Using an extensive dataset covering 187 countries during 1993–2011, this paper explores the impact of media freedom from government control on women's rights. To measure women's rights, we consider economic, political and social rights that capture the extent of government's respect for these rights at country level over time. A free press improves government's accountability to the society and leads to better governance. In the context of women's rights, a free press can enhance positive rights by helping women raise voices and gain recognition, and thereby making the government create a more conducive environment for women's empowerment. Further, higher press freedom can reduce the infringement of negative rights by calling for greater public accountability. Yet, a free media, while necessary, may not be sufficient in enhancing such rights, and other institutional factors related to a country's development might be essential to reap the benefit of a free media. Our estimated marginal impacts show that greater access of media (in the form of internet and mobile users) and countries with greater democratic capital enhance the impact of media freedom on women's economic and social rights, with little effect on political rights.

Several studies link development to institutions transplanted by European colonizers and here we extend this line of research to Asia. Japan imposed its system of well-defined property rights on some of its Asian colonies. In 1939, Japan began to register private land in its island colonies, an effort that was completed in Palau but interrupted elsewhere by World War II. Within Micronesia, robust economic development followed only in Palau where individual property rights were well defined. We show that well-defined property rights in Korea and Taiwan secured land taxation and enabled farmers to obtain bank loans for irrigation systems. Considering Japanese colonies, we use the presence or absence of a land survey as an instrument to identify the causal impact of new institutions. Our estimates show that property-defining institutions were important for economic development, results that are confirmed when using a similar approach with British Colonies in Asia.

Research on populism has gained importance in the light of the recent global populist surge. Political scientists have become concerned with the problem of authoritarian populism, examining how illiberal, anti-pluralist populist parties have degraded liberal democracies. Economic research on recent forms of populism, although also growing, lack a comprehensive conceptual approach. This paper reduces this gap by conceptualizing authoritarian populism in terms of political transaction costs, arguing that its primary function is to vertically integrate political exchange under conditions of general franchise. If successful, authoritarian populist regimes internalize a large share of political transaction costs inherent in decentralized democratic political exchange. This entails a degraded version of democracy, eliminating a significant part of substantial electoral choice. Through weakening impersonal collective political contracting, authoritarian populists bring back private political contracting as a dominant political coordination mechanism, effectively re-feudalizing democracy.

This is the second of two papers that generate and analyze quantitative estimates of the development of English caselaw and associated legal ideas before the Industrial Revolution. In the first paper, we estimated a 100-topic structural topic model, named the topics, and showed how to interpret topic-prevalence timelines. Here, we provide examples of new insights that can be gained from these estimates. We first provide a bird's-eye view, aggregating the topics into 15 themes. Procedure is the highest-prevalence theme, but by the mid-18th century attention to procedure decreases sharply, indicating solidification of court institutions. Important ideas on real-property were substantially settled by the mid-17th century and on contracts and torts by the mid-18th century. Thus, crucial elements of caselaw developed before the Industrial Revolution. We then examine the legal ideas associated with England's financial revolution. Many new legal ideas relevant to finance were well accepted before the Glorious Revolution. Finally, we examine the sources of law used in the courts. Emphasis on precedent-based reasoning increases by 1650, but diffusion was gradual, with pertinent ideas solidifying only after 1700. Ideas on statute applicability were accepted by the mid-16th century but debates on legislative intent were still occurring in 1750.

This paper uses an augmented Feldstein–Horioka savings–investment methodology to examine the impact of institutional quality on the degree of capital mobility in developing countries. A high correlation between domestic investment and domestic savings can arise from the presence of institutional rigidities restricting the movement of capital across borders. We find that including different aspects of institutional quality raises the coefficient of the savings rate, implying lower capital mobility. However, the improvement in institutional quality that strengthens the legal system, reduces investment risks, and ensures democratic accountability, increases capital mobility in developing countries. Inclusion of foreign aid also has a positive impact on the coefficient of the savings rate.

We look at the institutional determinants of both within- and across-country variations in US foreign direct investment (FDI) flows over time. The strength of our approach is that in contrast to the previous work that has focused on average FDI flows across countries, we are able to explain both the variations in FDI flows across and within countries for a given year. Our core hypothesis is that in countries with high quality of contract enforcement, multinationals are more likely to invest in the industries, where by their very nature investments are relationship specific. Conversely, in countries with low quality of contract enforcement, multinationals are more likely to invest in industries where investments to a large degree are not relationship specific. Using-three dimensional panel data for US FDI flows to 50 countries and 6 sectors for the period 1984–2010, we find strong support for our hypothesis. Our findings suggest that countries that want to attract US FDI in sectors that are highly intensive in technology and institutions such as transportation and electronics should improve their property rights and contracting environment.

