Biomedical choices are emerging as critical policy issues of the 1980s. Political pressures for cost containment, trends toward corporate medicine, and continuing problems of access and equity ensure biomedical issues a prominent place on the policy agenda. Students of political science should be familiar with the array of biomedical technologies that currently are challenging the tenets of medicine as well as the capacity of political institutions to resolve the resulting policy dilemmas. Based on this, a course in biomedical policy is overdue. This article outlines a course which is designed to clarify the public policy dimensions of biomedicine and develop analytical skills in the students so that they can better cope with these issues of public and personal importance. It describes some of the approaches and methods that I have found useful and summarizes a few of the problems one might expect to encounter in teaching biomedical policy.

Nurses, as other life science students, have been prejudiced against politics, imagining that it only contaminates techno-scientific enterprises. However, the new, professional nurse is aware of the need for political understanding and political skills. The transformation of the socio-economic status of the health care industry from a social service to a business provides an excellent opportunity for introducing the nursing student to political thought in a positive conjunction with practical analysis.

To generate a credible metapolitical framework, I embrace rather than avoid the current problems about the nature of the subject matter of politics. An aggressive, philosophically informed attack on the myth of autonomous, objective science opens the student's intellectual map of reality, and lays the groundwork for a proposed (paradoxical) complementarity of the two traditional models: politics as a science and politics as a humanity. This uncomfortable, middle ground position, abandoning any global Rationalism, again makes historical and contemporary case studies a relevant—in fact essential—part of political education. This is an effective approach to introducing the nursing student, whose education is dominated by classical, rationalistic, scientific images, to political studies.

Biopolitics must be taught in a context that makes it possible for students to acquire competence in at least evolutionary biology, genetics (with the proper molecular biology perspective), biological anthropology, neurobiology, and the evolution of behavior. A more modest beginning may be necessary, however, and actually has been pursued at various institutions.

Although a systematic study of experiences in teaching biopolitics has not been prepared, various impressions have been obtained. In spite of some seemingly discouraging situations with respect to biopolitics, expectations that a biobehavioral perspective ultimately will be the principal and pervasive frame of reference for a proper study of political processes and institutions are justified.

Breeding for virtue is no novelty. Conscientious prospective parents from deepest antiquity have hoped to breed for virtue in mate selection and peri-conceptual regimen. But methods may be changing. Plotting biotechnology's trajectory well beyond today's horizon, Professor Mark Walker asks if virtue is valuable enough to warrant breeding by molecular-genetic means. He presented this question as “Enhancing genetic virtue: A project for twenty-first century humanity?” in the previous issue of POLITICS AND THE LIFE SCIENCES.

In a development parallel to the emergence of the biobehavioral orientation in political science, the ethology of law has become a prominent endeavor in the past ten years. That it is indeed a biobehavioral approach is a fact that received a cogent reminder at the Fifth International Conference on Human Ethology in Tutzing, West Germany, in 1986. In a major address at the conference, Irenaus Eibl-Eibesfeldt defined human ethology as the biology of human behavior. Correspondingly, Wolfgang Fikentscher and Hagen Hof, in their respective presentations at the session on the ethology of law at the conference, emphasized that law is a particular form of human behavior, making it clear that the biobehavioral context for the study of law is imperative.

Arnhart's “Aristotle's Biopolitics: A Defense of Biological Teleology against Biological Nihilism” is both a valuable and yet at the same time a problematic study. Its value for political science lies in Arnhart's reminder that for many of the most important thinkers in the history of Western political thought their efforts to discover and articulate the principles of a political order necessarily presupposed a specific understanding of the order of nature itself. Given this, the fundamental political challenge of the modern scientific and industrial revolutions not only includes the new instruments and techniques of organization and manipulation made possible by the discoveries of modern science, but also those cultural and intellectual assumptions which create that very environment within which such instruments and techniques first became possible. In illustrating this intimate relationship between modern natural science and modern political science, Grant (1976:124) has written: “What calls out for recognition here is that the same apprehension of what it is to be ‘reasonable’ leads men to build computers and to conceive the universal and homogenous society as the highest political goal. The ways such machines can be used must be at one with certain conceptions of political purposes because the same kind of ‘reasoning’ made the machines and formulated the purposes. To put the matter extremely simply, the modern physical sciences and the modern political sciences have developed in mutual interpenetration, and we can only begin to understand that interpenetration in terms of some common source from which both forms of science found their sustenance.”

Since the Gruter Institute is interested in the mutual influence of law and behavioral science (in the broadest sense), it has evolved a policy of occasionally tackling ongoing cases as exemplars of this interaction at the “ground level” of case law. This is done partly to contrast such an approach with the more usual “philosopher king” pose adopted by scientists who wish to influence legislation. In common-law countries at least, the approach through case law merits experimental attention. To this end a working group1 of legal and scientific scholars was instituted to study the issues in the now notorious “Baby M” case, a case which was to set a precedent on the issue of surrogate mothering contracts and which would have wider implications for the legality of many of the new alternative birth technologies.

Reviewing the work of Lynton Caldwell, Robert Blank, and Andrea Bonnicksen is both a privilege and a challenge. These three scholars rank among the key figures in the development of biopolicy as a legitimate research and teaching subfield within political science. Each of them worked in academia, on significant bioethical advisory boards, and with policymaking entities, and also contributed to numerous externally funded research projects. Across long and prolific careers, Caldwell, Blank, and Bonnicksen engaged seriously with the political, social and ethical issues raised by significant advances in many bio-scientific domains. This essay analyzes several of their works across two broad themes: 1) the development of the subfields of biopolitics and biopolicy, and 2) the tension between science policy and democratic governance. While each of them wrote significant and well-received books, the focus here is on insights to be gleaned from an idiosyncratic selection of their scholarly articles across the time period, 1966 to 2007. To borrow Michel Foucault's term, this brief and necessarily selective archaeology of the published journal record nevertheless demonstrates the significance, durability and prescience of the authors' insights. (I expect that at least one, if not all three, of these authors might raise objections to the mention of Foucault, but the term “archaeology” in this instance is apt.)