This article considers the critical roles of risk and risk assessment in the management of health emergencies and disasters. The Task Force on Quality Control of Disaster Management (TFQCDM) has defined risk as the “objective (mathematical) or subjective (inductive) probability that something negative will occur (happen)”. Risks with the greatest relevance to health emergency management include: (1) the probability that a health hazard exists or will occur; (2) the probability that the hazard will become an event; (3) the probability that the event will lead to health damage; and (4) the probability that the health damage will lead to a health disaster. The overall risk of a health disaster is the product of these four probabilities.

Risk assessments are the tools that help systems at risk—healthcare organizations, communities, regions, states, and countries—transform their visceral reactions to threats into rational strategies for risk reduction. Type I errors in risk assessment occur when situations are predicted that do not occur (risk is overestimated). Type II errors in risk assessment occur when situations are not predicted that do occur (risk is underestimated). Both types of error may have serious, even lethal, consequences.

Errors in risk assessment may be reduced through strategies that optimize risk assessment, including the:(1) adoption of the TFQCDM definition of risk and other terms; (2) specification of the system at risk and situations of interest (hazard, event, damage, and health disaster); (3) adoption of a best practice approach to risk assessment methodology; (4) assembly of the requisite range of expert participants and information; (5) adoption of an evidence-based approach to using information; (6) exclusion of biased, irrelevant, and obsolete information; and (7) complete characterizations of any underlying fault and event trees.

Since the 1995 Tokyo subway sarin attack, terrorist attacks involving weapons of mass destruction or other industrial chemicals present worldwide security and health concerns. On-scene medical triage and treatment in such events is crucial to save as many lives as possible and minimize the deleterious effects of the toxic agent involved. Since there are many chemicals that can be used as potential terrorist weapons, the medical challenge for the emergency medical services (EMS) is a combination of: (1) recognizing that a chemical terrorist attack (non-conventional) has occurred; and (2) identifying the toxic agent followed by proper antidotal treatment. The latter must be done as quickly as possible, preferably on-scene. The most valuable decision at this stage should be whether the agent is organophosphate (OP) or not OP, based on clinical findings observed by pre-trained, first responders. This decision is crucial, since only OP intoxication has readily available, rapidly acting, onscene, specific agents such as atropine and one of the oximes, preferably administered using autoinjectors. Due to the lack of a specific antidote, exposure to other agents (such as industrial chemicals, e.g., chlorine, bromide, or ammonia) should be treated on-scene symptomatically with non-specific measures, such as decontamination and supportive treatment. This paper proposes an algorithm as a cognitive framework for the medical teams on-scene. This algorithm should be part of the medical team's training for preparedness for chemical terrorist attacks, and the team should be trained to use it in drills. Implementing this path of thinking should improve the medical outcome of such an event.

This is a summary of the proceedings of the Conference on the Health Aspects of the Tsunami Disaster in Asia that was convened by the sunami World Health Organization in Phuket, Thailand from 04–06 May 2005. It contains reviews of the experiences of the health sector and early recovery fol following the Earthquake and Tsunami with emphasis onwhat was done well and what could have been done better and the lessons learned that can be incorporated into actions that will mitigate the damage created by future events. It outlines the national and international responses and recovery and the actions taken and not taken by the international community in support of the countries affected. Specific issuesaddressed include: (1) needs assessments; (2) coordi- coordination; (3) filling gaps in essential services, and (4) capacity building at the country level. Each of these aspects is analyzed as to its: (1) appropriateness; (2) adequacy; (3) effectiveness; (4) efficiency; and (5) connectedness.

Much of what occurred provided benefits to the stricen population, but there is substantial room for improvement through implementation of the lessons learned. These lessons must be converted into actions in order to mitigate the damagesustained and to enhance our responses to the damage from future

The Hospital Emergency Incident Command System (Hospital Emergency Incident Command System), nowin its third edition, has emerged asa popular incident command system model for hospital emergency response in the United States and other countries. Since the inception of the Hospital Emergency Incident Command System in 1991, several events have transformed the requirements of hospital emergency management, including the 1995 Tokyo Subway sarin attack, the 2001 US anthrax letter attacks, and the 2003 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) outbreaks in eastern Asia and Toronto, Canada.

Several modifications of the Hospital Emergency Incident Command System are suggested to match the needs of hospital emergency management today, including: (1) an Incident Consultant in the Administrative Section of the Hospital Emergency Incident Command System to provide expert advice directly to the Incident Commander in chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear (CBRN) emergencies as needed, as well as consultation on mental health needs; (2) new unit leaders in the Operations Section to coordinate the management of contaminated or infectious patients in chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear emergencies; (3) new unit leaders in theOperations Section to coordinate mental health support for patients, guests, healthcare workers, volunteers, anddependents in terrorismrelated emergencies or events that produce significant mental health needs; (4) a new Decedent/Expectant Unit Leader in the Operations Section to coordinate the management of both types ofpatients together; and (5) a new Information Technology Unit Leader in the Logistics Section to coordinate the management of information technology and systems.

New uses of the Hospital Emergency Incident Command System in hospital emergency management also are recommended, including: (1) the adoption of the Hospital Emergency Incident Command System as the conceptual framework for organizing all phases of hospital emergency management, including mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery; and (2) the application of the Hospital Emergency Incident Command System not only to healthcare facilities, but also to healthcare systems.

Finally, three levels of healthcare worker competencies in the Hospital Emergency Incident Command Systemare suggested: (1) basic understanding of the Hospital Emergency Incident Command System for all hospital healthcare workers; (2) advanced understanding and proficiency in the Hospital Emergency Incident Command Systemfor hospital healthcare workers likely to assume leadership roles in hospital emergency response; and (3) special proficiency in constituting the Hospital Emergency Incident Command System ad hoc from existing healthcare workers in resource-deficient settings. The Hospital Emergency Incident Command System should be viewed asa work in progress that will mature as additional challenges arise and ashospitals gain further experience with its use.

This is the text for the Opening Address for the Conference, Health Aspects of the Tsunami Disaster in Asia, convened by the World Health Organization (WHO) in Phuket, Thailand, 04-06 May 2005. The frightening reality of the costs (human and material) must be balanced by what has been and can be learned that, if applied, can make the world more resilient for the next event. At the time of this Conference, we are moving from response to recovery. The immediate conclusion relates to the consequences of the realization of a truly interdependent world. Given the huge resourcesmade available, there is an increased need for accountability. Several factors will bear heavily on the outcomes: (1) risk of loss of momentum; (2) ensuring that no gaps in services occur; (3) ensuring that already marginalized communities do not become forgotten or even more marginalized; (4) support and respect of national leadership; (5) commit to enhanced coordination; and (6) develop mechanisms for joint and shared assessments. The available resources must be used to stablize the livelihoods of people for years. Lastly, the reliability and sustainability of the important contributions of the military and the commercial private sectors for future events must be established