From a New Institutional Economics (NIE) perspective, standards are acknowledged to play a central role in building efficient market infrastructure by defining what is exchanged and reducing the level of transaction and measurement costs. Nevertheless, only a few prior NIE studies have considered standard-setting activities as coordination and governance issues per se. This article aims to fill this gap by adapting and extending the classical Williamsonian analytical framework to the governance of standard-setting institutions. This analysis is substantiated by empirical data on global private standards in the agricultural sector. Our results highlight the importance of standard selection and the limits to current harmonisation as regards institutional failure to define alternative multilateral governance mechanisms at the international level.

Corporate social responsibility (CSR) was long associated with the ethics of company heads but now falls within an institutional process whereby practices give rise to rules which in turn modify company actions. CSR has spread as a result of social demand for a more ecological society, but it also constitutes a response to the crisis of shareholder governance. Drawing on the notion of ‘conception of control’ set out by Neil Fligstein (1990), we argue that CSR has given rise to a new ‘conception of control’, which we term ‘shareholder–CSR compatible’. Such a conception reflects how governance changes when environmental and societal responsibilities are combined with responsibility to shareholders. Shareholder value is still central within the enterprise, but top managers must now assume the position of mediators between these two imperatives.

We use the Economic Freedom Index to characterize the institutions of the Athenian city-state in the fourth century BCE. It has been shown that ancient Greece witnessed improved living conditions for an extended period of time. Athens in the fourth century appears to have fared particularly well. We find that economic freedom in ancient Athens is on level with the highest ranked modern economies such as Hong Kong and Singapore. With the exception of the position of women and slaves, Athens scores high in almost every dimension of economic freedom. Trade is probably highly important even by current standards. As studies of contemporary societies suggest that institutional quality is probably an important determinant of economic growth, it may also have been one factor in the relative material success of the Athenians.

The article proposes a reading of Marcel Mauss's insights into gift exchange in primitive societies through the lens of the institutional economics approach. It thus tries to demonstrate that the gift as seen by Mauss can be interpreted as an institution arising from the self-transcendence of social relationships that gifts themselves are expressly designed to create and according to which individuals orient their behavior. On this basis, we provide elements to discuss the benefits that might derive from the adoption of the institutionalist approach in economics.

Was technological progress during and after the Industrial Revolution top-down or bottom-up? The technology that created the great inventions was driven by a combination of pathbreaking ideas and the dexterity and skills of trained artisans. While those forms of human capital were quite different, they both came out of small elites of intellectuals and craftsmen, what are rapidly becoming known as “upper-tail human capital.” I analyze the institutions that drove the incentives for both, and show that they came together to produce the Great Enrichment. These incentives were both material and social: between 1500 and 1700, the search for financial security and reputation cooperated in producing a unique institutional environment in which the elites in Western Europe produced the three legged-stool of European modernity: the Reformation, the Scientific Revolution, and the Enlightenment. Once these three movements had succeeded, the foundation for modern economic growth had been laid.

In this paper, two models of long-run development are constructed, one for a unimodal agricultural structure and the other for a bimodal agricultural structure. The process of the evolution of state institutional capacity under these two structures is analyzed. Capacity is measured by the ability of the state to extract revenue in return for which services are provided. The development of such capacity is seen as the key factor in providing the human capital and infrastructure necessary for the shift from inward- to outward-oriented development. Latin America and East Asia are used as examples of these two modes of long-run development.

Institutional inertia as one of the underlying reasons for hysteresis is often ascribed to external factors such as the distribution of wealth and income. Complementing these findings, the paper focuses on important internal factors, which render institutions stable and which prevent fast institutional changes, namely the role of mental models. Their importance is derived from the analysis of an important set of institutions, which can be described as enabling rules. Such rules enable actors to do certain things, such as speaking a language or playing chess. In doing so, enabling rules arguably require complementary mental models, which contain not only knowledge about the rules and the context in which they are applied, but also about how to apply the rules successfully. An important implication of this conceptualisation is that institutions and their representation are interdependent and mutually stabilising.

