The European Platform on Preparedness for Nuclear and Radiological Emergency Response andRecovery (NERIS Platform) was established in June 15, 2010. The Mission of NERIS is topromote the involvement of different stakeholders and improve public confidence incapabilities of the key players in management of nuclear and radiological emergencies inEurope. The NERIS Platform encourages European, national, regional and local authorities,technical support organisations (TSOs), operators, professional organisations, researchinstitutes, universities, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and national and localstakeholders to co-operate in emergency management, and to facilitate access to expertiseand technology in maintaining competence in the field of nuclear and radiologicalemergency management for the benefit of European countries and citizens. The vision isthat by 2015, the self-sustaining NERIS association exists, and by 2020, all Europeanorganisations being members of the association are sharing common views and commonapproaches and are developing and using compatible technology and methods for consequencemanagement of the emergencies. The NERIS Platform has, in September 2012, 43 memberorganisations representing stakeholders with a wide range of backgrounds, e.g.authorities, emergency centres, research organisations and the academiccommunity. The Strategic Research Agenda (SRA), being under preparation, will provide thebasis for priorities of future research and development in order to achieve the vision.The SRA therefore will communicate the future research needs, but will also be aninstrument for creating synergies, co-operation and coordination internally between theNERIS participants and externally with activities taking place within other internationalforums.

The European Basic Safety Standards Directive (EU, 1996) contains a chapter onintervention, which, to a large extent, is dedicated to emergency planning and response,but without detailed requirements. A new Directive will consolidate all existingDirectives and thus broaden the scope to all exposure situations and categories ofexposure, including the protection of the environment. This new text follows thesituation-based approach recommended by ICRP (ICRP, 2007). The requirements for emergencypreparedness have been worked out in more detail, and the use of reference levels foremergency response is highlighted. The accident in Fukushima prompted reflection on theEuratom legal framework, including the Basic Safety Standards, the arrangements for theearly exchange of information (ECURIE) and legislation on the nuclear safety of nuclearinstallations. A “stress test” of EU nuclear power plants has been undertaken, whichincludes on-site emergency response. The results of this exercise will allow theCommission to report, by the end of 2012, to the EP and the Council, and to propose newlegislation as appropriate. This may extend to the harmonisation of off-site emergencyresponse and communication arrangements among Member States. Meanwhile, an informalcoordination mechanism is being set up with the Heads of European Radiation ProtectionCompetent Authorities (HERCA). With regard to the legislation on maximum permitted levelsin food, there will be further reflection on the consistency between the controls in placeafter Chernobyl and after Fukushima, as well as their consistency with the values for theplacing on the market of food and feed in the EU in the event of a future accident.

An interim edition of the IAEA Safety Requirements document: “Radiation Protection andSafety of Radiation Sources: International Basic Safety Standards” (BSS) was published inNovember 2011. The revision of the BSS was coordinated by a BSS Secretariat consisting ofrepresentatives of the IAEA, FAO, EC, ILO, UNEP, PAHO, WHO and NEA/OECD. The BSS takesinto account the Fundamental Safety Principles, the findings of the United NationsScientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation and the 2007 recommendations ofthe International Commission of Radiological Protection (ICRP) and other applicable ICRPstatements and publications. This paper provides an overview of the revised BSS, includingrequirements on preparedness for a nuclear or radiological emergency and to remediation ofareas contaminated by residual radioactive material following a nuclear or radiologicalemergency.

