In a previous paper, a functional calculus based on strict implication was developed. That system will be referred to as S2. The system resulting from the addition of Becker's axiom will be referred to as S4. In the present paper we will shw that a restricted deduction theorem is provable in S4 or more precisely in a system equivalent to S4. We will also show that such a deduction theorem is not provable in S2.

The following theorems not derived in Symbolic logic will be required for the fundamental theorems XXVIII* and XXIX* of this paper. We will state most of them without proofs.

We discuss ways in which a typical one-dimensional Brownian motion can be approximated by oscillations which are encoded by finite binary strings of high descriptive complexity. We study the recursive properties of Brownian motions that can be thus obtained.

The Principle of Dependent Choice is shown to be equivalent to: the Baire Category Theorem for Čech-complete spaces (or for complete metric spaces); the existence theorem for generic sets of forcing conditions; and a proof-theoretic principle that abstracts the “Henkin method” of proving deductive completeness of logical systems. The Rasiowa-Sikorski Lemma is shown to be equivalent to the conjunction of the Ultrafilter Theorem and the Baire Category Theorem for compact Hausdorff spaces.

We show that relative to the consistency of a supercompact cardinal does not imply . The model-theoretic transfer property ⟨ℵ1, ℵ0⟩ → ⟨ℵω + 1, ℵω⟩ does not imply , and it is consistent to have an ultrafilter on ℵω + 1 which is λ-indecomposible for all ω < λ < ℵω.

The intuitionistic propositional logic I has the following disjunction property

This property does not characterize intuitionistic logic. For example Kreisel and Putnam [5] showed that the extension of I with the axiom

has the disjunction property. Another known system with this propery is due to Scott [5], and is obtained by adding to I the following axiom:

In the present paper we shall prove, using methods originally introduced by Segerberg [10], that the Kreisel-Putnam logic is decidable. In fact we shall show that it has the finite model property, and since it is finitely axiomatizable, it is decidable by [4]. The decidability of Scott's system was proved by J. G. Anderson in his thesis in 1966.

The axiom of infinity can be expressed by stating the existence of sets satisfying a formula which involves restricted universal quantifiers only, even if the axiom of foundation is not assumed.

This article aims to classify those reducts of expansions of (ℚ, <) by unary predicates which eliminate quantifiers, and in particular to show that, up to interdefinability, there are only finitely many for a given language. Equivalently, we wish to classify the closed subgroups of Sym(ℚ) containing the group of all automorphisms of (ℚ, <) fixing setwise certain subsets. This goal is achieved for expansions by convex predicates, yielding expansions by constants as a special case, and for the expansion by a dense, co-dense predicate. Partial results are obtained in the general setting of several dense predicates.

Ever since Post [4] the structure of recursively enumerable sets and their classification has been an important area in recursion theory. It is also intimately connected with the study of the lattices and of r.e. sets and r.e. sets modulo finite sets respectively. (This lattice theoretic viewpoint was introduced by Myhill [3].) Key roles in both areas have been played by the lattice of r.e. supersets, , of an r.e. set A (along with the corresponding modulo finite sets) and more recently by the group of automorphisms of and . Thus for example we have Lachlan's deep result [1] that Post's notion of A being hyperhypersimple is equivalent to (or ) being a Boolean algebra. Indeed Lachlan even tells us which Boolean algebras appear as —precisely those with Σ3 representations. There are also many other simpler but still illuminating connections between the older typology of r.e. sets and their roles in the lattice . (r-maximal sets for example are just those with completely uncomplemented.) On the other hand, work on automorphisms by Martin and by Soare [8], [9] has shown that most other Post type conditions on r.e. sets such as hypersimplicity or creativeness which are not obviously lattice theoretic are in fact not invariant properties of .

