Simone Well saw in the symbol of the cross, that focal point of Christianity, a wide range of meanings, and drew from them a corresponding variety of conclusions, some of which, of course, are at odds with orthodox Christian theology, but which demonstrate her constant care to derive as rich a significance as possible from any one image. In her search for sources she would no doubt have greeted with enthusiasm the statement of the Vedanta scholar, R. Guénon, when he says:

La croix est un symbole qui, sous des formes diverses, se rencontre à peu prés partout, et cela dés les époques les plus reculées … le christianisme tout au moins sous son aspect extérieur et généralement connu, semble avoir quelque peu perdu de vue le caractère symbolique de la croix pour ne plus la regarder que comme le signe d'un fait historique….

The knockdown argument, the logically impregnable position are rarities in philosophy. Indeed, there are some who might argue (guardedly of course) that no philosophical argument or position is immune from damaging criticism: what seems utterly convincing to one generation of philosophers is 1iable to be held up as a classic blunder by the next. Nevertheless, Hume's presentation of the problem of evil and his allied criticisms of a Christian-type theism (in the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, esp. Parts X and XI) have seemed conclusive to an impressive array of nineteenth- and twentieth-century philosophers, and both his efforts, consequently, might be regarded as likely exceptions to the principle of philosophical fallibility. But now, in a fairly recent article, Professor Nelson Pike has seen fit to challenge even these supposedly reliable cornerstones of our philosophical heritage. More recently still, Pike has included this article, unchanged, in an anthology which he has edited, and he has backed it up with an introductory note which reaffirms his challenge to Hume on evil.

‘There is nothing more negative than the result of the critical study of the Life of Jesus’, wrote Schweitzer at the end of The Quest of the Historical Jesus. The subsequent history of Gospel research in Germany was to reinforce this judgement beyond its author's expectations. The signpost to the future turned out to be Wrede's book on The Messianic Secret in the Gospels which had appeared five years earlier on the same day in 1901 as Schweitzer's own Mystery of the Kingdom of God, and which is still the classical example of redactional criticism of the gospels. Schweitzer's final alternative: either consistent eschatology or thoroughgoing scepticism proved to be unnecessary. Both won and took prizes. But whereas Schweitzer has slain his thousands, Wrede has slain his ten-thousands.

My aim is to examine Buber's language, especially in I and Thou, with a view to discovering how to interpret his extraordinary mode of expression; and by doing so, demonstrate that it can be at least partially explained, and related to language-forms with which we are more familiar.

The form of this paper is unconventional. Just as composers sometimes want a change from the traditional sonata form and write a movement in the form of theme and variations, so I would like to depart from the orthodox form of philosophical paper, which contains a closely reasoned discussion of some particular problem, by stating a theme which will be a principle of pure logic, then sketching a number of applications of it in different areas of philosophy. But the variations on my theme will not be entirely disconnected with each other, for I suspect that it is a theme which could have especially important applications in philosophical theology. So my later variations on it will be increasingly oriented to concepts of God, and I will close with a coda which will consist of some controversial remarks about the controversial concept of transcendence.