Expert Group on Implementation of New International Recommendations for EmergencyExposure Situations (EGIRES) of the Working Party on Nuclear Emergency Matter (WPNEM) hasbeen mandated by the Committee of Radiation Protection and Public Health (CRPPH) of theOECD Nuclear Energy Agency to investigate issues in, and approaches to, the implementationof the new ICRP recommendations and revised Basic Safety Standards of the IAEA foremergency exposure situations, specifically nuclear/radiological emergencies includingaccidents and consequence management for malicious acts. This also includes theapplication of optimisation of protection strategies, setting of reference levels and theinclusion of stakeholder input in this process. The expected output of the expert group isto prepare a report on issues covering mentioned topics. Emergency exposure situations, asdefined by the ICRP, are unexpected situations that may require urgent protective actions,and perhaps longer-term protective actions to be implemented. The Commission continues torecommend optimisation and the use of reference levels to ensure an adequate degree ofprotection with respect to exposure to ionising radiation in emergency exposuresituations. Setting reference levels is a responsibility of national authorities andreference levels represent the level of dose or risk, above which it is judged to beinappropriate to plan to allow exposures to occur and for which therefore protectiveactions should be planned and optimized. EGIRES decided to analyze the establishedprocesses for optimization of the protection strategy for emergency exposure situationsand practical implementation of reference levels concept in several member states of theNEA by performing a survey. It is planned to collect information on the definition ofoptimization strategy in different countries, optimization of protection for differentprotective actions and also optimization of urgent protective actions. In addition,national criteria in setting reference levels, its use, relevant processes includingspecific triggers and dosimetric quantities in setting reference levels are focus pointsthat will be evaluated. Benefits expected from the work of the expert group will be usefulto find a path and even common understanding of surrounding issues in emergency exposuresituations with the inclusion of national perspectives and also to discuss stakeholderinvolvement.

Over the last few decades, the steady progress achieved in reducing planned exposures ofboth workers and the public has been admirable in the nuclear sector. However, thedisproportionate focus on tiny public exposures and radioactive discharges associated withnormal operations came at a high price, and the quasi-denial of a risk of major accidentand related weaknesses in emergency preparedness and response came at even higher price.Fukushima has unfortunately taught us that radiological protection (RP) for emergency andpost-emergency can be much more than a simple evacuation that lasts 24 to 48 hours withpeople safely returning to their homes shortly afterward. On optimization of emergency andpost-emergency exposures, the only “show in town” in terms of international RP policiesimprovements has been the issuance of the ICRP’s new general recommendations. However, nomatter how genuine these improvements were, they have not been “road tested” to thepractical reality of severe accidents. Post-Fukushima, there is a compelling case toreview the practical adequacy of key RP notions such as optimization, evacuation,sheltering, reference levels for workers and the public, and to amend these notions with aview to make the international RP system more useful in the event of a severe accident. Inpursuing further improvements to the international RP system, it should be clearly bornein mind that the system is generally based on protection against the risk of cancer andhereditary diseases. The system also protects against deterministic non-cancer effects ontissues and organs. In seeking refinements of such protection notions, we invite ICRP topay increased attention to the fact that a continued balance must be struck betweenbeneficial activities which cause exposures, and protection. The global nuclear industryis committed to help overcoming the above key RP issues as part of the RP community’supcoming international deliberations towards a more efficient international RP system.

With the ICRP recommendations Publications 103, 109 and 111 (ICRP, 2007; ICRP 2009a,2009b), new concepts and quantities have been introduced into emergency management andrehabilitation. Two of them will possibly influence national procedures, but for sure theywill influence countermeasure simulation approaches: 1. The concept of a “reference level”for emergency and existing controllable exposure situations that represents the level ofdose or risk, above which it is judged to be inappropriate to plan to allow exposures tooccur, and for which therefore protective actions should be planned in advance. 2. Whendeciding on the optimum course of protective actions, all exposure pathways and allrelevant actions have to be taken into account. The major changes for the simulationmodels result from the second recommendation that all exposure pathways must be consideredwhen deciding on protective actions. So far all countermeasure simulations in the earlyphase of an emergency are carried out by considering individual countermeasures such assheltering or evacuation, if some dose limit for the respective action is exceeded. Thisapproach has to be changed and strategies of several countermeasures analysed andsimulated with the ultimate goal not to exceed the reference level over a given timeperiod, typically one year.

In April 2011 the European Platform on Preparedness for Nuclear and RadiologicalEmergency Response and Recovery (NERIS-TP) decided to expand the two European DecisionSupport Systems JRodos and ARGOS with respect to the new ICRP-103 recommendations. Theextension should be applicable for nuclear accidents and radiological emergencies andcomprise a new screening model, the possibility to optimise dose reducing actions with themodels ERMIN (European Model for Inhabited Areas) and AGRICP (Agricultural CountermeasureProgram), respectively, and scenario preparation tools to support the user in definingcountermeasure strategies. This paper describes the screening model that was developed bythe authors and is foreseen for realisation and inclusion in JRodos and ARGOS in2012/2013.