In general the program of analyzing and classifying r.e. sets has been directed at the simple sets. Thus the subtypes of simple sets studied abound — between ten and fifteen are mentioned in [5] and there are others — but there seems to be much less known about the nonsimple sets. The typologies introduced for the nonsimple sets begin with Post's notion of creativeness and add on a few variations. (See [5, §8.7] and the related exercises for some examples.) Although there is a classification scheme for r.e. sets along the simple to creative line (see [5, §8.7]) it is admitted to be somewhat artificial and arbitrary. Moreover there does not seem to have been much recent work on the nonsimple sets.

Let X be a compact metric space. A closed set K ⊆ X is located if the distance function d(x, K) exists as a continuous real-valued function on X; weakly located if the predicate d(x, K) > r is allowing parameters. The purpose of this paper is to explore the concepts of located and weakly located subsets of a compact separable metric space in the context of subsystems of second order arithmetic such as RCA0, WKL0 and ACA0. We also give some applications of these concepts by discussing some versions of the Tietze extension theorem. In particular we prove an RCA0 version of this result for weakly located closed sets.

We give a solution stated in the title to problem 3 of part 1 of the problems listed in the book of Eklof and Mekler [2], p. 453. There, in pp. 241-242, this is discussed and proved in some cases. The existence of strongly λ-free ones was proved earlier by the criteria in [5] and [3]. We can apply a similar proof to a large class of other varieties in particular to the variety of (non-commutative) groups.

As Gödel [6] has pointed out, there is a certain interchangeability between the intuitionistic notion of proof and the notion of constructive functional of finite type. He achieves this interchange in the direction from logic to functionals by his functional interpretation of Heyting arithmetic H in a free variable theory T of primitive recursive functionals of finite type. In the present paper we shall extend Gödel's functional interpretation to the case in which H and T are extended by adding an abstract notion of constructive ordinal. In other words, we obtain the Gödel functional interpretation of an intuitionistic theory U of numbers (i.e., nonnegative integers) and constructive ordinals in a free variable theory V of finite type over both numbers and constructive ordinals. This allows us to obtain an analysis of noniterated positive inductive definitions [8].

The notion of constructive ordinal to be treated is as follows. There is given a function J which embeds the nonnegative integers in the constructive ordinals. A constructive ordinal of the form Jn is said to be minimal. There is also given a function δ which associates to each constructive ordinal Z and number n a constructive ordinal δZn which we denote by Zn. When Z is nonminimal, each Zn is called an immediate predecessor of Z. The basic principle for forming constructive ordinals says: for every function f from numbers n to constructive ordinals, there exists a constructive ordinal Z such that Zn = fn for all n. The principle of transfinite induction with respect to constructive ordinals says: if a property Q(Z) of constructive ordinals Z holds for minimal Z, and if ∀nQ(Zn) → Q(Z) holds for all Z, then Q(Z) holds for all Z.

A number of classical theories are interpreted in analogous theories that are based on intuitionistic logic. The classical theories considered include subsystems of first- and second-order arithmetic, bounded arithmetic, and admissible set theory.

The logic KM is the smallest normal modal logic that includes the McKinsey axiom

It is shown here that this axiom is not valid in the canonical frame for KM, answering a question first posed in the Lemmon-Scott manuscript [Lemmon, 1966].

The result is not just an esoteric counterexample: apart from interest generated by the long delay in a solution being found, the problem has been of historical importance in the development of our understanding of intensional model theory, and is of some conceptual significance, as will now be explained.

The relational semantics for normal modal logics first appeared in [Kripke, 1963], where a number of well-known systems were shown to be characterised by simple first-order conditions on binary relations (frames). This phenomenon was systematically investigated in [Lemmon, 1966], which introduced the technique of associating with each logic L a canonical frame which invalidates every nontheorem of L. If, in addition, each L-theorem is valid in , then L is said to be canonical. The problem of showing that L is determined by some validating condition C, meaning that the L-theorems are precisely those formulae valid in all frames satisfying C, can be solved by showing that satisfies C—in which case canonicity is also established. Numerous cases were studied, leading to the definition of a first-order condition Cφ associated with each formula φ of the form

where Ψ is a positive modal formula.

