The advances in economic and social history over the past years enabled me to empirically test assumptions about the long-run development of markets. The review by Geoff Hodgson of the resulting book, The Invisible Hand?, is lucid but incomplete. I argue that the rise to dominance of factor markets, followed by that of financial markets, took place already in several early cases, and that all market economies, through an endogenous process, saw the accumulation of wealth and, next, the translation of this wealth into political leverage, creating a feedback loop with negative outcomes which is very hard to break.

This paper evaluates the contribution of Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit to the development of economic theory in the 20th century. Our argument in this paper is twofold. First, we contend that this book embodied what had been the common knowledge of early neoclassical economics prior to World War II (WWII). Second, we also argue that embryonic to Knight's account of economics were two divergent approaches to economic thought that emerged after WWII. The first approach, what has come to be known as microeconomics, is characterized by utility maximization under fixed price, income, and institutional parameters that approximate equilibrium. This first approach is distinct from a second approach, referred to as price theory, in which prices are not sufficient statistics, as in microeconomics, but operate as guides to consumption and production decisions under alternative institutional arrangements. This second approach not only represented the continuation of the mainline1 of economic thought from its classical and early neoclassical roots. It also embodies the basis for Knight's understanding of uncertainty, profit and entrepreneurship, as well as its implications for economic organization and social progress.

Frank Knight's theory of monopoly price has received relatively little attention in the literature on Risk, Uncertainty and Profit. We argue that Knight accepted and refined the monopoly price theory of Carl Menger and his followers. Knight highlights the difference between monopoly as an inevitable outcome of departures from perfect competition, and monopoly as a contingent or ‘culture-history fact’. In the latter case, coercive institutional barriers to potential competition shape the choice set of consumers and producers, and provide a crucial method for identifying monopoly gains. There are three benefits to this account of Knight's contributions: it rehabilitates the focus on the institutional determinants of monopoly price, as opposed to the mainstream emphasis on market frictions and imperfections; it opens the way for a Mengerian monopoly price theory that seriously engages the study of institutions; and it adds new evidence and nuance to ongoing debates about Knight's place in economics.