As part of the ongoing European project NERIS-TP, a revision has been made of someparameters influencing dose estimates in the European emergency management decisionsupport systems RODOS and ARGOS. On the basis of survey data, the estimates of the timefractions typically spent indoors and outdoors over longer time periods have been revised.On the basis of measurement data, also new values for the natural ventilation rategoverning early ingression of contaminants into dwellings have been derived for differentparts of Europe. Other potential parameterisation improvements for the decision supportsystems are discussed.

The improved use of collective dose following the 2007 ICRP recommendations is studiedfor nuclear and radiological emergency situations. To study the accumulation of lowindividual doses to the collective dose the collective dose is calculated as a function ofthe minimum individual dose for three cases including nuclear as well as radiologicalaccidents. It is found that the use of collective dose in this way can have an added valuein nuclear emergency preparedness and response in particular related to decisions onoverall protective actions following an accident.

The Incident and Emergency Centre (IEC) of the International Atomic Emergency Agency(IAEA) is the global focal point for preparedness and response to nuclear and radiologicalincidents and emergencies irrespective of their cause. In the area of preparedness theCentre continuously works to develop standards and guidance for strengthening MemberStates’ preparedness; practical tools and training programs to assist Member States inpromptly applying the standards and guidance; and organizes a variety of training eventsand exercises. This paper provides an overview of the information presented in the IAEASafety Standards and Guidance in the area of emergency preparedness and response.

In Germany, the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and NuclearSafety (BMU) has asked the German Commission on Radiological Protection (SSK) to provideadvice on the revision of the German “Radiological Fundamentals for Decisions on Measuresfor the Protection of the Population against Accidental Releases of Radionuclides”(Radiologische Grundlagen). A working group has been established to guide the preparationof a new version of that document. It was asked that the revision has to consider mostrelevant publications of international bodies such as ICRP, EC and IAEA. Therefore, theICRP recommendations 103, 109 and 111 have to be considered together with the draftdocuments of the European Union and the IAEA Basic Safety Standards. Recommendations ofworking groups of NEA (WPNEM) as well as the EPAL working group of HERCA (Heads ofEuropean Radiological Protection Competent Authorities) will be also taken into account.Within the discussion it turned out that the practical application of the newrecommendation for professionals working in the operational community is extremelyimportant. As the current recommendations are widely accepted and operational all overGermany, it was investigated to which extent the current procedures can be taken over withminor modifications.

In Finland, Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) is the competent authority andthe national warning point with respect to bilateral and international agreements. STUKhas drafted proposals for new guides for intervention levels in different phases of anemergency to be adopted by the Ministry of Interior (MoI) in Finland. These guides arewritten separately for early phase and intermediate phase of a radiological emergency.STUK selected 20 mSv effective residual dose from all exposure pathways during the firstyear of an emergency as the reference level. This overall goal has been supplemented withthe following general guidance; if a projected dose without protective measures is duringthe first year: (1) higher than 10 mSv, it is necessary to perform protective measures;radiation expose is dominant in decision making, (2) 1–10 mSv, protective measures areusually justified but other factors effect decision making, (3) below 1 mSv, theprotective measures may be carried out especially if they are easily feasible; otherfactors are dominant in decision making. More specific criteria are given for separatecountermeasures as a projected dose in a certain time period or as an operationalintervention level (OIL) in a quantity which can be directly measured (external dose rate,magnitude of surface contamination, concentration level) or as a trigger (such as plantconditions). This paper presents the main intervention levels and criteria to be used in aradiological emergency for members of the public.

HPA is updating and consolidating its advice on radiation emergencies and recovery.Current advice was published in 1997. Since 2007, the ICRP has issued a set ofrecommendations to elaborate its guidance for emergency exposure and existing exposuresituations. It is expected that the European Basic Safety Standards, when published, willalso reflect the ICRP recommendations. The new ICRP guidance represents a marked change inapproach, with emphasis placed on optimisation of whole protection strategies usingreference levels of residual dose. These new concepts as well as the relevant lessonsidentified following the Fukushima accident will be included in the new UK advicedocument. The scope of the UK advice includes reactor and transport accidents as well asreleases from waste stores, reprocessing and defence activities. The revised advice willconsider the initiation of emergency countermeasures based on averted dose criteria andoptimisation of the subsequent protection strategy based on reference levels of residualdose. The advice will illustrate that the type of protection strategy selected depends onthe contribution of different exposure pathways over time to projected dose, and this willvary according to the scenarios considered as reasonably foreseeable. Due to the potentialimpact of the advice, a wide range of stakeholders are being consulted. In particular,feedback will be required on the potential for adapting current practices for shelteringand stable iodine prophylaxis to situations involving longer duration releases or thosewith a prolonged threat phase. The advice document will contain guidance for emergencyplanning and response, criteria for the withdrawal of emergency countermeasures, factorsto consider during the transition to an existing exposure situation and the management oflong term contaminated areas. It is the first time that the whole spectrum of advice willbe presented in a single publication, which is expected to be published in 2013, followinga public consultation process.

