The principle of prohibiting forced labour exists in both treaty and customary international law. However, there are limits to this prohibition, in that certain types of forced labour are actually permitted; this is the case for forced labour performed by prisoners of war (PoWs). This paper examines the legal regime applicable to such labour. It starts by setting out the current rules, following a brief historical review. It then explains the shortcomings of those rules, which are open to abuse and are not focused exclusively on the rights and interests of the PoWs, before proposing two possible ways of improving the situation by means of a systemic approach. The first is based on international humanitarian law itself, while the second is based on the complementary relationship between that body of law and international human rights law. Such improvements would give PoWs the right to perform any available work while continuing to require them to carry out work exclusively dedicated to running the PoW camp.

When do non-international armed conflicts (NIACs) end? Determining the existence of a NIAC requires a detailed, fact-intensive inquiry. Since the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia's seminal decision in the Tadić case, international courts and tribunals have evaluated the existence of NIACs under the Tadić test's two-pronged inquiry into intensity and organization. Although that decision also pronounced that international humanitarian law (IHL) continues to apply until a “peaceful settlement is achieved,” neither international tribunals nor scholars have articulated a comparably widely accepted and well-developed test for determining the end of NIACs.

At the same time – and especially since 9/11 – States have increasingly relied on IHL to meet the threat posed by non-State actors, broadening the scope of conflict-related liabilities in armed conflict without conferring the privileges or immunities otherwise inherent in IHL. This one-sided approach twists the purpose of IHL and places members of organized armed groups into legal black holes without temporal limitations, as States resist the termination of “armed conflict” irrespective of the continuing intensity of violence or the level of organization of non-State actors. Ultimately, the current approach gives States broad discretion without appropriate safeguards, which undermines the proper application of human rights and humanitarian principles within conflict and prevents the establishment of a sustainable peace.

This paper argues that the most appropriate test for ascertaining the end of a NIAC is one that combines objective consideration of the diminution of organized and intense hostilities below the Tadić threshold with the likelihood that hostilities will not again rise above that threshold. It thus draws from but does not fully endorse the preferred approach of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which focuses on the lasting termination of hostilities,1 while abjuring a general temporal limitation. Although commendable for its effort to avoid the legal uncertainty that attends the revolving conflict classification problem, the ICRC's approach unfortunately tends to encode existing uncertainty surrounding the termination of NIACs and to indistinctly prolong the application of IHL to erstwhile conflict situations. In contrast, the authors suggest that a test for the end of NIAC based on a specific period (five months following the diminution of organized and intense hostilities below the Tadić threshold), subject to an evaluation of the risk that those hostilities may resume, better balances certainty of legal application with the promotion of a return to peace. The authors will employ the facts of diverse case studies, including the FARC in Colombia, the LTTE in Sri Lanka, numerous armed groups in Mali, and the United States with Al-Qaeda, to build a legal standard that courts can use to determine IHL's continuing applicability to an erstwhile armed conflict.

This article aims to highlight the importance of determining the temporal scope of the transition from armed conflict to peace. It will also consider the emergence of a new legal paradigm, jus post bellum, applicable to the post-conflict period, and the associated need for an appropriate regulatory framework. Given the unavoidable impact of armed conflict, the post-conflict period deserves particular attention, especially with regard to the need for a legal framework to facilitate the sustainable reconstruction of communities torn apart by conflict and ensure a lasting peace. After any kind of armed conflict, a solid legal framework is essential to finalize the end of hostilities, begin a sustainable peace process, build a united society and address the rifts caused by armed violence.

Neutral States must abstain from supporting a party to a conflict with military equipment and assistance. This core aspect of the law of neutrality has not changed with the adoption of the UN Charter in 1945, or with the brutal Russian aggression against Ukraine. That said, by reviewing the changes to neutrality law over time, this article finds plausible reasons to believe that neutrality has – for better or worse – become optional for the vast majority of States, which can today opt to be non-belligerent States – i.e., States that are neither neutral nor parties to the armed conflict. All States have to cooperate to bring to an end serious violations of international law, including humanitarian law, and this duty of cooperation has abolished “sitting-still neutrality”, but it does not render neutrality law moot. This reading of “optional but not qualified” neutrality maintains the core neutrality idea of abstaining in military matters. In this article, I argue that views of “obsolete” or “qualified” neutrality are not new at all but depart from well-accepted rules of legal interpretation and raise concerns about double standards. Viewing neutrality as optional but unqualifiable offers greater conceptual clarity, is more honest than alternative views, and comes with advantages for humanitarian action.

