I would like to thank Graciana del Castillo for her remarks regarding After War. I will focus my response on what del Castillo finds to be the major shortcoming of my book—the main policy implication. In After War, I conclude that current approaches to reconstruction, which typically rely on military occupation, are more likely to fail than to succeed. This outcome is not due to a lack of planning, effort, or political will, but is instead is the result of the array of incentives and constraints limiting what occupiers and policymakers can rationally design and implement in foreign societies. In considering alternative strategies for exporting the ideas, values, and beliefs underpinning liberal democracy, I argue that the U.S. should assume a default position of military non-intervention and free trade (unilateral if necessary). Del Castillo is sympathetic to this position as a “preventive measure,” but does not seem convinced of its suitability as a primary strategy. For example, she points out that offering trade preferences to the Taliban following 9/11 would hardly have brought liberalism to Afghanistan. I agree. However, I do not think this point undercuts my argument for a default position of free trade and non-intervention. Let me clarify why I believe this to be the case.