W. D. Hudson's criticism of some points in my ‘Wittgensteinian Fideism’ are challenging and deserve comment. I remain, however, unconvinced that they require any modification in my assessment of Wittgensteinian Fideism. I shall try to justify this conviction.

Several recent attempts to isolate the fallacy in the view that I am committed to particular moral principles merely by describing a man as having promised seem to me to have erred through excess of zeal. The argument which commits the fallacy is at its most explicit in an article by Professor Searle, and the attempted refutations with which I am concerned fasten upon the first step in his ‘deduction’, which moves from

(1) Jones uttered the words ‘I hereby promise to pay you, Smith, five dollars’

to

(2) Jones promised to pay Smith five dollars

by way of the ‘fact about English usage’ which Searle states as:

(1a) Under certain conditions C anyone who utters the words (sentence) ‘I hereby promise to pay you, Smith, five dollars’ promises to pay Smith five dollars (p. 44).

J. R. Lucas argues in “Minds, Machines, and Gödel”, that his potential output of truths of arithmetic cannot be duplicated by any Turing machine, and a fortiori cannot be duplicated by any machine. Given any Turing machine that generates a sequence of truths of arithmetic, Lucas can produce as true some sentence of arithmetic that the machine will never generate. Therefore Lucas is no machine.

In his paper ‘Collective Responsibility’ (Philosophy, July 1968) Mr. D. E. Cooper argues for the thesis that collectives can be held responsible in a sense not reducible to the individual responsibility of the members of the collective. And he uses this conclusion to support views of individual responsibility and of blame and punishment which he wishes to assert independently. Is hall argue that although there is a sense in which the actions and responsibility of a collective cannot be analysed in terms of the actions and responsibilities of the individual persons who compose the collective, it is not moral responsibility which is involved. I shall then maintain that Cooper's account of collective responsibility does not support his account of individual responsibility; and that his account of individual responsibility is in any case false, if he means moral responsiblity.

I shall not try to deal with all of the interesting points Mr. R. S. Downie (Philosophy. Jan. 1969) raises against my paper, Collective Responsibility (Philosophy. July 1968). I shall deal with (1) a matter of clarification, (2) one of the lesser issues between us, and (3) the major issue between us.

(1). On one point, surely, Downie has simply misunderstood what I said. He claims that my criticisms do not work against the common view that Responsibility is analytically tied to blameworthiness; but only apainst the claim that Responsibility is analytically tied to the efficacy of blame. Well, I hope so. For it was meant to be clear that I was only attacking the view, to be found in Nowell-Smith's Ethics (and also among some Utilitarians), that Responsibility is to be analysed in terms of the efficacy of blame and punishment. Far from attacking the view that Responsibility is analytically tied to blameworthiness, I quoted, with full approval, a passage from Brandt, according to which Responsibility entails the “fittinsness” of blaming and praising attitudes.

In “Minds, Machines, and Gödel”, J. R. Lucas claims that Goedel's incompleteness theorem constitutes a proof “that Mechanism is false, that is, that minds cannot be explained as machines”. He claims further that “if the proof of the falsity of mechanism is valid, it is of the greatest consequence for the whole of philosophy”. It seems to me that both of these claims are exaggerated. It is true that no minds can be explained as machines. But it is not true that Goedel's theorem proves this. At most, Goedel's theorem proves that not all minds can be explained as machines. Since this is so, Goedel's theorem cannot be expected to throw much light on why minds are different from machines. Lucas overestimates the importance of Goedel's theorem for the topic of mechanism, I believe, because he presumes falsely that being unable to follow any but mechanical procedures in mathematics makes something a machine.

The Bishop of Cloyne, George Berkeley, was the sort of philosopher who, although most genial himself, was quite apt to embroil opponents and critics of his time and of our own in long-lasting and sometimes unresolved controversies. In attacking the “infidel mathematicians”, the “minute philosophers” among the scientists, Berkeley initiated a controversy on behalf of religion by taking to task the theory of fluxions held by Sir Isaac Newton, his friends, and followers which, beginning with Berkeley's Analyst and replies to it by Jurin and Walton, was continued on over one hundred years by subsequent writers. Florian Cajori in his History of Mathematics, commenting on the affair has written:

‘We must not neglect to express our appreciation of the fact that Berkeley withdrew from the controversy after he had said all that he had to say on his subject. Some of the debates that came later were almost interminable, because the participants continued writing even after they had nothing more to say.’

It is odd that something that Wittgenstein says is clear should have been so puzzling to English-speaking philosophers. 5.542 begins:— ‘Es ist aber klar, dass “A glaubt, dass p”, “A denkt p”, “A sagt p” von der Form, “p ‘sagt p” sind.’ I would like to suggest that one reason for the difficulties that have been felt with this lies in a misleading translation, particularly of, “p ‘sagt p”. For this both English translations have “p” says p’. But since German has a single present tense where English has two, ‘sagt’ may be rendered either ‘says’, or ‘is saying’, and I want to argue that ‘“p” is saying p’ is preferable.