Three decades after the United Nations Security Council invoked its Chapter VII powers to create the ad hoc criminal tribunals, there can be little doubt that the prosecution of individuals responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law (IHL) contributes to restoring and maintaining peace. While there is little doubt that the reparatory function of justice is just as crucial as retribution, under international law today, reparations for IHL violations remain harrowingly insufficient or borderline non-existent. In scholarship and strategic litigation, various attempts have been made to distil an individual right to reparations from black-letter IHL. This article argues that such approaches are doomed to fail, as procedural aspects of international obligations rarely, if ever, emerge through the evolution of an existing customary international obligation, let alone via the crystallization of a new customary international norm. They are usually triggered by a political shift that makes States adopt novel regulations setting forth the jurisdictional ramifications of enforcing a pre-existing right or obligation. This article thus advances a two-fold argument. First, it asserts that States’ increased compliance with the obligation to provide compensation for violations of IHL attributable to them would contribute to “the restoration and maintenance of peace” just as much as the prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations thereof. Second, it argues that the individual right to claim reparations for IHL violations can only be established through a political decision of States, and that the establishment of an international mechanism for Ukraine might be an important precedent for the evolution of the current international system.

Does targeting combatants really provide a military advantage during an armed conflict? The limitations on the use of force against civilians and means and methods of warfare are well developed under contemporary international humanitarian law (IHL), but the issue of targetability of adversary combatants remains underdeveloped. This paper builds on contemporary developments in international human rights law and moral just war theory to offer a revised lex ferenda look at the basic principles of IHL through the internalization of the value of the lives of combatants. It is argued that such a reading of IHL would allow for a rejection of the automatic necessity of targeting combatants, and hence give due consideration to the value of life of combatants (both adversary combatants and own combatants) in the evaluation of the use of force during armed conflicts, including through reduced military advantage, force protection, and adjusted proportionality analysis.

2024 will mark seventy-five years since the adoption of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Despite the drafters’ efforts to mitigate the worst horrors of armed conflict, contemporary conflicts continue to witness the death and suffering of millions. This raises fundamental concerns over the ability of international law to alleviate the harm caused to those caught up in armed conflict, to redress violations and to prevent their recurrence. In international policy, international humanitarian law (IHL) is increasingly intertwined with transitional justice and in particular its emphasis on the centrality of human rights. This article focuses on the intersection between IHL and transitional justice in protracted conflicts, interrogating their increasing overlaps, complementary intersections and even tensions. In particular, the article examines the importance of the temporal dimensions of humanity and justice in prevention of violations. In doing so, the article concentrates on the impact of time on those harmed by armed conflict and the repercussions this has on the law and justice efforts. The article argues that time can be weaponized to frustrate accountability and prevent interference with belligerents’ behaviour. Victims in war cannot wait until the end of fighting to seek the recovery of the remains of their loved ones, for those responsible to be brought to justice, and for redress of their continuing suffering. Indeed, such delays amount to violations of victims’ right to an effective remedy and fail to stop the continuation of violations or the re-victimization of civilians and their communities. The article suggests the need for “provisional justice”, whereby, in the increasing number of situations of protracted conflict, efforts to redress conflict-related violations should be, at least in part, dealt with at the time, rather than waiting until the end of hostilities, so as to mitigate harm to victims and to correct belligerents’ behaviour in order to prevent recurrence.

