The accuracy of U.S. Social Security Administration (SSA) demographic and financial forecasts is crucial for the solvency of its Trust Funds, other government programs, industry decision-making, and the evidence base of many scholarly articles. Because SSA makes public insufficient replication information and uses antiquated statistical forecasting methods, no external group has ever been able to produce fully independent forecasts or evaluations of policy proposals to change the system. Yet, no systematic evaluation of SSA forecasts has ever been published by SSA or anyone else—until a companion paper to this one. We show that SSA's forecasting errors were approximately unbiased until about 2000, but then began to grow quickly, with increasingly overconfident uncertainty intervals. Moreover, the errors are largely in the same direction, making the Trust Funds look healthier than they are. We extend and then explain these findings with evidence from a large number of interviews with participants at every level of the forecasting and policy processes. We show that SSA's forecasting procedures meet all the conditions the modern social-psychology and statistical literatures demonstrate make bias likely. When those conditions mixed with potent new political forces trying to change Social Security, SSA's actuaries hunkered down, trying hard to insulate their forecasts from strong political pressures. Unfortunately, this led the actuaries into not incorporating the fact that retirees began living longer lives and drawing benefits longer than predicted. We show that fewer than 10% of their scorings of major policy proposals were statistically different from random noise as estimated from their policy forecasting error. We also show that the solution to this problem involves SSA or Congress implementing in government two of the central projects of political science over the last quarter century: (1) transparency in data and methods and (2) replacing with formal statistical models large numbers of ad hoc qualitative decisions too complex for unaided humans to make optimally.

Questions about racial or ethnic group identity feature centrally in many social science theories, but detailed data on ethnic composition are often difficult to obtain, out of date, or otherwise unavailable. The proliferation of publicly available geocoded person names provides one potential source of such data'if researchers can effectively link names and group identity. This article examines that linkage and presents a methodology for estimating local ethnic or racial composition using the relationship between group membership and person names. Common approaches for linking names and identity groups perform poorly when estimating group proportions. I have developed a new method for estimating racial or ethnic composition from names which requires no classification of individual names. This method provides more accurate estimates than the standard approach and works in any context where person names contain information about group membership. Illustrations from two very different contexts are provided: the United States and the Republic of Kenya.

This article investigates inconsistency and invalid statistical inference that often characterize dynamic panel analysis in international political economy. These econometric concerns are tied to Nickell bias and cross-sectional dependence. First, we discuss how to avoid Nickell bias in dynamic panels. Second, we put forward factor-augmented dynamic panel regression as a means for addressing cross-sectional dependence. As a specific application, we use our methods for an analysis of the impact of terrorism on economic growth. Different terrorism variables are shown to have no influence on economic growth for five regional samples when Nickell bias and cross-dependence are taken into account. Our finding about terrorism and growth is contrary to the extant literature.

Electoral rules have the potential to affect the size and composition of the voting public. Yet scholars disagree over whether requiring voters to register well in advance of Election Day reduces turnout. We present a new approach, using web searches for “voter registration” to measure interest in registering, both before and after registration deadlines for the 2012 U.S. presidential election. Many Americans sought information on “voter registration” even after the deadline in their state had passed. Combining web search data with evidence on the timing of registration for 80 million Americans, we model the relationship between search and registration. Extrapolating this relationship to the post-deadline period, we estimate that an additional 3–4 million Americans would have registered in time to vote, if deadlines had been extended to Election Day. We test our approach by predicting out of sample and with historical data. Web search data provide new opportunities to measure and study information-seeking behavior.