¹ See, inter alia, Brown, , Adams, William and Opie, Redvers, American Foreign Assistance, Washington, 1953Google Scholar; Bingham, , Jonathan, B., Sbirt-Sleeve Diplomacy, New York, 1954Google Scholar; Mack, Robert, T. Jr, Raising the World's Standard of Living, New York, 1953Google Scholar; Hoselitz, , Bert, F., ed., The Progress of Underdeveloped Areas, Chicago, 1952Google Scholar; Buchanan, N. S. and Ellis, H. S., Approaches to Economic Development, New York, 1955Google Scholar; Staley, , Eugene, , The Future of Underdeveloped Countries, New York, 1954Google Scholar; Sharp, , Walter, R., International Technical Assistance; Programs and Organization, Chicago, 1952Google Scholar, and ibid., “The Institutional Framework for Technical Assistance: A Comparision of UN and US Experience” International Organization, VII, p. 342–379.

² The author in his private capacity is alone responsible for all statements of fact and opinion contained in this article, which does not necessarily reflect the views of the UN, any specialized agency, or the government of Egypt. The author is indebted to Professor H. Paul Castleberry of the State College of Washington, formerly Fulbright Scholar in Egypt, for valuable assistance in assembling part of the factual data on which the article is based.

³ See Egypt and tie United Nations, a study to be published shortly under the joint sponsorship of the Egyptian Society of International Law and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, in the Endowment's series of National Studies on International Organization. The writer was privileged to examine this study in manuscript.

⁴ These figures are taken from the annual Reports of the UN Technical Assistance Board.

⁵ The information in this table was supplied by courtesy of the directors of the various UN agency offices in Egypt.

⁶ In the case of FAO, agency relations with Israel are now handled directly form the Rome headquarters; UNESCO has maintained a special branch office in Istanbul, which covers Israel; ICAO has had difficulty in obtaining the agreement of Israel and the Arab states to the designation of a centre for air flight control for the Eastern Mediterranean; for WHO's situation, see below, p. 240–241.

⁷ There appear at times to have been pressures from the Egyptian government for the enlargement of agency field officers located on its territory, in particular that of FAO.

⁸ See Ascher, , Charles, S., “Current Problems in the World Health Organization's Program,” International Organization, VI, p. 27–50Google Scholar.

⁹ Article 50.

¹⁰ In the 1956 program only India, Pakistan, Indonesia and Burma, in that older, are slated to receive larger allocations of funds than Egypt. UN Document E/TAC/L.86, November a, 1955.

¹¹ Figures compiled from annual TAB Reports through 1954, and from the 1955 program for Egypt as approved by TAB. July 1, 1955.

¹² Four of them were Egyptians employed in a technical capacity on specialized agency projects.

¹³ Figures provided by courtesy of the Program Officer of the U.S. Operations Mission in Cairo.

¹⁴ During this period Egypt served as one of the places of foreign study for about the same number of UN agency fellows from other (chiefly Arab) areas. (UN Document E/TAC/SC.1/Rev.1, June 6, 1955).

¹⁵ From all accounts, considerable “overselling” by zealous UN agency representatives took place in other areas during the early years of ETAP.

¹⁶ The Egyptian government set up in 1953 two interministerial bodies at the “undersecretary” level with the task of establishing development goals and drafting specific project proposals for cabinet consideration. One of these was the National Production Council, and the other the National Welfare Services Council. Each is staffed by a small technical secretariat. Through weekly meetings of the presidents and secretaries-general of the two councils an attempt is made, not very effectively, to coordinate action proposals falling within the economic and welfare spheres, respectively. There is, unfortunately, no very clear differentiation between planning and operational responsibilities as regards the two councils and the subject-matter ministries. Early in 1955. with a view to expediting government action on development projects, a National Planning Commission, headed by the Prime Minister, was established as a cabinet-level committee.

¹⁷ For example: on one occasion the Ministry of Agriculture is reported to have requested FAO to provide an underground water expert for aid in land reclamation work; concurrently, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry asked UNESCO for a similarly qualified specialist to advise on mining operations. Both requests were approved by the coordinating committee and submitted to the agencies concerned. When they reached TAB, they were sent back for consolidation.

¹⁸ ECOSOC Resolution 542 B II (XVIII), subsequently approved by the General Assembly in its Resolution 831 B (IX).

¹⁹ US-UNTAA Coordination—Instructions to USOM, April 30, 1955.

²⁰ One expert informed the writer that he was offered a field appointment without the appointing agency's having consulted the national committee set up by his own government at TAB's request to aid in finding technical assistance talent in his country. The expert in question managed to mollify the committee for having been bypassed (doubtless by oversight) so that he could proceed to Cairo without waiting for the committee's formal blessing of his selection “through channels”.

²¹ Last year a special program for the training of secretaries, file clerks and office supervisors was initiated by the new Institute of Public Administration with the aid of a grant from the Ford Foundation.

²² In one case that came to the writer's attention a UN expert threatened to resign because the new chief of the administrative division he was advising refused to give him information essential for his work. The situation was eventually resolved only after an appeal over the head of the division chief to the minister.

²³ Should the Egyptian government accept UN technical experts from the Soviet bloc countries (now that the USSR and several of its satellites are participating in ETAP), ideological cleavages might well accentuate interpersonal tensions.

²⁴ The Egyptian press has repeatedly underscored the International Bank has made substantial loans to other Middle Eastern countries. According to press reports, negotiations with the bank for a $250 million loan to the Aswan High Dam project had reached an advanced stage at the time this article was prepared. New York Times, February 4, 1956.

²⁵ In a report to the General Assembly during its tenth session, the Secretary-General recognized the need of strengthening the staffs and expanding the substantive activities of the UN Information Centres. Document A/3041, November 30, 1955.

²⁶ Report of the US Senate Subcommittee on Technical Assistance Programs, 83d Congress, 2d Session (Washington, 1954), p. 126Google Scholar.

²⁷ Seventh Report of TAB, cited above, p. 191.

²⁸ Bingham, , Jonathan, , Shirt-Sleeve Diplomacy: Point Four in Action, New York, 1954, p. 193Google Scholar.

²⁹ Egypt was among the first fourteen states to accept membership in the International Finance Corporation (by March 1956). See Matecki, B. E., “Establishment of the International Finance Corporation: A Case Study,” this issue, p. 261–275Google Scholar.

³⁰ To cite one illustration of this: FAO has complained that WHO is inclined to invade FAO's province in the field of nutrition, ILO in agricultural education, and UNESCO in rural welfare.

³¹ UN Document E/TAC/L.82, July 7, 1955.

³² Three years ago, in an article that appeared in this review (VII, p. 342–379), the writer ventured to urge such action by the United States. The Eisenhower Administration, early in 1956, proposed to congress that in authorize funds that could be applied to specified U.S.-aided foreign projects of several years' duration, among them the Egyptian High Dam. So far as ETAP is concerned, the appropriation by Congress during 1955 of the 1956 U.S. contribution, and the expected continuation of this pattern in the future, represent a step toward improved financial stability of the program—although it advances information of available funds by only six to twelve months.

³³ The Middle East: A Political and Economic Survey, 2d edition, London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1955, p. 228Google Scholar.