraq was believed to be developing deadly weapons which it might use against neighbouring states or hand over to terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda. A second argument was based on international security. Iraq was supposed to comply with a series of UN Security Council Resolutions and was failing to do so, thereby undermining the credibility of the leading international institutions. The third argument was based on human security. The Iraqi people had suffered too long under a tyrannical regime and this was an opportunity to overthrow it and replace it with something much better.

As is often the case when a concept gets a new lease of life in the newspapers there has been a resurrection of interest in recent times in the concept of ‘reconstruction’. The current American administration has now undertaken not one but two major wars that have resulted in the need for reconstruction since 2001 when George W. Bush took up office in the White House. In the previous few years there were major reconstruction efforts undertaken in Bosnia (after the 1995 Dayton Accords) and in Kosovo (after the war of 1999), to name but the most obvious. Historians have to some extent taken up this cue and have been producing edited books and even full length monographs on the ‘lessons’ that we might learn from historical reconstruction efforts. There has also been a great use of conscious historical analogy by President George W. Bush. One classic example of the recent past by President Bush in a speech to the American Enterprise Institute elicited an indignant response from a number of historians in the Financial Times on the dangers of historical analogy.

The support that businessmen and business organisations displayed for the peace processes in Israel and Northern Ireland was open and vocal, underscoring the supposed linkage between globalisation, peace and economic growth, and the supposed leadership role of business. The purpose of this study is to examine the motivations of the business communities in Israel and Northern Ireland in becoming involved in the peace processes, their organisation to promote peace, decision-making processes at critical junctures, and their actual impact on the political outcomes. Study of the business communities demonstrates that their empowerment enabled them to exert political influence but fell short of hegemony that would enable them to set the wider political agenda. The impact of both business communities, for different reasons, was therefore limited.

the rapid economic and military development of china over the decades since the death of mao zedong in 1976 are already changing asia and the world. but what are the longer-term implications of this rise? even in china itself there seems to be disagreement. thus current president hu jintao and his brains trust have advanced the term ‘peaceful rise’ [heping jueqi] in an apparent effort to reassure neighbours who are increasingly troubled not only by china’s increasing economic clout, but by her military strength as well. hence, china’s rising is taken for granted – and has been for a long time. the classic introduction to the modern period, by immanuel hsu and now in its sixth edition, has been titled, for thirty five years, the rise of modern china.

This article explores the international political thought of one of the most prominent late Victorian public intellectuals, John Robert Seeley (1834–95), the Regius Professor of Modern History at Cambridge, and author of the best-selling The Expansion of England (1883). Challenging conventional readings of Seeley, I argue that his vision of global politics must be located within the wider frame of his views on the sacred, and that he is seen best as articulating an intriguing political theology of international relations. In particular, I argue that instead of interpreting him as a realist, as has traditionally been the case, his position is classified most accurately as ‘cosmopolitan nationalism’. Only by situating him in the intellectual context(s) of his time is it possible to provide an adequate account of the identity of his political thought.

It is now more than twenty years since Jürgen Habermas's work was first referred to in International Relations (IR) theory. Along with many other continental philosophers and social theorists, Habermas was initially mobilised in the critique of positivism, and in particular neorealism, in IR theory. As such, the interest in Habermas and IR must be located in the first instance within the context of the fourth debate. This Forum section of the Review provides us with the opportunity to take stock and ask whether the dialogue between Habermas and IR has, thus far, been useful in providing new conceptual and methodological tools to analyse international politics and in inspiring new research agendas in IR. We also ask whether the role that dialogue plays within Habermas's work has been useful in formulating a critical theory of international relations.

In his recent article ‘The State as Person in International Theory’, Alexander Wendt advocates explicitly ‘personifying the state’. In his philosophical argument, he opposes a ‘physicalism’ which would reduce states to their individual members with his own ‘thin version of personhood’ derived from social theory. But this approach, neglecting normative criteria, sets up an opposition between false extremes, as well as being false to the full nature of human beings. It is doubtful whether the state is ever, in practice, the perfect corporate agent of Wendt's prescription, and it would be suspect if it were.

