This paper investigates the pricing effects of financial innovation in an economy with endogenous participation and heterogeneous income risks. The introduction of non-redundant assets endogenously modifies the participation set, reduces the covariance between dividends and participants' consumption and thus leads to lower risk premia. In multisector economies, financial innovation spreads across markets through the diversified portfolio of new entrants, and has rich effects on the cross-section of expected returns. The price changes can also lead some investors to leave the markets and give rise to non-degenerate forms of participation turnover. The model is consistent with several features of financial markets over the past few decades: substantial innovation, higher participation, significant turnover in investor composition, improved risk management practices, a slight increase in real interest rates, and a reduction in risk premia.

Previous studies offer a mixed understanding of the economic role of stock repurchases. This paper investigates three key economic motivations—mispricing, disgorging free cash flow, and increasing leverage—by evaluating cross-sectional differences in both the initial market reaction and long-run performance. The initial reaction provides some support for the mispricing story. However, subsequent earnings-related information shocks suggest that the initial market reaction is incomplete and that long-run performance may be informative. The long-horizon return evidence is most consistent with the mispricing hypothesis and, to some degree, the free cash flow hypothesis. We find little support for the leverage hypothesis.

Many financial institutions employ outside portfolio managers to manage part or all of their investable assets. It is well recognized that outside portfolio managers are unwilling to share security information with each other or with the centralized decision maker and this in general will lead to sub-optimal portfolios. In this paper, we derive an implementable set of rules under which a central decision maker can make optimal decisions without requiring decentralized decision makers to reveal estimates of security returns. Furthermore, we derive conditions under which these rules hold and when they do not hold.

This paper presents a consumption-based model that explains the equity premium puzzle through two channels. First, because of borrowing constraints, the shareholder cannot completely diversify his income risk and requires a sizable risk premium on stocks. Second, because of limited stock market participation, the precautionary saving demand lowers the risk-free rate but not stock return and generates a substantial liquidity premium. This model also replicates many other salient features of the data, including the first two moments of the risk-free rate, excess stock volatility, stock return predictability, and the unstable relation between stock volatility and the dividend yield.

We investigate the pricing of 4,989 equity IPOs with offer dates between 1981 and 2000. Approximately three-fourths of these IPOs have integer offer prices. Average initial returns for IPOs with integer offer prices are significantly higher (24.5%) than those priced on the fraction of the dollar (8.1%). This result is robust through time and after conditioning for other effects known to influence initial returns. We hypothesize that integer vs. fractional dollar IPOs are the result of negotiations between the issuing firm and underwriter. Under this negotiation hypothesis, the frequency of integer pricing should be an increasing function of the offer price and the degree of uncertainty surrounding the value of the firm. Empirical evidence, supportive of the negotiation hypothesis, is presented.

The literature offers many explanations for why the IPO market cycles from hot to cold. These include theories in which hot markets represent clusters of IPOs in a new industry, and signaling models that predict that hot markets draw in better quality firms. Others suggest hot market IPOs' stock returns reflect their poor quality. We compare IPOs over cycles during 1975–2000 and find that hot and cold IPO markets do not differ so much in the characteristics of the firms that go public as in the quantity of firms that go public. Both hot and cold IPOs are largely concentrated in the same narrow set of industries and they have few distinctions in profits, age, or growth potential. Our results suggest that hot markets are not driven primarily by changes in adverse selection costs, managerial opportunism, or technological innovations, but more likely reflect greater investor optimism.

I argue that overallocation is used as a marketing strategy to increase the offer price and aftermarket price of an initial public offering (IPO). I show that, when there is weak demand, it can be optimal for the underwriter to oversell an issue and take a naked short position. The issuing firm benefits from a higher expected offer price. This is in spite of the fact that, in equilibrium, allocating more shares when there is weak demand requires greater underpricing when there is strong demand.

This paper examines intra-day trading data from the inter-dealer broker market for U.S. Treasury securities and measures the degree of price pressure in the off-the-run Treasury market. As is well known, securities that would appear to be very close substitutes, i.e., on-the-run and off-the-run Treasury bonds, behave as if there is some degree of market segmentation. This is the first systematic study of the off-the-run Treasury note and bond market focused entirely on a price pressure effect using intra-day data. The paper analyzes price pressure through matched pairs of securities that differ only in liquidity.

Using a sample of emerging market closed-end funds, I find evidence that indirect investment barriers exert powerful effects on asset pricing differences across countries. I show that not only do indirect investment barriers contribute to international capital market segmentation, but also they can lead to segmentation even in the absence of strong capital inflow restrictions. This result is consistent with Bekaert and Harvey's (1995) conclusion that “other markets appear segmented even though foreigners have relatively free access to their capital markets” (p. 403). The empirical results of this paper provide a rational market segmentation explanation of both premiums and discounts in emerging market closed-end funds, and they are consistent with the deterrent effect of indirect barriers on equity flows to emerging markets found in the capital flow literature.

This paper analyzes the optimal quality decision of a producer in a multi-period setting with reputation effects. Using a unique database of returns on real estate limited partnerships (RELPs), we empirically examine alternative theoretical predictions of optimal producer strategy. In particular, we test whether the producers in our market invest in reputation building by initially selling high quality goods and then lowering quality. Using a variety of statistical tests, we find evidence consistent with reputation building, both in the aggregate and for individual developers.