A fundamental notion in a large part of mathematics is the notion of equicardinality. The language with Härtig quantifier is, roughly speaking, a first-order language in which the notion of equicardinality is expressible. Thus this language, denoted by LI, is in some sense very natural and has in consequence special interest. Properties of LI are studied in many papers. In [BF, Chapter VI] there is a short survey of some known results about LI. We feel that a more extensive exposition of these results is needed.

The aim of this paper is to give an overview of the present knowledge about the language LI and list a selection of open problems concerning it.

After the Introduction (§1), in §§2 and 3 we give the fundamental results about LI. In §4 the known model-theoretic properties are discussed. The next section is devoted to properties of mathematical theories in LI. In §6 the spectra of sentences of LI are discussed, and §7 is devoted to properties of LI which depend on set-theoretic assumptions. The paper finishes with a list of open problem and an extensive bibliography. The bibliography contains not only papers we refer to but also all papers known to us containing results about the language with Härtig quantifier.

Contents. §1. Introduction. §2. Preliminaries. §3. Basic results. §4. Model-theoretic properties of LI. §5. Decidability of theories with I. §6. Spectra of LI-sentences. §7. Independence results. §8. What is not yet known about LI. Bibliography.

In 1960 G. F. Rose [R] made the following definition: A function f: ω → ω is (m, n)-computable, where 1 ≤ m ≤ n, iff there exists a recursive function R: ωn → ωn such that, for all n-tuples (x1,…, xn) of distinct natural numbers,

J. Myhill (see [McN, p. 393]) asked if f had to be recursive if m was close to n; B. A. Trakhtenbrot [T] responded by showing in 1963 that f is recursive whenever 2m > n. This result is optimal, because, for example, the characteristic function of any semirecursive set is (1,2)-computable. Trakhtenbrot's work was extended by E. B. Kinber [Ki1], using similar techniques. In 1986 R. Beigel [B] made a powerful conjecture, much more general than the above results. Partial verification, falling short of a full proof, appeared in [O]. Using new techniques, M. Kummer has recently established the conjecture, which will henceforth be referred to as the cardinality theorem (CT). It is the goal of this paper to show the connections between these various theorems, to review the methods used by Trakhtenbrot, and to use them to prove a special case of CT strong enough to imply Kinber's theorem (see §3). We thus have a hierarchy of results, with CT at the top. We will also include a discussion of Kummer's methods, but not a proof of CT.

The stability of each of the theories of separably closed fields is proved, in the manner of Shelah's proof of the corresponding result for differentially closed fields. These are at present the only known stable but not superstable theories of fields. We indicate in §3 how each of the theories of separably closed fields can be associated with a model complete theory in the language of differential algebra. We assume familiarity with some basic facts about model completeness [4], stability [7], separably closed fields [2] or [3], and (for §3 only) differential fields [8].

A hyperimaginary is an equivalence class of a type-definable equivalence relation on tuples of possibly infinite length. The notion was recently introduced in [1], mainly with reference to simple theories. It was pointed out there how hyperimaginaries still remain in a sense within the domain of first order logic. In this paper we are concerned with several issues: on the one hand, various levels of complexity of hyperimaginaries, and when hyperimaginaries can be reduced to simpler hyperimaginaries. On the other hand the issue of what information about hyperimaginaries in a saturated structure M can be obtained from the abstract group Aut(M).

In Section 2 we show that if T is simple and canonical bases of Lascar strong types exist in Meq then hyperimaginaries can be eliminated in favour of sequences of ordinary imaginaries. In Section 3, given a type-definable equivalence relation with a bounded number of classes, we show how the quotient space can be equipped with a certain compact topology. In Section 4 we study a certain group introduced in [5], which we call the Galois group of T, develop a Galois theory and make the connection with the ideas in Section 3. We also give some applications, making use of the structure of compact groups. One of these applications states roughly that bounded hyperimaginaries can be eliminated in favour of sequences of finitary hyperimaginaries. In Sections 3 and 4 there is some overlap with parts of Hrushovski's paper [2].