Having apparently abandoned war as a device for settling their own quarrels, developed countries, in the wake of the Cold War, have had an opportunity to cooperate to deal with the two chief remaining sources of artificial or human-made death: civil war and vicious regimes. In addition, international law has evolved to allow them to do so, variously conferring legitimacy on most international policing measures even when they involve the use of military force and even when they violate the policed country’s sovereignty.

It may be that states are not persons, but there is nothing in Peter Lomas' dismissive critique of my article that would help us decide one way or the other. Lomas never engages the central points of my argument, and does not appear to have read the relevant literature. This is too bad, since Lomas' evident passion about the question of whether states are persons is fully justified. At stake empirically is our ability to explain important patterns in world politics, like balancing or the tendency of states to follow international law, which seem to presuppose state persons. And normatively, state personhood has many politically charged implications, whether limiting the possibilities for individual self-realisation, as emphasised by Lomas, or providing a metaphysical ground for claims of group rights, collective responsibility and guilt, reparations, and the like. So the stakes are high, and having been neglected in IR for so long our current understanding of the issue is preliminary at best. Passion, however, is no substitute for clear thinking, and here Lomas muddies the water considerably. As such I welcome the opportunity to respond. Since Lomas concentrates on my easy case – collective intentionality – I shall do likewise, defending the reality of only that aspect of state personhood, thus bracketing whether states are also super-organisms with collective consciousness.

when gerry segal asked ‘does china matter?’ in 1999, his answer was an unequivocal ‘no’:

the country that is home to a fifth of humankind is overrated as a market, a power, and a source of ideas. at best, china is a second-rank middle power that has mastered the art of diplomatic theater: it has us willingly suspending our disbelief in its strength. in fact, china is better understood as a theoretical power – a country that has promised to deliver for much of the last 150 years but has consistently disappointed. after 50 years of mao’s revolution and 20 years of reform, it is time to leave the theater and see china for what it is. only when we finally understand how little china matters will we be able to craft a sensible policy toward it.

Recent debates about Habermas's conception of dialogic politics have focused on whether its commitment to ethical universalism has an emancipatory potential or threatens the assimilation of non-liberal forms of life within exclusionary Western cultural frameworks. One way of contributing to this unfinished debate is to ask whether discourse ethics contributes to the modern ‘civilising process’, as Norbert Elias defined that term. All societies, according to Elias, have civilising processes or ways of trying to solve the problem of how persons can satisfy basic needs without ‘destroying, frustrating, demeaning or in other ways harming each other time and time again in their search for this satisfaction’. This formulation invites the question of whether or not the discourse theory of morality is the best available means of extending the civilising process in global politics.

This article illustrates the continuing salience of Karl Polanyi's The Great Transformation (1944) by employing two of its central concepts, fictitious commodities and the double movement to interpret the globalisation countermovement and one of its most important figures, José Bové. I explain the transformation of José Bové from rural sheep farmer to French folk hero and global activist and analyse the extent to which his rhetoric and political actions are congruent with Polanyi's key insights. Arguing against the media characterisation of Bové as protectionist, I show that this misrepresentation conceals the larger ideological threat his movement poses to institutionalised politics and neoliberal hegemony. The political vision underlying Bové's symbolic media tactics and articulated in his book, Le Monde n'est pas une Marchandise, reveals significant manifestations of Polanyi's chief intellectual legacy – an unparalleled critique of economism and market society. An often neglected question in Polanyian scholarship is whether or not it is possible to have a market economy without becoming a market society. A more careful analysis of Polanyi's thought sheds light on this key issue while the empirical analysis of Bové's movement reveals its implications for French society and the broader globalisation countermovement.

Writing on international relations frequently makes reference to the use of force, but rarely integrates changes in its nature into a central role in the explanatory model. In particular, force, in the shape of military capability, is often seen as the ‘servant’ of ideas about its appropriate use, and thus of the norms of the international system, rather than as an independent element, let alone playing a central role in affecting the latter. This article addresses the issue with particular reference to relations between the West and the ‘non-West’, arguing that the contested relationship between the different narratives of military history impinge directly on the character of international relations.