This Opinion Note continues the discussion started in Antonio Donini and Daniel Maxwell's “From Face-to-Face to Face-to-Screen: Remote Management, Effectiveness and Accountability of Humanitarian Action in Insecure Environments”, published previously in the Review, by exposing the realities of Médecins Sans Frontières' (MSF) struggle with the issue of remote management. By reviewing MSF's experience with remote management in Somalia and Afghanistan, the authors explore how operational compromise evolves over time, based on specific contextual factors, and highlight the challenges that this form of compromised action poses to MSF's identity and principles.

Common Article 3 to the four Geneva Conventions encourages the parties to a non-international armed conflict to bring into force international humanitarian law provisions through the conclusion of special agreements. Since armed groups are ever more frequent participants in contemporary armed conflicts, the relevance of those agreements as means to enhance compliance with IHL has grown as well. The decision-making process of special agreements recognizes that all the parties to the conflict participate in the clarification and expansion of the applicable rights and obligations in a way that is consistent with the principle of equality of belligerents. This provides incentives for armed groups to respect the IHL rules they have themselves negotiated. However, even upon the conclusion of such agreements, it remains unclear which legal regime governs them. This paper will argue that special agreements are governed by international law instead of domestic law or a sui generis legal regime.