As usage of military artificial intelligence (AI) expands, so will anti-AI countermeasures, known as adversarials. International humanitarian law offers many protections through its obligations in attack, but the nature of adversarials generates ambiguity regarding which party (system user or opponent) should incur attacker responsibilities. This article offers a cognitive framework for legally analyzing adversarials. It explores the technical, tactical and legal dimensions of adversarials, and proposes a model based on foreseeable harm to determine when legal responsibility should transfer to the countermeasure's author. The article provides illumination to the future combatant who ponders, before putting on their adversarial sunglasses: “Am I conducting an attack?”

The protection of non-combatants in times of autonomous warfare raises the question of the timeliness of the international protective emblem. (Fully) Autonomous weapon systems are often launched from a great distance, and there may be no possibility for the operators to notice protective emblems at the point of impact; therefore, such weapon systems will need to have a way to detect protective emblems and react accordingly. In this regard, the present contribution suggests a cross-frequency protective emblem. Technical deployment is considered, as well as interpretation by methods of machine learning. Approaches are explored as to how software can recognize protective emblems under the influence of various boundary conditions. Since a new protective emblem could also be misused, methods of distribution are considered, including encryption and authentication of the received signal. Finally, ethical aspects are examined.

In times of armed conflict, disasters and violence, people may become separated from their families, go missing or die, or become victims of ill-treatment and sexual violence. Under international humanitarian law, States have obligations to prevent harm and address humanitarian needs. At State level, the medicolegal system is conventionally mandated to address these needs and fulfil related legal obligations. In practice, State responses can sometimes be non-existent, limited by the endemic functionality of existing systems, or degraded by crises of violence, natural disasters and migration. These conditions can, in turn, impede the establishment of peace, reparations, restorative justice efforts and post-conflict reconstruction. This paper explains what a medicolegal system is and the entities that encompass it. The paper highlights the importance of developing clear policies, regulation and procedures that ensure proper functioning of the system. It reviews common gaps and challenges that limit State prevention and response to issues of humanitarian concern. Finally, recommendations when developing and implementing humanitarian programmes to strengthen medicolegal systems are provided, with a particular focus on the content of protection dialogue in diplomatic fora.

To encourage further interrogation of the language of “survivor-centredness” in the field of conflict-related sexual violence, this article offers a case study of efforts to build and intensify more survivor-centred pedagogy for use in the training of humanitarian workers seeking to address sexual violence in conflict and emergency settings. Set against the backdrop of a literature review of existing usages, it builds on key aspects of an earlier evaluation in which all three authors were involved in different capacities.

What rules of fighting (armed combat) does Hinduism espouse? The sacred texts are the pre-eminent sources, so these need to be summarized and compared to each other. Teaching mostly through stories, the texts describe deeds of people (especially warriors), gods and demons to show how to behave and not to behave in war. While the injunctions in the Mahābhārata and Arthaśāstra are already covered in the literature, including in this journal, this present work examines the Purāṇas in depth. After a thorough search of all relevant passages, we find the Purāṇas to be very similar to the epics in terms of the list of prescribed and proscribed actions in war that they provide. We also make comparisons to international humanitarian law (IHL); as in the epics, we find that the Purāṇas contain many similar provisions to those found in IHL but that they go above and beyond what is required by IHL in urging that fighting be fair at the tactical level (i.e., between individual fighters). Being religious texts, the Purāṇas also deal with the afterlife consequences of both righteous and unrighteous combat.

This article delves into Sweden's evolving legal response to international crimes, notably focusing on the 2021 War Poses case before the Swedish Supreme Court. The case involves an Iraqi asylum-seeker charged with violating the personal dignity of several persons, presumed to be deceased, during a 2015 non-international armed conflict in Kirkuk, Iraq. A key contention is whether deceased individuals can be considered “protected persons” under Swedish war crimes legislation. The article examines the Swedish Supreme Court's decision, which deems deceased individuals as protected persons, drawing on the Rome Statute's Elements of Crimes. It examines the complexities surrounding the application of international humanitarian law (IHL) to cases involving the deceased and explores potential misinterpretations arising from the Court's brief and ambiguous reasoning. As Sweden grapples with the complexities of international criminal law, the article advocates for clarity and comprehensive discussion to ensure that justice is served while upholding accurate and harmonized definitions of fundamental concepts of IHL.