We have designed and implemented an experimental module in the 2014 Health and Retirement Study to measure older persons' willingness to defer claiming of Social Security benefits. Under the current system’ status quo where delaying claiming boosts eventual benefits, we show that 46% of the respondents would delay claiming and work longer. If respondents were instead offered an actuarially fair lump sum payment instead of higher lifelong benefits, about 56% indicate they would delay claiming. Without a work requirement, the average amount needed to induce delayed claiming is only $60,400, while when part-time work is stipulated, the amount is slightly higher, $66,700. This small difference implies a low utility value of leisure foregone, of under 20% of average household income.

Defined benefit pension funds invest in illiquid asset classes for return, diversification or liability hedging reasons. So far, little is known about factors influencing how much they invest in illiquid assets. We conjecture that liquidity and capital requirements are pivotal in this decision. Short-term pension payments and margining on derivative contracts generate liquidity requirements, while regulations impose capital requirements. Consistent with our model we empirically find that these requirements create a hump-shaped impact of liability duration on the fraction of risky assets invested in illiquid assets. Further, we report that pension fund size, type, and funding ratio impact illiquid assets allocations.

Married men's Social Security claiming behavior does not always take into account spouse and survivor benefits. Specifically, married men tend to choose claiming ages that do not maximize the household's and widow's expected present value of benefits. To understand what contributes to this pattern, we conduct an online survey experiment with a representative sample of Americans. We randomly assign respondents to one of four vignettes that present information about a character who is choosing when to claim his retirement benefits. The vignettes differ by whether the character is married or not, whether information about survivor benefits is presented, and whether the information includes an illustrative example. We next ask respondents to provide advice to the character about when to claim. We find that (1) respondents do value survivor benefits for spouses, and (2) information about survivor benefits tends to increase the suggested claiming ages only among the subgroup of respondents who are the least knowledgeable about these benefits.

Pricing ultra-long-dated pension liabilities under the market-consistent valuation is challenged by the scarcity of the long-term market instruments that match or exceed the terms of pension liabilities. We develop a robust self-financing hedging strategy which adopts a min–max expected shortfall hedging criterion to replicate the long-dated liabilities for agents who fear parameter misspecification. We introduce a backward robust least squares Monte Carlo method to solve this dynamic robust optimization problem. We find that both naive and robust optimal portfolios depend on the hedging horizon and the current funding ratio. The robust policy suggests taking more risk when the current funding ratio is low. The yield curve constructed by the robust dynamic hedging portfolio is always lower than the naive one but is higher than the model-based yield curve in a low-rate environment.

We examine the investment performance of Chilean pension funds during their multi-fund period (2003–17). Using tradable asset class benchmarks, we extend Sharpe's (1992) return-based style analysis by explicitly considering regulatory restrictions and currency hedging. We find that despite the significant differences between pension fund manager returns, they are statistically similar to our style benchmarks for all fund types. Furthermore, accounting for currency hedging improves the accuracy of the replicating portfolios and the selection return estimates. Our results have policy implications for investment regulation of pension systems with similar characteristics to the Chilean one.

The share of workers who are self-employed rises markedly with age. Given policy concerns about inadequate retirement savings, especially among those with lower education, and the resulting interest in encouraging employment at older ages, it is important to understand the role that self-employment arrangements play in facilitating work among seniors. New data from a survey module fielded on a Gallup telephone survey distinguish independent contractor work from other self-employment and provide information on informal and online platform work. The Gallup data show that, especially after accounting for individuals who are miscoded as employees, self-employment is even more prevalent at older ages than suggested by existing data. Work as an independent contractor is the most common type of self-employment. Roughly one-quarter of independent contractors aged 50 and older work for a former employer. At older ages, self-employment generally – and work as an independent contractor specifically – is more common among the highly educated, accounting for much of the difference in employment rates across education groups. We provide suggestive evidence that differences in opportunities for independent contractor work play an important role in the lower employment rates of less-educated older adults.

The current study assesses the role of the pay-as-you-go system as an intergenerational redistributive mechanism while immigration control is considered. A theoretical model of a small open economy populated with overlapping generations of heterogeneous agents is used to show that skill-favouring immigration policies are, under rather permissive conditions, welfare depriving for the overall population. However, the policy-setting generation is shown to benefit from immigration control, thus decreasing the welfare for the future population.

We study whether retirement preparedness of overconfident individuals – those with high self-rated but low objective financial knowledge – and underconfident individuals – those with low self-rated but high objective financial knowledge – differs from that of individuals for whom self-assessed and actual knowledge align. We find that overconfident individuals fare no different than others with similarly low levels of objective financial knowledge in terms of retirement preparedness, while they are less interested in improving their knowledge. Underconfident individuals exhibit worse economic outcomes than others with similarly high financial knowledge but show interest in learning more about retirement. Our results suggest that accompanying financial literacy campaigns with initiatives that increase awareness of one's actual knowledge may be an effective lever to encourage the overconfident to increase their financial competence and to prove to the underconfident that they have sufficient skills to start planning their financial future.

We examine pension-cost crowd out of salary expenditures in the public sector using a 15-year data panel of state teacher pension plans spanning the Great Recession. While there is no evidence of salary crowd out prior to the Great Recession, there is a shift in the post-recession years such that a 1% (of salaries) increase in the annual required pension contribution corresponds to a decrease in total teacher salary expenditures of 0.24%. The effect operates through changes to the size of the teaching workforce, not changes to teacher wages. An explanation for the effect heterogeneity pre- and post-recession is that public employers are less able to shield the workforce from pension costs during times of fiscal stress. This problem is exacerbated because unlike other benefit costs, such as for health care, pension costs are countercyclical.

Individuals are increasingly asked to take responsibility for preparing for retirement and available financial products to do so are growing in sophistication. A better understanding of how non-cognitive skills influence financial capability and retirement preparation could help effective policy design. This area of research has been hampered by the struggle to find reliable measures of these skills. I argue that questionnaires themselves can be seen as performance tasks, such that measures of survey effort could lead to meaningful measures of non-cognitive skills. I exploit the fact that I observe respondents taking multiple survey modules covering different topics in different moments of time to build survey effort measures in a nationally representative internet panel. I use survey effort measures along with self-reports to study the role of non-cognitive skills on retirement preparation and financial capability. My results show that non-cognitive skills can have a significant role, beyond the role of cognitive ability.

We estimate how raising the statutory retirement age affects employment by considering the pension age reform in Estonia, that gradually raised the normal retirement age (NRA) for women from 58 to 61.5 and the early retirement age (ERA) from 56 to 59.5 during the period of 2001–2011. The analysis employs a difference-in-differences estimation strategy on register data covering women born between 1943 and 1952. The reform did have an impact on the employment rate of affected women, with an estimated increase of 4.1 percentage points associated with the rise in the NRA, and 3.4 percentage points with the rise in the ERA. These estimates are at the lower end of those found in previous studies for other countries, pointing to the role of contextual features such as lower replacement rates and fewer disincentives to work while drawing pensions.

Automatic enrollment has substantially increased employee participation in defined contribution plans. Yet little is known about how retirement plan design features influence retirement wealth accumulation in a setting of labor market turnover. We find that employees separating from jobs with automatic enrollment plans are significantly more likely to take a cash distribution (and potentially pay a tax penalty) than those separating from jobs with voluntary enrollment plans, offsetting some of the benefits from automatic enrollment. Yet given the sizeable improvements in plan participation from automatic enrollment, wealth accumulation for automatically enrolled participants, net of cash-outs and penalties, remain higher than it would have been under voluntary enrollment.