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Comment on “A New Method to Obtain a Consensus Ranking of a Region's Vintages' Quality”

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 February 2013

Neal D. Hulkower
Neal D. Hulkower*
Affiliation:
McMinnville, OR 97128, email: [email protected]
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Extract

Issues with the Cordorcet method used in the subject paper to aggregate rankings are presented. These arise because critical information contained in each voter's ranking is ignored. The mathematically superior Borda Count, which uses the complete information provided by each voter, is used to aggregate the rankings and the results are compared.

Type
Commentary
Information
Journal of Wine Economics , Volume 7 , Issue 2 , November 2012 , pp. 241 - 244
Copyright
Copyright © American Association of Wine Economists 2013

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References

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