The nuclear reactor remote monitoring system of the federal state of Baden- Wuerttemberg(KFUe BW) is realized according to the renewed “recommendations for remote monitoring ofnuclear power plants” (BMU, 2005a). The spectrum of the system covers both, pursuit ofoperational procedures, and incidents or accidents. The KFUe BW provides a measurementnetwork and information system for operational parameters at the plant sites as well asradiological and meteorological measurements in their vicinity. For the Ministry, itpreferentially serves as an instrument of nuclear supervision. This paper gives a briefsurvey of the system architecture and concentrates on the role of the KFUe with respect tothe determination and evaluation of the radiological situation in the range of off-siteemergency management.

During nuclear or radiological emergency preparedness and response a processing pipelineis put in place at the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority to produceassessment reports of the current situation, its likely evolution with time, andrecommendations on protective actions. Within the processing pipeline raw data is more andmore refined towards these end products as experts, advisors, and decision makers collect,analyze, portray, annotate, filter, arrange and rearrange, share, approve or dismiss, andpublish content. Emergency procedures and guidelines assist and guide them through theprocess, as do information and communication technologies. The inner working of theprocessing pipeline is in constant flux as information and communication technologiesdevelop and allow better facilitation of the process, and as social and political demandschange. The present article describes the overall working of the pipeline, and how it hasrecently been improved by the KETALE collaborative software. The focus then shifts to thenew ICRP recommendations and how the new national emergency guidelines are planned to beimplemented within the KETALE software. The KETALE software has greatly increased thethroughput of our emergency processing pipeline and improved product quality.

The new recommendations on emergency exposure situations of the International Commissionon Radiological Protection (ICRP) advise a reference level for the residual dose in arange of between 20 and 100 mSv effective dose (acute or per year). At the same time, theprotection strategy should account for the simultaneous consideration of all the exposurepathways, as well as all of the protective actions. Similarly to other countries, theactual Belgian nuclear emergency plan is based on individual projected doses (thyroidcommitted dose and total effective doses) and independent protective actions that mainlyfocus on the early phase of an emergency situation. The two approaches are compared inthis study on the basis of the projected and residual dose calculations obtained usingJRODOS and the Belgian Noodplan models for different radiological or nuclear accidentalscenarios. The comparison has been made by considering separately the early and the latephase contributions. The ingestion dose has been investigated from the predicteddeposition values and compared to the single level of the ICRP 109 recommendations.

The unusually strong earthquake in Japan on 11 March 2011 and the following extremetsunami caused enormous damage in the buildings of Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant(NPP) situated on the Pacific coastline of Japan. The accident led to the release of alarge amount of radioactive material into the environment. According to the measurementsof the Radiological Monitoring and Data Acquisitions Network (RAMDAN) the radioactiveplume reached Hungary on 24 March 2011. The main volatile fission products –131I, 134Cs, and 137Cs radioisotopes – were measurable in aerosoland fallout samples in Hungary. Their activity concentration in air reached the maximumvalue in the last days of March and returned to the background level in the first half ofMay. As a consequence of respiration of contaminated air, a maximum of 1 Bq per capita of131I could be accumulated in the thyroid gland of the Hungarian population during thegiven period. The calculated upper limits of the committed effective dose from inhalationof 131I were 4 nSv and 10 nSv to the Hungarian adults and infants,respectively. These values are a hundred thousand times less than the annual radiationdose from natural sources to the Hungarian population. The radiation dose from radioactivecaesium isotopes originating from Fukushima was even less, around 1 nSv on average, toHungarian residents. No health deterioration can be expected from this radiationburden.