Indescribability is closely related to the reflection principles of Zermelo-Fränkel set theory. In this axiomatic setting the universe of all sets stratifies into a natural cumulative hierarchy (Vα: α ϵ On) such that any formula of the language for set theory that holds in the universe already holds in the restricted universe of all sets obtained by some stage.

The axioms of ZF prove the existence of many ordinals α such that this reflection scheme holds in the world Vα. Hanf and Scott noticed that one arrives at a large cardinal notion if the reflecting formulas are allowed to contain second order free variables to which one assigns subsets of Vα. For a given collection Ω of formulas in the ϵ language of set theory with higher type variables and a unary predicate symbol they define an ordinal α to be Ω indescribable if for all sentences Φ in Ω and A ⊆ Vα

Since a sufficient coding apparatus is available, this definition is (for the classes of formulas that we are going to consider) equivalent to the one that one obtains by allowing finite sequences of relations over Vα, some of which are possibly k-ary. We will be interested mainly in certain standardized classes of formulas: Let (, respectively) denote the class of all formulas in the language introduced above whose prenex normal form has n alternating blocks of quantifiers of type m (i.e. (m + 1)th order) starting with ∃ (∀, respectively) and no quantifiers of type greater than m. In Hanf and Scott [1961] it is shown that in ZFC, indescribability is equivalent to inaccessibility and indescribability coincides with weak compactness.

Zest for both system and objectivity is the formal logician's original sin. He pays for it by constant frustrations and by living ofttimes the life of an intellectual outcaste. The task of squeezing a large body of stubborn facts into a more or less rigid system can be a painful one, especially since the facts of mathematics are among the most stubborn of all facts. Moreover, the more general and abstract we get, the farther removed we are from the raw mathematical experience. As intuition ceases to operate effectively, we fall into many unexpected traps. The formal logician gets little sympathy for his frustrations. He is regarded as too rigid by his philosophical colleagues and too speculative by his mathematical friends. The life of an intellectual outcaste may be a result partly of temperament and partly of the youthfulness of the logic profession. The unfortunate lack of wide appeal of logic may, however, be prolonged partly on account of the fact that very little of the well-established techniques of mathematics seems applicable to the treatment of serious problems of logic.

The axiomatic method is well suited to provide results which are both exact and systematic. How attractive would it be if we could get an axiom system in which all the axioms and deductions were intuitively clear and all theorems of mathematics were provable? Such a system would undoubtedly satisfy Descartes who admits solely intuition and deduction, which are, for him, the only “mental operations by which we are able, wholly without fear of illusion, to arrive at the knowledge of things.” Indeed, according to Descartes, intuition and deduction “are the most certain routes to knowledge, and the mind should admit no others. All the rest should be rejected as suspect of error and dangerous.”

In reverse mathematics, one formalizes theorems of ordinary mathematics in second order arithmetic and attempts to discover which set theoretic axioms are required to prove these theorems. Often, this project involves making choices between classically equivalent definitions for the relevant mathematical concepts. In this paper, we consider a number of equivalent definitions for the notions of well quasi-order and better quasi-order and examine how difficult it is to prove the equivalences of these definitions.

As usual in reverse mathematics, we work in the context of subsystems of second order arithmetic and take RCA0 as our base system. RCA0 is the subsystem formed by restricting the comprehension scheme in second order arithmetic to formulas and adding a formula induction scheme for formulas. For the purposes of this paper, we will be concerned with fairly weak extensions of RCA0 (indeed strictly weaker than the subsystem ACA0 which is formed by extending the comprehension scheme in RCA0 to cover all arithmetic formulas) obtained by adjoining certain combinatorial principles to RCA0. Among these, the most widely used in reverse mathematics is Weak König's Lemma; the resulting theory WKL0 is extensively documented in [11] and elsewhere.

We give three other combinatorial principles which we use in this paper. In these principles, we use k to denote not only a natural number but also the finite set {0, …, k − 1}.