Twenty years after the Supreme Court struck down existing death penalty statutes (Furman v. Georgia 1972) and a day after Justice Thurgood Marshall's death, the senior Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, Harry Blackmun, charged the Court with coming “perilously close to murder” in its latest death penalty ruling. He made this charge in an unusual oral dissent from a decision which held that a federal appeals court could not hear newly developed evidence of a death row inmate's possible innocence (Herrera v. Collins 1992). The Court, nine months earlier, had barred a lower federal court from hearing new evidence challenging execution by asphyxiation as cruel punishment (Gomez v. U.S. District Court 1992) and had then taken the unprecedented step of ordering no further stays of execution (Vasquez v. Harris 1992).1 How did we reach this point when 20 years earlier the Court had declared that the death penalty as applied was too arbitrary to be constitutionally acceptable, and when virtually all other modern industrialized nations of the free world either had already, or soon would, do away with capital punishment?

Recent developments in higher education and in microelectronics have converged to alter the work and status of the legal profession. In this study of the subject of these far-reaching trends on lawyers in the German insurance industry, the professional jurisdiction of lawyers is found to have been greatly weakened. The need for the professional expertise of lawyers is greatly reduced because qualified nonlawyer business clerks have access through the legal data banks to legal knowledge once only available to them after many years of experience. Ironically, however, the excess supply of lawyers has led insurance companies to hire them to do work below their qualification level that can be done by qualified nonlawyer clerks; thus these over-credentialed lawyers find it almost impossible to establish or maintain any professional legal jurisdiction.

This study tests the impact of OSHA enforcement on workplace injuries. Using data on injuries and OSHA inspections for a panel of 6,842 large manufacturing plants between 1979 and 1985, we find significant specific deterrence effects. Inspections imposing penalties induce a 22% decline in injuries in the inspected plant during the following few years. We suggest that narrow deterrence perspectives have led to unduly pessimistic assumptions about enforcement effectiveness and that a managerial attention model is more consistent with our findings.

In a technical appendix we describe the Chamberlain technique, a powerful analytic approach for panel data that provides tests and corrections for potential biases endemic in enforcement studies, including unmeasured heterogeneity among units, serially correlated dependent variables, and endogeneity of inspections. We argue that more empirical studies of enforcement impacts are necessary to provide an appropriate perspective for descriptive and analytic studies appraising regulatory behavior.