For various reasons, governments sometimes fail to provide public goods. Private provision of such goods might then be used if it succeeds in overcoming three main problems: high organization costs, the assurance problem, and the free-rider problem. We argue that technologies that enable crowdfunding – the method of funding projects by raising small amounts of money from a large number of people via the internet – have enabled these problems to be overcome more readily. Such technology has lowered organization costs and enabled the employment of more efficient mechanisms to reduce the assurance and free-rider problems. To illustrate these effects, we present two case studies of private provision of public goods via crowdfunding: police services in Rockridge in Oakland, California, and the Ukraine Army.

Economic freedom is robustly associated with income growth, but does this association extend to the poorest in a society? In this paper, we employ Canada's longitudinal cohorts of income mobility between 1982 and 2018 to answer this question. We find that economic freedom, as measured by the Fraser Institute's Economic Freedom of North America (EFNA) index, is positively associated with multiple measures of income mobility for people in the lowest income deciles, including (a) absolute income gain; (b) the percentage of people with rising income; and (c) average decile mobility. For the overall population, economic freedom has weaker effects.

This paper provides an empirical analysis linking two theories of firms' strategic behavior. We analyze corporate strategies in the emerging global market for liquefied natural gas. First, following Porter, we identify three strategic target market positions: chain optimization, flexibility strategy, and national oil companies (NOCs). Each target market position is supported by an underlying resource profile. Second, following transaction cost economics, we hypothesize that specific investments under uncertainty provide incentives to integrate vertically. We test these economic relationships empirically applying a two-stage procedure. Estimation results show that the three strategic choices of target market position, resource profile, and organizational structure are interrelated. We show that NOCs rely on less idiosyncratic assets than companies following a flexibility strategy and companies following a flexibility strategy rely on less idiosyncratic assets than chain optimizers. An increase in hold-up potential results in a higher probability of a firm organizing transactions within its own hierarchy.

The notion that business corporations should be managed for the exclusive benefit of shareholders has been widely challenged. In particular, critics have argued that directors are authorised to serve the interests of the corporation: a legal entity that is completely separate from its shareholders. However, the premise that shareholders have sole legitimate claim to ‘membership’ has rarely been questioned. This article explores medieval thought on ownership, authority and participation in guilds, churches, towns and universities, and shows that membership can be understood as participation in, and shared responsibility for, a group's distinct collaborative activity over time. Our theory suggests that ‘membership’ in the modern corporation extends to non-shareholding stakeholders, but with the implication that ownership and authority are vested in the members as a body and not in a separate entity.

Many years ago, Emmanuel Todd came up with a classification of family types and argued that the historically prevalent family types in a society have important consequences for its economic, political, and social development. Here, we evaluate Todd's most important predictions empirically. Relying on a parsimonious model with exogenous covariates, we find mixed results. On the one hand, authoritarian family types are, in stark contrast to Todd's predictions, associated with increased levels of the rule of law and innovation. On the other hand, and in line with Todd's expectations, communitarian family types are linked to racism, low levels of the rule of law, and late industrialization. Countries in which endogamy is frequently practiced also display an expectedly high level of state fragility and weak civil society organizations.

Can foreign aid help free the press? Aid may boost press freedom by incentivizing government to reduce media regulations and provide financial support for infrastructure. Alternatively, foreign aid may prevent press freedom by expanding the role of the state and promoting government over private enterprises. We contend that the magnitude of foreign aid's influence is conditional on the existence of democratic checks. Using panel data from 1994 to 2010, we find evidence suggesting that aid significantly increases press freedom in democracies but insignificantly relates to press freedom in autocracies. Collectively, the results suggest that a standard deviation increase in aid to a country at the mean level of democracy increases press freedom by approximately a 1/20th standard deviation. Overall, the findings suggest that donors should be cautious as most aid recipients are not democratic and aid leads to only relatively small marginal improvements in press freedom.

I investigate the historical development of limited liability – widely considered a cornerstone of the business corporation – and challenge the commonplace linear narratives about how limited liability evolved. I dismiss the claim that limited liability was invented with the very first joint-stock business corporations around 1600. I also reject the assertion that it became dominant with the limited liability acts of the mid-19th century. My argument is that it was only around 1800 that limited liability became a separate corporate attribute, distinct from legal personality, and that limited liability in the modern sense became a uniform attribute of all corporations only in the 20th century. Since corporations, stock markets and the corporate economy enjoyed a long and prosperous history well before limited liability in its modern sense became established and dominant, the economic theory of limited liability needs to be revisited. The paper opens a new set of conceptual, empirical and theoretical research questions, and points to new possibilities in terms of viable future liability regimes.