The treatment of injured Indian soldiers in Britain during WWI deployed particular ways of recording injuries and using them to make judgments about loyalty to the Imperial Army by assessing the soldier’s ability to malinger. This was possible by using personal correspondences between soldiers and their families for ethnographic ends ie. to determine susceptibility to develop mental illness through a soldier’s ethnic background and whether he was from the so-called ‘martial races’ or not. This classificatory knowledge as well as the suspicion towards exaggerated symptoms was also inherited by Indian psychiatry after partition. However, while these psychiatrists reproduced some colonial biases about susceptibility of illness, they were much more receptive to considering the social experience of patients including their kinship relations at home and in the military. By the end of WWII, symptoms came to be regarded as signs of recovery and readjustment to social relations to make a case for the lasting impacts of war on the soldier’s mental and physical health.

Despite numerous global health initiatives after World War II, tuberculosis still poses a major threat in sub-Saharan Africa. This article examines one attempt to tackle this problem: the Somalia-Finland Tuberculosis Control Project. Conducted in the 1980s as a bilateral development aid project between the two countries, it became the most extensive – and expensive – tuberculosis initiative in Somalia in that decade. An interesting feature of the project is that, despite a lack of previous experience in tuberculosis work in developing countries, the Finnish partner decided not to follow the WHO global guidelines designed to standardise tuberculosis activities across the developing world. Instead, Finns established their own treatment programme based on X-ray and short-course chemotherapy – otherwise rarely used in clinical practice in Africa. Through a close reading and comparison of the correspondence, project plans, memos and minutes, the article analyses the formation of this strategy. Focusing on ground-level decision-making, it argues that the decisions were based not only on a belief in the superior clinical effectiveness of these methods, but also on the fact that they better suited Finnish ambitions and project logic. Thus, the article supports the notion that donor perspectives on resources and project objectives determined what was seen as feasible treatment in a developing country. By shedding light on the debate between the supporters of short-course chemotherapy and the WHO standard treatment strategy, it also contributes to the early history of DOTS (directly observed treatment, short course).