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Stagnating yields, unyielding profits: The political economy of Malaysia's rice sector

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 January 2018

Abstract

Since the 2008 rice crisis, Malaysia's rice policies have been caught between government efforts to raise production and its support of the country's monopoly rice importer (Bernas). This article argues that when the politics behind the country's policies are revealed, the paradox is more apparent than real. The three principal policy components — gratifying Barisan Nasional's coalition partners in East Malaysia by expanding the acreage devoted to rice; buttressing the rural Malay economy by providing subsidies through a yield-enhancing programme; and relying on big business for financial support (Bernas's new owner is one of Malaysia's richest businessmen) — aim to serve the same end: to perpetuate UMNO's political power amid increasing electoral competition.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The National University of Singapore 2018 

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Footnotes

I would like to thank two anonymous referees and the journal's editors for their insightful remarks. Funding for this research has been generously provided by a FRC National University of Singapore grant (R-108-000-070-112).

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109 I thank one of the referees for emphasising this point.

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120 One (Pekan) is 647 hectares; the other (Rompin) is 2,874 hectares.

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122 The projects’ official status as granaries will be conferred upon completion; it is unlikely either will be completed by their 2020 deadline.

123 Interview, Syahrin bin Suhaimee, Deputy Director, MARDI, Serdang, 13 Feb. 2015.

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126 At best both projects would raise SSL in rice in each state by 10 per cent (Interview, Bin Yusup, Head of Beras Corporation Sdn Bhd, Bernas's Sarawak subsidiary, Kuching, 17 Feb. 2016; J. Lamdin, Mohd. S.S., W.W.W. Wong, and J. Gumpil, ‘Sabah's roles and contributions towards fulfilling the nation's strategies in achieving 100% SSL in rice production’ [Kota Kinabalu: Department of Agriculture Sabah, 2015]). The failure of prior, smaller-scale programmes in Sarawak stemmed from the lack of trust between officials and local communities (Interview, Nicholas Mujah, Head of Sarawak Dayak Iban Association, Kuching, 19 Feb. 2016).

127 ‘Bernas rice import monopoly extended by more 10 years’, Borneo Post, 7 May 2012, http://www.theborneopost.com/2012/05/07/bernas-rice-import-monopoly-extended-by-more-10-years (accessed 17 Aug. 2016).

128 ‘Budget 2016 provides RM29.2 bln for development in Sabah, Sarawak’, Borneo Post, 23 Oct. 2015, http://www.theborneopost.com/2015/10/23/budget-2016-provides-rm29-2-bln-for-development-in-sabah-sarawak (accessed 20 Aug. 2016). I am grateful to Yi Fan Chung for alerting me to this development.

129 Interview, Kamaruddin bin Dahuli, Director, Rice Industry Division, MADA, Alor Setar, Kedah, 30 Mar. 2017.

130 See the government website http://etp.pemandu.gov.my.

131 Interview, Kamaruddin bin Dahuli.

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139 Alavi et al., Trusting trade.

140 Mohd. A.S.A., ‘Umno's chief crony’, www.freemalaysiatoday.com, 28 Oct. 2012; http://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/opinion/2012/10/28/umnos-chief-crony (last accessed 17 Aug. 2016).

141 Gooi H.L., ‘Did Ismail Sabri lie to farmers & fishermen? Syed Mokhtar's Bernas denies any relisting plan’, Malaysians Must Know the Truth, blog, 12 Feb. 2014, http://malaysiansmustknowthetruth.blogspot.sg/2014/02/did-ismail-sabri-lie-to-farmers.html (last accessed 20 Aug. 2016).

142 Reportedly some RM700 million has been advanced to Tradewinds. M. Chan, ‘Explain Bernas cash transfer worth millions, says MP’, Free Malaysia Today, 10 June 2015; http://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/nation/2015/06/10/explain-bernas-cash-transfer-worth-millions-says-mp (last accessed 17 Aug. 2016).

143 Anon. interviews, Bernas staffers, Kuala Lumpur, 27 July 2015 and Kota Kinabalu, 25–27 Apr. 2016.

144 Even if not all the money was used for this purpose, it is still a staggering sum for an election with just over 13 million eligible voters.

145 Davidson, Jamie S., ‘Why the Philippines chooses to import rice’, Critical Asian Studies 48, 1 (2016): 100122 Google Scholar; Timmer, C. Peter, Operationalizing pro-poor growth; Country study for the World Bank: Indonesia (Washington DC: PREM/World Bank, 2005)Google Scholar.

146 This concept refers to the transition of an agrarian economy via increased agricultural productivity to one preponderantly based on industrial, urban economic activity (Timmer, Food security and scarcity, pp. 75–113).