In the immortal words of Herbert McCabe, ‘Whatever we are referring to when we use the word “God” it can no more be a god than it can be a model aeroplane or half-past eleven’ (God Still Matters). This striking idea – the “atheism” of true Christianity – has, in fact, a long pedigree. This paper traces its history from the early Church to the Angelic Doctor himself. The essential point is this: if our God really is who Christians claim God is, then all our words about God – including the word “god” – must necessarily fall short.

This article has three parts. The first two explore contemporary philosopher Bonnie Kent's important contributions to the role of the weakness of the will in actions of the morally incontinent in Thomas Aquinas treatment of human action. While Kent's treatment gives many important insights, nevertheless, she fails to recognize that the weakness of the will does in fact have role in the actions of the morally incontinent. Kent is correct that, for Aquinas, the passions cause the incontinent act to act as such. She fails, however, to recognize that the role of the passions does not exclude the weakness of the will as a cause, and even a principal cause. The third part takes up the criticisms of Gary Watson to which Kent's remarks were meant as a reply and shows that even with the causative role of the weak will, Aquinas' account does not fall prey to Watson's criticisms.

Gustaf Aulén's Christus Victor soteriological/atonement motif is constituted by the central theme of divine victory over the devil. Few scholars discuss at length the significance of Christ's victory over the devil in Aquinas's soteriology. A comparative analysis of the two treatments of Christ's victory over the devil will unveil the role and significance of that victory in Aquinas's soteriology. According to Aquinas, Christ's humanity and all his human actions are the instrumental efficient causes of salvation and, necessarily, his victory over the devil. Therefore, Christ's life prior to his Passion may be examined for evidence of that victory. The most obvious event for such an analysis is Christ's temptations which will offer a unique insight into Aquinas's presentation of Christ's victory over the devil.

Augustine's rejection of pagan virtue in the City of God is often connected to his anti-Pelagian works and so exaggerated. However, Augustine's actual account of pagan virtue, both in the City of God and Contra Julianum, is much more nuanced than is commonly recognized. Augustine connects true virtue to true religio, its end in the beatific vision, and the grace without which it is impossible, and consistently highlights the connection between virtue and worship. Nevertheless, the category of the pagan virtues, habits sufficient to promote the flourishing of Rome, is an important part of Augustinian virtue theory. Attending to the presence of pagan virtue in the City of God shines light on why Augustine repeatedly claims that his theology, and not that of Julian, is most opposed to Manichean claims. The City of God provides useful context for interpreting Augustine's theology of grace in the anti-Pelagian works, and so avoiding an over exaggerated theology of the Fall.

Fifty years ago, Yves Congar voiced concern over what he considered a serious point of confusion in the post-conciliar Church, namely, the meaning of “the sacred” in Christian faith and mission. This essay details Congar's diagnosis of the problem and explores the continued relevance of his constructive response, or, what he calls “sacred pedagogy.” For Congar, the world is not sacred in itself, because the body of Christ is the only sacred reality. Yet the world can become sacred, if we approach it “pedagogically,” as filled with signs that can lead us to grace. In the end, however, all present experience of the sacred will be transcended in the eschatological kingdom of God.

Laudato Si’ contains a prophetic vision of what time is and is for. It challenges development organisations to think critically about the way they conceive ‘progress’, the way they measure their ‘success’. In doing so, it invites them to ask how they express in their activity a particular conception of the meaning of time. This paper argues that Laudato Si’ proposes a vision of time which is theological, teleological, dialectical and contemplative, and that it is this vision which underpins its contrast between true and false notions of progress. The paper seeks to articulate a foundation for the formulation of authentic ‘measures of success’ that are expressive of this understanding of time, and to imagine what the organisational implications of such measures might be.

When speaking of the odd behavior of a particular individual, it is common for people to say something like, “Well, I am just made that way,” or, “He can't help it; that's the way he is.” On the other hand, when considering future vistas for action, some suppose that that, everything in life can be a matter of choice, that we can choose our own gender, ethnicity, or identity. It seems to me that there are theological parallels to these anthropological positions. First, similar to mechanical determinism, some believe in a determined mechanism of sin that destroys human nature and makes free choice an illusion. Second, similar to views that human fulfillment is simply a matter of exercising our will, some argue that graced happiness is merely an extension of nature. To all of these positions, Aquinas has a response.

The prosperity of theology at Universities in this country is, for better or worse, linked to the prosperity or otherwise of Religious Education in the nation's schools where pupils first learn the grammar and vocabulary of belief. Yet despite one of the aspirations of recent reforms of the subject being to harmonize student transition from secondary to tertiary level, other voices have been raised which question the validity of that project. This article considers why religious education is currently such a contested pedagogical space, what kind of alternatives are being proposed and why Newman's Idea of a University and an ‘inclusive’ understanding of Theology might inform a coherent Catholic response.

The Constitution on the Liturgy, Sacrosanctum concilium (1963), envisaged an extensive episcopal liturgical governance role. With the local episcopal conference, the bishop was to regulate the use of language in the liturgy and prepare and translate liturgical prayers into ‘living languages’ and oversee the implementation of liturgical change. These were key conciliar expressions of episcopal governance, which represented a deeper theology of the episcopacy. In subsequent years, the Council's reform agenda was challenged and resisted by the Roman Curia and others. The Curia aimed at protecting its pre-Vatican II position of governance and was not inclined to receive the Council's collegial and synodal ecclesiology. The most recent development, Magnum principium (2017), may be viewed as an opportunity yet to be grasped.

In this paper, I explore the axiological status of work. I engage with a number of prominent natural law theorists who consider it a basic human good and explain why their arguments fail. In the process, I put forward a novel argument against the very possibility of work being considered a basic good. I conclude that whilst work may be very important to us psychologically and instrumentally it should not be considered a basic human good.

The opening chapter of the Gospel of Luke establishes a connection between the Temple and Mary, the mother of Jesus. This connection is developed over the centuries by theologians, often in connection to Marian doctrines, but also in service of Christology. This research considers what the theological implications of such a typology might be—what are theologians saying about Mary, and often Jesus, when they draw a typological connection between the Temple and Mary? Furthermore, what is a feminist theologian to make of such a theological statement? Is Mary a monolithic, bland symbol or does a typological connection between the Temple and Mary make for a powerfully feminist Marian theology?

In The Spirit of Liturgy, Romano Guardini argued that liturgy is a playful activity. But one may ask, can liturgy really be analysed in light of the experience of play? This question opens up different theoretical problems, which range from a fundamental understanding of play and its celebratory spirit to a consideration of liturgy as an event of the divine Mystery. In this paper, I will therefore explore the nature of Christian ritual performance, drawing on a phenomenological analysis of the connections between play and liturgy in the process, before concluding that the liturgy – from a transcendental perspective – is in fact a playful activity. The argument will thus include a study of the particularity and difference of the original ritual patterns and the universe of play, thereby bringing into focus the interplay between the sense of rite and the experience of play. In such a way, I will show that play provides us with one of the possible ways of approaching the essence of the Christian ritual celebration as a transcendental experience of Mystery, as well as shedding light on the interrelation between homo ludens and homo liturgicus.

The article questions whether it is possible to derive natural laws from human sociability. It examines the work of Aristotle, Augustine and Aquinas, and concludes that there are certain natural laws that can be derived from the social character of human beings. Some of these hold across all societies and at all times (semper et ad semper) whereas others hold only in general but are subject to exceptions (semper sed non ad semper). The article concludes by confronting an anti-social and immoralist challenge to the idea of natural laws of sociability.

Recently a change to the Italian text of the Pater Noster has been proposed. Motivation for this change centers on worries about the suggestion that God leads us into temptation. This paper argues that these worries issue from a confused picture of the relationship between God and creaturely freedom. More fundamentally, however, the suggestion that these kind of worries ought to precipitate revision of liturgical texts fails to take seriously the nature of the liturgy as prayer, rather than simply a means of communicating information. Drawing on Wittgenstein, the sui generis nature of prayer is laid out before the paper concludes with some comments on the distinctive values of both scholarship and prayer.